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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction: Post-Modern ‘Cultural Identity’ and Human Rights 
 
In order to begin a discussion on Cultural Identity and Human Rights, I would first, rather prefer 
to place them in a mode within which this discussion is to take place -- a mode wherein we are 
able to locate the theoretical parameters of the concepts – Cultural Identity; and Human Rights. 
Initially, I would like to draw some attention into what it is in the terms ‘culture’, ‘identity’, 
‘recognition’, and ‘rights’ as to their spheres of exercise in the debates of comparative public and 
private discourse. Subsequently, the terminology post-modern, rather as we also see post-
colonial, in the later portions of my dissertation, is simply understood, as a deconstructed sense 
of the theoretical issues in question. Post-Modernism, and an array of literatures related to the 
theory of post-modernity and post-coloniality would be referred to in this Project, as to how the 
tools of this contemporary ‘ism’ is related to the practices of Multiculturalism and Human Rights 
in the long run.  
 
Hence, I would like to begin by throwing some light on the conceptual relevance of the Politics 
of Identity. The Politics of Identity, being referred to in here, depends upon an ‘essential’ version 
of culture. The conception of culture brings forth, at least in its initial phase of formulation, an 
inherent notion of ‘recognition’ – indeed, the struggles for recognition and the dialogical 
phenomenon of recognition in the debates underlined by Political Theory. The struggles for 
recognition, and the identities that underlie these struggles, are identified as being too pluralistic, 
and diverse and they themselves are in motion to a quest for a more definitive-recognized 
Identity. Thus, Identity Politics could be seen in the light of an ongoing struggle for being an 
inherent part of the process of democratic politics, in pursuance of fulfilling the credentials of the 
‘public’ norms of recognition.  
 
1.1 Identity: Basic Tools and Constituents 
 
As Jocelyn Maclure puts it -- ‘Identity politics must be thought of not only as struggles for 
recognition, but also as games of disclosure and acknowledgment. Accordingly, when we try to 
articulate the meaning of contemporary identity politics using the Hegelian language of 
recognition, we can but conclude that these struggles over “who we are” are means of enhancing 
self-respect and self-esteem (or dignity)’.  
 
Thus, the politics of recognition, as one of the driving forces of public reason, which is 
inevitably a defining character of democratic societies, does not seem to detach itself with the 
former. Consequently, it has become increasingly difficult to claim limits of Identity just so 
within the limits of the ‘private space’. In order to lay more focus on the struggle for recognition 
we are indirectly guided towards its ethical values in terms of self-knowledge, self-respect and 
self-esteem, leading to an opening up of the ‘misrecognized’ identities; and a process of 
deliberation with other subjects of the State about what should count as a more appropriate form 
of recognition. Along similar lines, group rights, rather than entailing an ‘essentialised’ 
conception of culture, can be seen as an expression of dissent towards the prevailing mode of 
governance and as particular moments in the ongoing quest for self-determination. 
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However, in addition to the quest for self-determination, comes into significance the much-
significant right to self-determination. There will be instances in this Project as to further 
groundings of the theory of self-determination – as to the contextual exploration of and a 
comparative analysis of how self-determination assumes the societal context in which we aspire 
to delve into, on account of its particularistic nature. We will see in further sections of the Thesis 
as to the foremost grounding of self-determination, the usage to which it is being put into, its 
correlation with the existing theoretical contours and how this right, as a progressive mode, can 
claim an ‘identity’ of its own amidst the discourse of the grand theory of Human Rights.   
 
Accordingly, Identity Politics can be thought of as manifestation in the political activity of trying 
to introduce new modes of being and also to distort or blurr the structures of validity and 
legitimacy and to rearrange the configuration of the societal functioning. As every particular 
embodiment of justice means domination for some, Identity Politics point towards the undefined 
practice of freedom. Moreover, although normative political theory has greatly contributed to the 
understanding of contemporary struggles for recognition, Identity politics must also be thought 
as a democratic activity that always overpowers the categories of this Normative Theory. 
 
As Anthony Appiah puts it -- ‘In my dictionary I find as a definition for “culture”: “The totality 
of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of 
human work and thought.” This is not, I think, quite right. There is, to begin with, no obvious 
incoherence in the idea of a non-human culture: we can reasonably speak of the culture of some 
primates or imagine, in science fiction, the culture of non-terrestrial creatures. But the definition 
surely picks out a familiar constellation of ideas. “Culture,” in one sense, does indeed name all 
the “products of human work and thought.”  
 
Hence, he refers to two tensions between the anthropologists’ idea of a culture and the idea of a 
civilization. First, there is nothing in the anthropologists’ idea that requires that the culture of a 
group should be a totality in any stronger sense than being what he called the mere logical sum 
of all the things they make and the actions they undertake. The second, connected, difference 
between what he calls the anthropological idea of culture and the idea of a civilization, is that the 
latter takes values to be more central to the enterprise, in two ways. First, the civilization of a 
group is centrally defined by its moral and aesthetic values: and the coherence of a civilization is, 
primarily, the coherence of those values with each other and, then, of the group’s behavior and 
institutions with its values. Second, civilizations are essentially to be evaluated. 
 
Using Appiah’s disjuncture between the ‘culture’ and ‘civilizations’, we are led into deeply 
ingrained tools and analysis of what comes into being as to when we refer to something as 
‘culture’, and the ethical differentiations it bears vis-à-vis a ‘civilization’. This already leads us 
into the exercise of practicing the usage of these concepts, in its particularity vis-à-vis a 
generality. Another connotation that can be derived from such a study could well take into 
account of laying the foundation for a relationship between anthropology and philosophy. As we 
will see in the further sections herein, as to how the conceptualization of something as ‘culture’ 
can lead us to thinking, and a re-thinking of these figures of political, social, economic and a 
cultural functioning.  
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1.2 Conceptualizing Culture in Political Theory 
  
As a follow-up to our discussion at hand, we now begin looking into the form of concept which 
this ‘culture’ is trying to acquire. A hint has already been made as to our perpetual efforts to 
avoid stepping into the ‘essentializing’ tendencies towards an understanding of these sociological 
terms. Though conceptualizing culture here would mean to know and be aware of the debates 
within a culture as well as outside a culture – the internality characterized by intra-culture 
differentiations, and an externality defined by a relation of a culture with another culture in its 
totality. Hence, putting ‘culture’ in this framework of Political Theory would be rather 
characterizing it in a framework wherein its relevance and practical implications might well be 
understood in the context of the dynamics of political behavior, a political setting – a politics 
governed by a set of rules and regulations of a particular kind of society we are trying to look 
into.  
 
To reiterate Appiah again herein -- ‘Using the words “civilization” and “culture” to distinguish 
two ways of thinking about the products of human work and thought, I don’t claim that these 
words now mark that distinction in ordinary speech. I want to point out now that the move from 
the cluster of ideas I have labelled the concept of “civilization” to the cluster I have called 
“culture” was the result of arguments, not a simple drift of usage’. 
 
A lot of violent and non-violent conflict-ridden history is a testimony to the fact that a 
‘misrecognition’ or even a misunderstanding arising out of these differing tendencies leads us to 
rethink towards a solution, a re-worked solution towards an avoidance or a cropping-up of this 
conflict at least in the near future. We refer a lot of times, to the issue of ‘identity-crisis’; the 
crisis to be understood in simple terms not just in wake of a human persona but even which is 
characterized by a group-identity indirectly and inherently summing up the individual identities 
of that particular group. Thus, a set of pattern emerges where we are trying to reach a bird-eye’s 
view of the existence of different groups with different set of beliefs, customs, and practices; 
ultimately in its finality making a distinction between the ‘I’ and the Other’.  
 
‘To see the Other as culturally different is no cause for applause and self-congratulation. . . . This 
marks not a moral nor an intellectual victory but a great trivialization of the encounter with the 
Other. . . . To say then that since we now see the non-European Other democratically as merely 
having a different culture, as being fundamentally ‘only’ culturally different, we have a more just 
idea of her, a less prejudiced and truer idea of her than did the nineteenth century who saw her on 
the horizon of historical evolutionary development, the Enlightenment who saw her on the 
horizon of ignorance, or the Renaissance who saw her on the horizon of the demonical, would be 
merely to reaffirm the Eurocentric idea of the progress of knowledge; i.e., it would be to 
instantaneously, retroactively, and totally transform this work from being an archaeology of the 
different conceptions of difference into being, once again, a history of the progress of 
anthropological knowledge and an affirmation and celebration of the teleology of truth.’ —
Bernard McGrane, Beyond Anthropology 
 
Things have considerably changed in our historical and epistemic worlds and now culture has 
recommended itself as the conceptual site both of the critique of Enlightenment Reason, and of 
the assertion and security of the epistemological privilege of local knowledge. It is needless to 
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deny the virtues of this displacement. There is a concern to offer a doubt that what culture-as- 
constructed-meaning has inaugurated is really a new egalitarian era of knowledge-relations 
between the West and its Others. 
 
Not to forget here, at this juncture, the relevance of knowledge-economy created by a generation 
of these tendencies as to how a culture can create and re-create a meaning or even subvert a 
meaning existing in its essential form. The distinction between the West and its ‘Others’ holds 
true to the extent when it is substantiated or justified by the creation of a version and a 
simultaneous creation of its ‘another’ version. To put it more explicitly, it is an Idea, a 
Contradiction which gives rise to a New Idea, wherein a direct lineage can be referred to 
Hegelian Dialectics in its basic form.  
 
If we consider one expression of this new awareness of the relevance of culture for liberal-
democratic theorizing, let’s say Amy Gutmann, someone close enough to the middle in the 
contemporary debate about multiculturalism who suggests that liberal democracies have become 
sites of controversy over whether and how its public institutions should recognize the identities 
of cultural and disadvantaged minorities. Hence, Gutmann refers here to the marginalized 
sections of the society who are indeed in a dire need to be recognized; the claims of who cannot 
be ignored at the behest of a dominant-prevalent stream of thought.  
 
And she goes on to conclude: ‘Recognizing and treating members of some groups as equals now 
seems to require public institutions to acknowledge rather than ignore cultural particularities, at 
least for those people whose self-understanding depends on the vitality of their culture. This 
requirement of political recognition of cultural particularity—extended to all individuals—is 
compatible with a form of universalism that counts the culture and cultural context valued by 
individuals among their basic interests’. 
 
Political culture is an attractive concept to characterize the specific preferences regarding politics 
in different political communities. However, it is a blurred concept because of the confusion 
between patterns of individual values and collective culture at the one hand, and the disputable 
separation between orientations and practices on the other. This contribution explores the 
potential of a Cultural Theory.  
 
The main advantage of the concept ‘political culture’ is to point out that political behavior has to 
be seen in a cultural context. Political behavior is directed by interpretations and preferences. 
The notion of culture stresses the importance of meanings, interpretations, justifications and 
discourses and more generally of cognitive and affective factors. The main ambiguity is rooted in 
the dual use of the term political culture to characterize both individuals and society. Political 
culture refers alternatively to the patterns of values of individuals, and to the cultural 
characteristics of society. Hence, it does bear a distinction in the form of an individual capacity 
and the ‘generality’ presented to the said individual. 
 
Hence, Political Culture does as well, renders itself to this duality and is trying to figure out itself 
within the binary concepts of Individualism and Communitarianism or in other words, Individual 
Rights and Group Rights. Though we will engage ourselves in a deep discussion as to the 
weighing-balance between the two, it would be pertinent to refer  here, briefly, as to how 
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Political Culture is intertwined in the debate between the two. But before indulging ourselves in 
that debate, let’s take a turn towards the final notion of my Project as to how these debates of 
‘Cultural Identity’ are related to and have an impinging effect upon the discourse of Human 
Rights. 
 
1.3 ‘Cultural Identity’ as a Determinant to Human Rights 
  
‘Cultural Identity’ as a determinant to Human Rights is a third trajectory of this Project in the 
explanation of how the ‘cultural identity’ being referred to here, has an implication upon and 
gives us a reason to think it in terms of determining the Human Rights Discourse. What is 
already discussed in detail in the last section of this work is a post-colonial understanding to 
Human Rights, as to the works of Ratna Kapur, Upendra Baxi, and certain other references to 
highlight the aversion to the essentialist discourse, as I address it here.  
 
In her articles on ‘Human Rights in the 21st Century’, Ratna Kapur mentions three normative 
claims on which the human rights project is based and exposes the ‘dark side’ of this project. She 
examines the larger context within which human rights has taken shape, and critiques the claim 
that human rights is a part of modernity’s narrative of progress; interrogates the assumption that 
human rights are universal, challenging its neutral and inclusive claims; and unpacking the 
liberal subject on which the human rights project is based and its correlating assumptions about 
the ‘Other’ who needs to be contained. She makes some tentative proposals as to how we can 
engage with human rights once its dark side is exposed. Hence, she unpacks three normative 
claims on which the human rights project is based and exposes its dark side. 
 
These works inspire us to understand the issues, in particular the Human Rights Discourse, from 
a parallel-running perspective, wherein we make an attempt to study a phenomenon of social 
science discourse from a bottom-up analysis, rather than just top-down. Apart from highlighting 
the inherent-abstract power of the narrative in this approach, this approach makes us realize how 
important it is to study the symbols, tools and concepts in Social, Political and Cultural Theory 
from the vantage view-point of the ‘Other’ in its ‘answering-back approach’ towards the existing 
mainstream theories. Hence, through this dimension, we are able to complete the Project by 
adding onto the ‘Other’ which I had been explicating so far. This can also be seen in the light of 
the ‘Other’ being substantiated by the subjects, in the form of people, especially with reference 
to the ‘East-centric’ or a Third World Approach.  
 
In the first section, she sets out the larger context within which human rights has taken shape, 
especially the claim that human rights is part of modernity’s narrative of progress - that is, 
human rights represents a step forward in the progress of human development and civilizational 
maturity. In the second part, she interrogates the assumption that human rights are universal, 
challenging its neutral and inclusive claims. In the third part, she examines the liberal subject on 
which the human rights project is based and its correlating assumptions about the ‘Other’, who 
needs to be contained. In the final part of the article, she makes some tentative proposals as to 
how we can engage with human rights once its dark side is exposed. The process of rejuvenating 
the  ‘alienated’ subjects of the past into the liberal democratic state through the discourse of 
human rights represents, for her, the metamorphosis of a racist state into one that is caring and 
compassionate.  
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Human rights become a site for reconciling moments of rupture and exclusion, and bringing the 
past into synch with the norms and values of liberalism, rather than bringing about a deeper 
interrogation of those norms and values. This belief in the transformative and progressive 
potential of human rights is contingent on an assumption that we have, as a civilized world, 
moved forward, and that the coming together of nation-states in the recognition of universal 
human rights is a critical part of the liberal project that seeks to advance individual rights and 
human desires. Thus, through Kapur we know not just the fallacies of liberalism but also how 
regressive this liberalism can be in the longer-run.  
 
Hence, an indirect comment is made on this tendency towards possessing a world-view of 
liberalism personified predominantly in the West, including also a ‘general’ view which the West 
tries to portray without realizing the local-particularistic conditions in which the ‘Other’ is 
located. Though the mention of the fact as ‘dark side’ might be reflective of too critical a 
tendency on the part of Kapur to refer to as Human Rights as being totally on the gloomy-side, as 
degenerative, a dark reality seen in the eyes of East as something totally unrelated to the 
practices of the East. But more than its literal interpretation, there is an entire theoretical 
background that Kapur delves into in order to make us realize the significance of the ‘Other’.  
 
Hence, this refers to an explanation based on the belief that history has an aim, a purpose and 
direction, together with an assumption that the world has emerged from a backward, an 
uncivilized era. There is this dark side to human rights work, which has been exposed by the 
postcolonial scholars, feminists and new scholars in international law. Thus, moving on from the 
theoretical contours we delve ourselves into the sundry other forms of literature, arts, music and 
painting that do have an immediate effect from an uncovering of the ‘latent aspects which Kapur 
helps us to do so, and which we will see once we delineate the conceptual parameters of our 
Project.  
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Traditions in Cultural Identity 
As a matter of our first step in locating the concepts and providing a definition and a re-
definition of the terminology of Political Theory, we begin step-by-step in identifying and 
questioning the significance of these terms. First, we make an attempt to define them, as is 
mentioned in the theoretical discourses, and then, we try to imbibe them in an inclusive sense as 
to how all these ‘individuated’ concepts relate to a bigger notion or a concept, leading to an 
entire set of Political Implications in Theory and Practice. Hence, let’s start defining and outling 
as to what is indeed a Culture.  
2.1 What is Culture ? 
‘An aesthetic of cognitive mapping – a pedagogical political culture which seeks to endow the 
individual subject with some new heightened sense of its place in the global system – will 
necessarily have to respect this now enormously complex representational dialectic and invent 
radically new forms in order to do it justice.’1 – Fredric Jameson in Postmodernism or the 
Cultural logic of Late Capitalism. 
 
‘Culture’ can be taken to be as a term, symbolic of a bearer of cultural traditions and practices 
which are often found wanting for always a “little more” than their present status. What is it that 
a culture has that makes it representative enough to be deemed of more “space”, specifically in 
the context of a multicultural society? Does it need to be granted the space it demands? What is 
the basis of preference, if at all, of one culture over the other? These are some of the questions 
that I would attempt to answer herein. 
 
To elaborate and give a further clarification to these questions, I put it in the following manner. 
Since traditions educate each other towards a way of a more peaceful community building, they 
bind the members of, not only the same community, but extend their harmony beyond its 
frontiers. Thus, I would locate the identity of a culture not only in its traditions and practices but 
also the effects and the imprints it bears upon the society around which it is thriving. This would 
lead us to re-locate the cultural identity based upon these reworked and reformulated criteria. 
 
To begin speaking of cultural traditions is to first place them in a particularistic mode of 
expression. Each culture bears upon it the bearings of its historical tradition or legacy. In 
addition, it proposes some practices, some of which become institutionalized over a period of 
time. And some become a matter of practice even without the institutional recognition. Hence, a 
culture creates within itself a universal, that is, a universal within the particular culture. This is 
not to undermine the ‘particularity’ of a culture because essentially each one of them is distinct 
from the other, in one characteristic or the other. 
 
As well, not to forget at this juncture, that ‘culture’ brings with it some forms of rights which are 
inherent in the individuals, in its concreteness and in the ‘culture’ as such, in its abstractness. The 
rights are tokens for an individual to exercise their well-being and to be a part of the entire social 
paradigm in which he/she is located. The ‘abstractness’ within the culture also imposes certain 
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rights on the individual in the form of social rights or social obligations. An obligation becomes 
important when individuals possess a mutual right towards the well-being of each other. It is the 
common shared consciousness of all individuals within a ‘culture’. 
 
To apply the ‘mutuality’ outside one culture is the beginning of my problematic. At this stage, 
we begin by working out the factors which promote Consensus, if at all, to ensure the existence 
of all. First, we locate the concurrences or conjectures among two or more cultures in order to 
arrive at the consensus. Then, we understand the differences between them and reach a position 
which is equally advantageous to all. That ‘position’ is not absolute, but relative to the context. 
How to reach the position is one of the larger aims for creating an all-inclusive society, at a 
consequential successive stage. Considering the increasing migration and the increased 
interchange among the communities in the contemporary milieu, there is a need for sustaining 
the interests of all for avoiding the possibility of a conflict ,which resurfaces at any instance of 
contrasting ‘cultures’ unable to identify the linkages which are hidden among them. The cultural 
case- studies bring out in greater details the similarities and differences among them. It helps us 
to understand them from a perspective which, though I cannot claim to be different, but genuine 
and reasonable to gain greater knowledge. The physical proximity is a materialist interpretation 
of cultures, wherein one finds a lot of sameness among cultures spread among thousands of miles 
apart; the practices and styles do bear resemblance in most of the respects. 
 
Moving on herein, from the paradigm of culture, we look into the dimension of Identity. To 
clarify here the notion of Identity, must be studied first in a separate sphere, and then at a later 
stage, we bring in the two trajectories of Culture and the Identity. Hence, let’s first look into this 
Identity and indulge ourselves into its single and the multiple ramifications, on the same lines as 
we did with the ‘Culture’.  
 
II Identity, Identity formation and Identity Politics 
 
Identity is a sociological construct. A construct, though not purely sociological, but economical, 
political, religious, ethnic, caste, also post-modern which originates in factors constant to the 
environment, but works in a flux over a period of time. It is usually personified, though not 
always, as animals do have an identity; a wild one. But the pertinent issue at stake is that of a 
personified identity, useful as a good starting point for the discussion at hand. Identity can be of 
differing types, as mentioned, could be social, political, economic, religious, linguistic and many 
more depending upon the context with which it is to be associated. Human Identity, at many 
times, works in overlapping conjunctures of varying identities manifest in a single personhood. 
Aspects of an identity vary also according to the geopolitical conditions and the notion of time. 
 
The concept of Identity bears significance to the continual theoretical formulations of ‘identity’ 
as such, usually leading to a practice of one theory being subsequently challenged by the other. 
Also, practically, identity changes according to the context defining it as more a dynamic 
concept in practice than even in theory. In different contexts, identity can be defined in a number 
of ways. It may be defined primarily according to the socio-cultural and environmental factors 
that make an identity. In other words, the factors which make a way for the recognition of that 
particular Identity are the features that operate within a context, in which the identity is located. 
An Identity comes into being by a small number of contextual factors that add up to that identity. 
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It is an additive phenomenon that makes up for a consolidated identity. Though it is not just a 
summation of factors but bringing together of differently existing contextual factors that lead to 
an identity. It is ultimately formed out of the mixture of heterogeneous features. 
 
Every feature or factor contributes to that Identity though there may always be a variance among 
the degree to which they exercise their influence. Also, at times, there may be a change in this 
degree among different factors which may lead to a state of one toppling the other, in the 
exercise of influence. The contextual features might be, depending upon the context, the features 
constituting the societal dynamic milieu, the economic upheavals, the ethnic belongingness, the 
religious connotation et al. These features can be taken to be as constitutive of a society as such, 
in which the identity is located. The context may be as wider feasible as possible, though for 
understanding its particular association with the identity, it is relevant to have a closer look at 
one or two dominant factors that lead up to an existence of this consolidated identity. 
 
The use of Identity in politics is many-folded. One of the prominent among them being the case 
where identity is misrepresented or under-represented, which gives rise to a dire need for using 
Identity on a political front to bargain for a greater share in power-sharing mechanism. At times, 
it has also led to the creation of a separate state on the basis of specific linguistic identity or an 
ethnic identity, leading to creation of more separatist demands. It does embark upon a dangerous 
tendency of the fear of generating more separatist claims, leading to a more differentiated, 
decentralized though a fractured democracy. A centralizing force for a unitary policy does 
become relevant in such a circumstance when certain matters of common concern desire for a 
more universal and cross-cutting solutions. Hence, Identity works for both, the pros and cons of 
its contribution to a political system, especially democracy. However, in a totalitarian regime, the 
position of identity, as such, seems to be stifled by the single authoritarian ruler wherein it is a 
homological identity, without the existence of other varied identities. 
 
Especially in the contemporary era of immigration, human personhood undergoes a, displaced 
identity wherein his/her identity shifts with the shifting of the physical location, thus bringing 
about a kind of complex identity. A citizen bears upon certain traditions from the previous 
country of residence and then accommodates himself/herself to the newly existing 
circumstances. There is a great attempt to find a middle path of existence which concurs with the 
existing reality, with a reflection of the past. This definitely, leads to a distortion of the essential 
identity, which had been in its existence and leads to a crisis state or situation. A situation where 
the human personhood being constant, there happen multiple identities overlapping and 
coinciding at one and the same time. This subsequently leads to the beginning of the dynamics, 
rather the beginning of the flux of the inherent conceptual trajectory of identity. This marks an 
important landmark point for a number of sundry other trajectories which lead to a kind of 
cultural displacement, being one of them. It is at this stage that ‘identity’ enters into a stage of its 
dynamic evolution of multicultural identity. 
 
A similar instance can be recalled here by referring to this piece of literature by V.S. Naipaul 
named ‘The Mimic Men’. This novel brings out clearly the dilemmas of cultural displacement 
which the protagonist of this novel, Ralph Singh faces during the different phases of his life. 
Rather, it is a cultural experience which he indirectly undertakes in order to later realize the 
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feeling of ultimate disillusionment brought about by the shift in the ‘cultural contexts’1 of his 
life. 
 
Briefly stating, the novel was written in a boarding house in London. It is a retrospect. It is a 
first-person account of Ralph's life, ranging over his childhood in the fictional West Indian island 
of Isabella, his university days in London where he meets and marries a white woman. 
Ultimately, it also depicts his somewhat successful business and political careers back in 
Isabella. Ralph Singh is a colonial character, an intelligent and sensitive person confused by the 
plural but unequal society in which he's raised, for whom identity is a primary issue. 
 
One of the primary aims to bring in this literature is to showcase the effect of this ‘post-
coloniality’ which we are already in subtlety introducing as to prove our point of how ‘culture’ 
and ‘identity’ which we discussed above are related and are already bearing a testimony to the 
existence of the literature reflective of a biographical sketch of a subject, wherein the subject is 
experiencing a changing identity at every facet of life.  
 
Reflecting theoretically herein, briefly can be stated the conceptual significance of identity, in 
the words of Charles Taylor, in his essay ‘Politics of Recognition’. The following can be a good 
reference point for proceeding with the debate. Taylor, succinctly, puts up a view mentioning 
how the dynamics of an identity contributes to ‘authenticity’. As he says’……we are all aware of 
how identity can be formed or malformed through the course of our contact with significant 
others…..we have a continuing politics of equal recognition…..recognition plays an essential 
role in the culture that has arisen around this ideal.’1 
 
With Taylor in mind, we can foreground ourselves in bringing together the two trajectories – 
‘culture’ and ‘identity’ in one bracket, and see how one can work out a relationship between the 
two. 
 
III Culture and Identity: An Exploration of a Relationship 
 
The evolution of an identity is always accompanied by the evolution of a culture. The cultural 
factors always mould, shape and reshape an identity. An identity is also a more explicit, 
personified expression of a culture. The ingredients of an identity are basically derived from the 
aspects of a culture itself. Culture is something to be understood in the sense of more than a 
lifestyle. It is a necessary part of a human bearing, including in the first instance traditions which 
human beings bear upon themselves. The practice of a cultural tradition may change over a 
period of time but the respect always remains for that particular tradition. It is the acculturation 
that assumes significance in respect of our discussion herewith. Through the means of 
acculturation, there is a need for reaching a compromise between the old inherent traditions and 
the newly acquired ones, without losing the respect and dignity for either of them. 
 
Hence, an identity is affected by the externality of culture at any given point of time and in any 
given context. The existing political culture of a state, for instance, will affect the identity of a 
citizen in the nature of the characteristics of the political culture, say political participation, 
affecting the behavior of the newly emigrated citizens since the political culture of states is at 
variance with each other. Identity modulates at this point of time though it is not just one factor 
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that reformulates the new identity but a number of other factors that shape or remold the new 
identity. It is the overarching framework of culture, the extending externality that makes it 
necessitated also in turn to be affected by the newly emerging identities. The culture makes an 
entry into the identity by appealing to its inherent characteristics, mentioned above and also 
some other factors. These factors account for the major portion, in terms of cultural traditions 
and practices primarily practiced within a specific community, which render it inevitable to enter 
into the identity. Secondarily, though, it might also be the positive effects thrown into gear by an 
inherent culture that permits an adaptation to a culture rather than being affected by them in the 
‘necessity’ dimension. Hence, this leads to a consonance between the two – culture and identity 
– on the complementarities of culture improvising the identity. This occurs, basically through the 
doors opened in terms of a ‘thinking’ of an individual, ‘actions’ performed by an individual and 
the ‘responsibilities’ undertaken by an individual, wherein his/her identity is characterized by the 
outer culture which fulfils the desired function. To state it simply, culture completes the 
functioning of the organism of identity which had parts of vacuum, rather to be filled only by the 
culture. Thus, emerges a direct relationship between the two, in a way, culture directly affects the 
aspects of an identity, thus molding it or rather reshaping it to give a substantial sense to it, in a 
way of ‘completing’ the identity. 
 
This leads to the new identity, a reformulated identity which is deemed to emerge in wake of the 
cultural necessities. To put it briefly, a culture necessitates the development of this new identity. 
This is so because what a culture propounds in theory, the identity performs it in action. This 
marks the beginning of a consensual relationship between the two, wherein the moment an 
identity reaches a stage of saturation or becomes static; culture does reshape it to a newer level of 
operationalization of the societal functions. An identity does become more used to the dynamic 
motion of rapid action where the culture lends it the features which make it durable to perform 
not only in a particular context but across many contexts. A reformulated identity is not 
dependant on any time conditions or so as it may change according to the need of the hour. By 
accepting the culture, it makes itself more vibrant and diverse to ensure its viability for as long as 
it possible. Hence, a culture sustains itself as long as the societal demands find their usefulness 
with the existence of this particular identity, which is already on its way to become universal. 
 
Hence, to reflect Taylor here again, he gives us a political ontology that stresses the interactive 
component of individual identity-formation: As he says "Identities are formed in open dialogue, 
unshaped by a predefined social script...” To be sure, if identities are formed inter-subjectively 
and – all things being equal -- without a "predefined social script," it would seem that cultural 
rules and traditions, insofar as they govern interaction and set terms of self-identification, would 
impinge upon the ideal of authenticity, that is, unless they can be accounted for within this 
matrix of a struggle for recognition. In other words, cultural influences imposed on participants 
from the outside would be a form of misrecognition, and only those cultural identifications 
produced among the participants themselves as part of an ongoing dialogical process would 
count as authentic cultural substance. This seems to be a fair account of the development and 
maintenance of cultural goods in the context of Taylor's paradigm, but it runs into tension when 
one thinks about the boundaries of cultures. 
 
Instead of entertaining a concept of culture that circulates and revitalizes itself among 
cooperating individuals in ongoing dialogue, Taylor does not address the relationship between 
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the development of individual identity to an ongoing development of collective identity, but 
simply posits cultural substance as a given that can be identified independently of its 
participants. This leads to a rather absolutist and inaccessible concept of culture, one to which we 
can ascribe as a singular and homogeneous unity with determinate boundaries. ‘Cultural claims’ 
are left in want for an internal link to the claims of its members, and it is through this detachment 
that cultural substance comes to be an end in itself. 
 
In his Quebec example, Taylor makes no assertion that French-Canadian culture develops and 
obtains its identity in dialogue with Anglo-Canadian culture, and vice versa. If anything, he 
seems to imply that any identity-influencing interaction would be an intrusion upon French- 
Canadian cultural identity; Anglo-Canadian culture is only treated as being abrasive to French-
Canadian self-determination. "Creating" individual identities is a different matter from 
preserving, protecting, or recognizing already-existing individual identities of which a common 
cultural identification is the relevant part. As Fred Dallmayr points out in his ‘Dialogue Among 
Civilizations’ in the following manner, how an interaction between the culture and identity can 
be applied on a global level, we move forward to the next level of a new emerging identity. He 
says “ As a result of historical sedimentations, “civilization” is an intricate, multi-layered fabric 
composed of different, often tensional layers or strands; moreover, every layer in that fabric is 
subject to multiple interpretations or readings, and so is the inter-relation of historical strands. In 
addition to this multi-dimensionality, one also needs to recall the embeddings of civil life in the 
web of what I call its corollaries or horizontal supplements.”1 
 
Now with the establishment of a deemed relationship between culture and identity, one can think 
of this ‘added’ notion of identity which is an accumulated concept of ‘learning’ and ‘unlearning’ 
techniques. Hence, invoking these multiple dimensions to the concept of Identity we can deduce 
a form of a new identity which is already on a path to being attained the status of it being 
‘dynamic’. What we refer by this dynamic identity here is explained here underneath.   
 
IV The Dynamic Identity 
 
The new identity is characterized by the features, more than its dynamism. It completely changes 
its nature, according to the new demands of the time and culture, though still retaining the old 
features on which it is based. The change in this new identity, though gradual, comes over a 
period of time, in the way of completely transforming the old identity; hence metamorphosis, due 
to which it becomes adept to the new external, -physical, psycho social conditions. Its new 
features are more diverse depending upon the contextual culture which casts an inevitable 
influence on this identity. One of the foremost, primary features of this new identity, the most 
significant aspect of it all which characterizes it as new is the cultural tag that it puts on in a way 
of adapting the cultural features which distinguish it from the older one. The cultural identity that 
emerges therein is marked by the special cultural features of the externality in which the identity 
is located. As discussed above, it is the varied aspects of the culture – social, cultural, political et 
al – that distinguish it in respect of the ‘other’ cultures, the practices in these of the subsets of 
culture that do create a differential identity in contrast with the other ones. The kind of culture 
that gives rise to such an identity is the continuation of the already existing culture together with 
its adulteration or the modulation which rests itself in the identity, giving rise to further scope for 
its dynamic motion. This identity acquires the new features of the pervasive culture and renders 
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itself to modulate according to this particular culture. An argument can also be made as to place 
this identity as a primary source rather than as a secondary This is so because this emergent 
identity is more significant in rendering itself functional to the existing reality of the outer 
culture. In other words, it is more efficient and functional to work in accordance with the 
practices of the existent prevailing culture in the outer world. It is a specific functional identity.  
 
The specific applications of this new identity are demonstrated in the adaptation of the new 
responsibilities toward the external cultural society. It is basically an all -inclusive identity. One 
of the primary aims of this new identity is to make it all-inclusive ,rather it emerges as all-
inclusive and not vulnerable to any exclusionary considerations, re-invoking the rhetoric that 
culture, identity are never used in the separatist sense. Taylor argues that the modern identity is 
characterized by an emphasis on its inner voice and the capacity for authenticity — that is, the 
ability to find a way of being that is somehow true to oneself. While doctrines of equality press 
the notion that each human being is capable of deploying his or her practical reason or moral 
sense to live an authentic life of an individual, the politics of difference has appropriated the 
language of authenticity to describe ways of living that are true to the identities of marginalized 
social groups. Hence, as he explicitly states in his “The Politics of Recognition”, “My identity is 
defined and located in relation to the other”. Thus, all proper conceptions of the self are 
dependent on social matrices. In order to understand the self, we 
must view it both in its relation to the good and in its relation to the other. This dialogical 
character, which implies a mutual interdependence, is not antithetical to one's ability to achieve 
individuality, but is rather a crucial aspect of it. Our awareness of this dialogical character, he 
argues, is a distinctive feature of the modern age, in which we are free to define ourselves and 
produce an "authentic" relation with the self, and in which we struggle to have our identities 
recognized in the context of our larger society. 
 
Bringing into focus the larger society, and throwing some light again on the question of 
Multiculturalism and Immigration, we see how this dialogical identity is applied to the context of 
a right to recognition: recognition of a single or multiple identities, in any form existing 
concretely or in absentia.  
 
For instance, Joseph Carens contends that ‘Quebec language policies and its official expectations 
of immigrants are morally defensible from the perspective of justice as evenhandedness because 
there are the sorts of demands that go hand in hand with a commitment to providing immigrants 
and their children with equal opportunities in Quebec and with the other rights and freedoms that 
a liberal democratic political community should provide to its members’1. Going a step further, 
to recall the words of Stephen Macedo, ‘while the commitment liberalism to individual freedom 
and equality is far more easily reconciled with group-based remedies for group-based 
inequalities than the critics of liberalism allow, the liberal commitment to freedom of association 
imposes limits on group recognition by insisting on intergroup openness and diversity’1. 
 
With the thoughts of these two Political Scientists, we are led into the liberal thinking of co-
existence is possible with the issue of Quebec, and how equality be guaranteed, in its basic form 
and spirit to each and every citizen of a Group or a Society. But we cannot forget here the 
diversity within a Group, which liberals have problem with, as to how a coherence within a 
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Group be ensured considering the in-built factions and multiple differentiations. A bit detailed 
explanation and examination of the same can be seen in the following section.  
 
V. Culture, Identity and Rights 
 
Now at this stage, there arises a necessity to institutionalize the newly formed identity. The 
question arises as to - why to give this recognition in the form of institutionalization? What are 
the criteria of coding them? Which one shall we place one over the other? How can they be 
applied in specific societies? Can they be applied in multicultural societies? In what aspects can 
they be applied in multicultural societies? How are they useful? How is their application viable? 
Rather, what is their application? Briefly stating Taylor’s trajectories, here again, over the 
conceptual ‘identity’, who argues for a form of communitarians, that attaches intrinsic 
importance prima facie to the survival of cultures. In his view, “differential treatment for certain 
practices is sometimes justifiable on the ground that such treatment is important for keeping a 
culture alive”. Taylor goes as far as to claim that cultural survival can sometimes support basic 
individual rights, such as freedom of speech. Accordingly, he defends legal restrictions on the 
use of English in Quebec, invoking the survival of Quebec's French culture. Rights play a crucial 
role in shaping identity by organizing the recognition of self by others and by legal and social 
institutions. For Hegel, though, “legal rights lead to an abstract type of recognition based on the 
universality of the law. The concreteness of the person, alongside the respect bestowed by legal 
recognition, calls for the acknowledgement of honor and esteem”.1 
 
 
Hence, the resonance of Hegel that I see in debate on cultural rights is in the fact that the whole 
process of the actualization of the will can be taken as a foreground for laying the basis for 
actualization or realization of the conditions of cultural rights. Since, it is through this 
actualization that the will attains freedom; thus, granting cultural rights actualizes the freedom 
condition in the individuals of that particular group. Kukathas makes a direct assertion about the 
cultural health of ethnic minorities that seem to have suffered over the last decades. According to 
Kukathas, the communitarians and other critics account a great amount of reasoning for this to 
“the disdain for liberal thinking” – since it neglects communal interests and favors individual 
autonomy. As the communitarians put it, there is “no prospect of individuals abandoning their 
particular loyalties for a universalist humanism”. For Kukathas, however, there is a need to lay 
emphasis on the fundamental importance of individual liberty or individual rights and question 
the idea that cultural minorities have collective rights. 
 
Hence, there is no need to depart from the liberal language as such, for Kukathas. But, as 
Kukathas points out, groups are changing with the environment and shift with the political 
context. Hence, this does not give sufficient basis for the granting of group rights. “Group 
formation”, Kukathas says, “is the product of environmental influences, and among these 
environmental factors are political institutions.” Infact, culture adds post facto content to a group 
identity. Also, collectives matter only due to actual individuals and ethical or moral evaluations 
of a community or collectives are based on actual individuals’ interests. Furthermore, as 
Kukathas claims, within a group there is a prevalence of subgroup conflicts and internal 
differentiations. Differences arise, in the first place, due to the variation in the interests of masses 
and elites. The congruence of their interests is like a rare phenomenon which is found wanting 
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for any sense of coherence or unity. This, specifically, poses a particular dilemma for cultural 
minorities seeking self determination, as within a minority, the right of self-determination for 
each individual is at different stands. Hence, Kukathas, in a way puts up a defense of liberal 
theory, which is generally concerned to avoid entrenching majorities or creating permanent 
minorities. As Vernon Van Dyke says “Individualism as destructive of minority cultures”, but 
Kukathas defends the liberal view by stating that since there is a conflict between the whole and 
individual members there does not come out any coherent or unified set of minority culture, 
rather cultural communities, at most times also run the risk of running into as electoral 
majorities, creating even further complications for the existence of minority cultures, as such. 
 
As Kukathas puts it that even if cultural communities exist, they exist as voluntary associations. 
Hence, individuals should be “free to associate: to form communities and to live by the terms of 
those associations”; and it is this right of the individuals that gives a great deal of authority to the 
cultural communities. Thus, cultural groups are not “natural” but rather associations of 
individuals drawn together by history and circumstance and the group as such has no right to 
self-preservation or perpetuation, owing to its constantly changing dynamics. Now, we turn to 
another trajectory of this debate, specifically, which deals with the defensive liberal theory 
offered by Will Kymlicka which shows us the nature of liberal theory to be found compatible 
with a “culture”, in its conceptual manner. Kymlicka proposes liberalism which gives special 
weight to cultural membership, and also equal citizenship. For him it is the cultural structures 
that provide the context of choice for an individual in that culture. Hence, group interests have 
their basis in liberal concerns about choice and equality. 
 
Rather, to be clearer, it is the cultural rights that protect individual autonomy. Kymlicka states 
his primary aim as the need for protection of the specific cultural “context”, since the context 
allows an individual to exercise his own choice consistent with the liberal principles of equality. 
Some clarification by Kymlicka is provided here when he states that different kinds of 
disadvantages require different kinds of rights, hence this lays sufficient grounds for special 
status for members of minority cultures. Moreover, a theory of special cultural membership or 
citizenship, rather a liberal theory of special rights protects autonomy of the individual whereas 
the internal structure of a culture restricts it. 
 
Hence it is the membership in a culture which enables informed choice about how to lead one’s 
life. A theory is a deficient liberal theory if it lacks preconditions for making a meaningful 
choice, in other words which is not a sufficient system of minority rights. Thus, the liberal 
conception of minority rights has to accomplish a two-fold task of first identifying the rights and 
then imposing them in a culture in order to ensure equality among groups. Following the 
fundamental liberal principles and the liberal system of minority cultures, there begins a process 
of dialogue of liberal minority cultures with the more liberal majority culture based on the liberal 
principles of freedom and equality; hence, it is not “the path of interference” rather the “first step 
in starting a dialogue”. The culture, as such, for Kymlicka, does not have any fixed boundaries to 
begin with.  
 
What constitutes the culture as such is the core, from which diverge other practices of the same 
like the lifestyles, for instance. If a culture is disadvantaged from a historical injustice, then there 
are means to rectify it. I agree with Kymlicka when he says that group rights as such need to be 
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accorded in order to rectify the disadvantage. But I disagree with him at a certain point when the 
problematic starts resurfacing in the light of Group Majoritarianism. Kukathas is right when he 
says that Kymlicka makes an interpretation of liberal principles, in its defense but halts after a 
point of time. He does not take into account the problems arising with a group, in terms of 
individual differences. 
 
What I will attempt to do now is to rework the debate in this manner. I may take up an example. 
For example, the one related to immigrants in Europe, say Great Britain. For instance, there is 
large Indian Community therein. Hence, the moment differences arise between the cultural 
practices of Indians and the British, legislation has to be initiated to protect the cultural practices 
of the Indians. But even if you grant them (as in all Indians the same rights) another issue arises 
is that of people is belonging to different religions within India. Then the rights granted may 
favour the Hindu Indians and might not be useful to the Muslim Indians though they may be 
granted to them in the name of special rights granted to “Indians” as such. Hence, at this juncture 
Kukathas seems right when he asserts that collectives matter only because of the interests of 
actual individuals. Also his claim stands right here when he speaks of different disadvantages 
suffered by the individuals within the 
Same Group. 
 
But this does not mean that in the name of individual-centric approach, group rights are not 
guaranteed at all. There are, for instance, many groups, which face disadvantages, and granting 
them same rights will act in their favor as their grievances, too, need to be redressed. But let’s 
see the debate if I put it simply in this manner. Hence, to come back to the debate that we started 
with, in order to ensure a good healthy environment for the cultural minorities and to ensure the 
protection of their cultural practices, Kymlicka and Kukathas, both offer a solution at different 
levels within the liberal framework. Kymlicka offers it in terms of Group or Cultural 
membership or citizenship, Kukathas even goes beyond Kymlicka, by proposing to see not only 
group differences as such. But rather the individual differences within a group. 
 
Hence, for me, they do not appear at loggerheads with each other but rather can be seen as 
advocating different levels of problem-solving where Kukathas goes a step beyond or ahead of 
Kymlicka. However, as a matter of this debate, now we attempt to find ways to tackle them like 
this. In a multicultural society, we respect the life and dignity of each and every individual. 
 
For instance, H L A Hart invokes rightly the natural right of all men to be free. But Kukathas 
completes his project by taking into consideration the conflicts which may arise in such a 
society. Still the problem remains unsolved for me because considering the fact that group 
identity keeps changing but to settle the matters in their instantaneous capacity, it is essential to 
legislate in order to avoid the conflicts. The context has to be a liberal wider society because 
what leads us out of this crisis is the integration of the minorities and assimilating them into the 
mainstream. At many times, cultural interference may be seen in the negative light but it is 
important to understand that interference is desired in order to protect the autonomy of the 
individual and save it from a particular cultural authoritarianism or totalitarianism.  
 
This is one point where I disagree with Kukathas when he speaks about “cultural interference”. 
Kymlicka is partly correct when he mentions it as a “dialogue” rather than interference. But, to 
19 
The Dynamic Notion of Cultural Identity: Implications for Human Rights 
Dhruv Pande LUISS Guido Carli 
 
state it more clearly, my position comes closer to Kukathas as he delves deeper into the crisis and 
for me individual interests are greater than the group interests as the problems do not stop at just 
granting group rights considering that all individuals face the same disadvantages within the 
group. There are, as a matter of fact, individual differences within the group, which might 
resurface to a conflict-like situation if they, as well, are not granted special rights. Hence, it 
might be said that in the process of debates, it comes out even more clearly on what is to be 
preferred over the other rather than making claims just in the superficiality of social – political 
terminology. The relation between culture and rights is a delicate one, where individuals cannot 
be ignored because both, the culture and rights can be realized through the concrete individual. 
The individual is a part of a culture but nevertheless he realizes his potentiality of life through 
the rights. The community, rather, can be seen is something which is not well-defined with 
bizarre or blurred boundaries. A group is a step towards a community but moving towards a 
community should again always be to avoid any entrenching tendency towards a majority 
community. The existence of a minority community leads even to a greater degree of a 
continuous state of opposition towards to a majority community, which can explode any time. 
 
Hence, the specificity of a “context” does assume importance even when granting special rights 
so as the rights are not rendered useless. But another aim could be stated here to be moving 
towards a greater sharedness, not to confuse this to accord to the liberal mainstream standards, 
but with the consent of all the individuals, which invokes a direct spirit of mutuality of freedom 
in a true sense. In the ultimate sense, post-modernists do assume significance because the 
attribution of figures such as “majority” and “minority” do themselves create the problematic, 
hence there is a need to do away with the “subject”. How this can be done is still a riddle in the 
long run of the formulation of political theory of the contemporary world.  
 
Not to forget at this juncture, the “theory of natural rights” offered by H L A Hart ( one of the 
major legal philosophers of the twentieth century ) who has to say on one essential natural right, 
for which he makes a conditional assertion in the following manner. According to him, “If we 
can recognize the existence of at least one basic or natural right, it is the equal right to liberty, 
implied negatively as the basis for justifying interference in the freedom of others in order to 
protect the liberty of all persons.”1 Hence, Hart advocates the equal right of all men to be free; 
though as he says, “it is only the conditional assertion that if there are any moral rights then there 
must be this one natural right.” In order to state his point in an exemplary form, my freedom may 
be restricted in order to ensure equal freedom for those around me. Hart not only justifies the 
concept of negative liberty but restates it in the form of a natural right. Also, he makes a 
clarification as to the fact that this concept is to be made distinct from a right in relation to duty. 
Further justification and clarification can be understood when he lays moral grounds for 
“limiting the freedom of another person and for determining how he/she should act.” 
 
He does this by working out the following formulations. First, there is an existence of special 
transactions or relationships among individuals which they enter into, in a kind of promise. 
Hence, they shift their moral position “from moral independence to moral relationship”. It is 
nothing but a voluntary transaction which men/women enter into in order to lay further grounds 
for “special” rights. These “special” rights are a basis for ensuring reciprocity among each other 
in respect of equal freedom. Also, when individuals surrender their rights to another, they 
partake a part of their capacity of freedom as to assure that all equally enjoy their own capacity 
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to freedom. Hart thus accounts for “mutuality of restrictions”, besides promises and 
deliberations. In other words, a system wherein each follows his/her own restriction in the same 
and equal manner as the other. This, subsequently, leads to a structure of legal rights and duties, 
which men/women follow as co-operating members of the political society. 
 
On the other hand, also to mention about the “General” Rights which come into being in their 
defensive use -- “General” Rights are based on the basic premise that all men are capable of 
choice, invoking rather again the principles of equality and freedom. Hence, to sum up Hart’s 
claim, the invocation of his conditional assertion comes out directly in the “General” rights since 
it brings forth directly equal freedom of all men to act freely according to their choice and 
“Special” rights invoke it indirectly, by making individuals first, partners in a special relationship 
or transaction and then exercising it according to the moral relationship. Thus, from a theoretical 
conjecture, it is the equal distribution of restrictions which leads to equality of freedom. This also 
calls for different standards of justice based on rights and liberties of the individual to be guarded 
against the vagaries of group power. The guard in this case is nothing but the political institution, 
which is also formed by the co-operating members of the political society (invoking Hart again 
here). But not to forget, that the formation of institutional mechanisms is contingent upon the 
significant power of groups within the polity. A neglect of a minority group will lead to a 
conflict otherwise. 
 
Hence, with the coming in of the role of institutions, the complex phenomenology of ‘General’ 
Rights versus ‘Group’ Rights, needs to be well catered to, in order to realize the effectiveness of 
working out such phenomenon of social science, not just in academia but in practice. How well, 
and How far we have been able to relate these to a discourse of Human Rights, in a simple 
straightforward sense, is yet to be seen in the next section.  
 
VI Culture and Identity, in relation to Human Rights 
 
Amidst the significance of the institutionalization of the cultural-identity rights, the most 
prominent among them that emerges is the discourse of human rights. Human Rights, embodied 
in the spirit of the equal respect and dignity of human beings, safeguard and protect, at its 
utmost, the cultural identity fabric discussed here above. As was already stated, with regard to 
the special coding of the rights in the section above, this is how human rights imply in respect to 
the aforesaid conditions. Specifically, due to the changed circumstance, the changed cultural 
condition, it becomes pertinent to protect and safeguard the dignity of the human beings, in their 
capacity of adapting to the changing shifting contexts. This marks a beginning of the growth of 
the human rights networks, not only at the local level but also a global one. Before turning to my 
own conclusions and restating the significant implications for human rights, I would prefer to 
recall the following two comments by Micheline R. Ishay and Fuyuki Kurasawa. 
 
According to Micheline R. Ishay, “With ever growing flows of migrants carrying different 
cultural values further and faster, along with the worldwide reconfiguration of economic 
production, globalisation, for all the dangers it has posed, has simultaneously opened new spaces 
for the progress of human rights. …..the formation of global human rights networks, abetted by 
the revolution in communications, has brought attention to the victims of wars, to the disabled, 
and to the plight of indigenous peoples.”1 As Fuyuki Kurasawa puts it, “the belief that societies 
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should forget the past in order to forgive, and offer an alternative according to which 
investigations and truth-telling exercises can establish a comprehensive and just record of severe 
human rights violations in transitional societies.”1 
 
Hence, at the outset, it can be stated that culture, identity and human rights have a direct collinear 
relationship; rather there exists a trajectory among the three, wherein one directly affects the 
other. Though much has been reflected upon the conceptual connections and the coherent paths 
of ‘culture’ and ‘identity’, it would be apt here to draw some serious ramifications for the 
theoretical practical implications of human rights. At a theoretical stage, it is the core 
relationship between the culture and identity, the emergence of a new identity and the practical 
application of the cultural identity that directly fits into the arena of human rights. What all 
human beings possess in the capacity of their natural right is what makes human rights feasible 
for the exercise of the rights by the individuals in the newly existing cultural milieu. To put it 
into practice, in the other stage, is by finding suitability in the demands put forth by the newly 
acculturated citizens being met by the human rights institutionalism; primarily, in its capacity to 
redress the human demands of being accepted by the new culture, the new society. It is the 
ultimate fabric of dynamic identity formation, the reformulation, which finds consonance in the 
granting of special privileges, the privileges demanded by the need of the hour, in the form of 
human rights. 
 
As David Miller says in “Immigrants, Nations and Citizenship”, “Immigration, on a significant 
scale, is now and will continue to be a significant feature of political life in Western liberal 
democracies. The intense desire of the migrants to make a better life for themselves (often 
against the background of intolerable conditions in their home countries) combines with the 
economic needs of public and private sector employees in the receiving states to defeat populist 
agitation for highly restrictive immigration controls”.  
 
Hence, to meet such a condition, it becomes a matter of primary importance for the existence of 
human rights, since it suits the criteria according to which immigration takes place, and 
immigration becomes inevitable, especially in the wake of growing multiculturalism in societies 
around the world. Individualism is part and parcel of classical liberalism. It is the individual that 
matters morally, and it is the individual for which liberalists postulate the right of an autonomous 
choice of its own way of life. But how does this connect to the fact that humans depend on others 
for both their physical and psychic survival? How does it connect to the fact that we pick our 
choices mainly from the role models that are available in society? Such are the questions that are 
discussed in ‘The Ethics of Identity’ by K. Antony Appiah. 
 
The book starts off with a narration. Appiah begins by narrating the life of John Stuart Mill, who 
at the same time is the arch-defender of liberty and, through his own biography, conscious of the 
importance of a person's identity for a good life. But even personal identity involves social 
aspects, or so Appiah argues: "To value individuality properly just is to acknowledge the 
dependence of the good for each of us on relationships with others. Without these bonds we 
could not come to be free selves, not least because we could not come to be selves at all." 
 
A collective identity is defined by Appiah as "the collective dimensions of our individual 
identities"1 -- and these collective dimensions of our individual identities "are responses to 
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something outside our selves", "they are the products of histories”. Therefore, collective 
identities, in Appiah's eyes, are "scripts": "narratives that people can use in shaping their projects 
and in telling their life stories" -- and society is the big "scriptorium" where such notions are 
created and copied. 
 
Not every collective term represents a social category: "There is no social category of the witty, 
or the clever, or the charming, or the greedy." Appiah argues that there is "a logical but no social 
category of the witty", because people who share this property of being witty "do not constitute a 
social group". But Appiah does not present an account of what is or is not to count as a social 
group. Thus his argument has a loose end here. Throughout the book Appiah is scarcely 
interested in groups as such, but rather in the individuals that belong to certain groups and how 
they see themselves. Sometimes, as in this case, it would have been helpful, had Appiah 
considered groups as collective entities in their own right. For Appiah, social categories are 
connected with social expectations: "Because we have expectations of the butler, it is a 
recognisable identity”. According to Appiah, if "L" denotes a collective identity then L has the 
following structure: First, there is a term, i.e. "L", available in public discourse for the bearers of 
this identity. It suffices that there is "a rough overlap in the classes picked out by the term 'L' so 
there need be no precisely agreed boundaries". Second, this label "L" is internalised by at least 
some of its bearers. Third, there are "strong narrative dimensions" connected with this label. And 
fourth, there are "patterns of behavior towards L such that Ls are sometimes treated as Ls" , both 
by people who consider themselves as Ls and by others: That someone is an L might be a reason 
for action, and therefore such collective patterns of identity matter for moral philosophy. 
 
But among political philosophers there is no unanimity "whether autonomy is or ought to be a 
value in the first place". Is it not just another thing that is being exported from Western 
modernity? Does not the "talk of self-fashioning, self-direction, self-authorship" reflect "an 
arrogant insularity”? Is there not "a tension between tolerance and autonomy"? Appiah does not 
evade these questions. Although the concept of autonomy may stem from Western modernity, or 
so Appiah argues, the right to choose one's way of life freely is a value for itself, while diversity 
is of instrumental value only. He does not plead for a "preservationist ethic". If individual 
autonomous choices will lead to the extinction of certain forms of life, of cultures or languages, 
then the individuals still have the right to choose their own way of life. Individuals do not create 
their "theory of the good" isolated from society. Humans are raised by parents and educated in 
schools, which may be run or supervised by the state. Public education of the children matters for 
their individual choices when they are grown up. Now, if it is not possible not to influence 
children, which influences are to be chosen? He discusses at length the tensions between soul 
making and the purported neutrality of the state towards identities, and which kinds of identity 
may be justly disfavoured by the state and which may not. According to Appiah, the state may 
justly disfavour identities like being a terrorist, because this identity threatens the state's very 
existence.  
 
In his last chapter, Appiah argues for a position he calls "rooted cosmopolitanism". The rooted 
cosmopolitanism does not deny his roots in his own culture, but he is open-minded with regard 
to other cultures. Appiah puts it in the slogan that we should seek "conversation, not mere 
conversion". Within conversation, or so Appiah hopes, we could also convince members of other 
cultures of the value of human rights: not through conversion to universal principles, but through 
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conversation starting from shared intuitions about particular cases. The issues Appiah discusses 
are of philosophical interest and at the same time of political importance.  
 
 
Hence, with the works of Appiah, we have been led into a world of dismay as to what is the 
‘identity’ in its ultimate sense being referred to in here. In this chapter we started with a desired 
explanation of the concepts, later intertwining them, and then leading them to a course of 
Institutionalization, which ultimately leads us to a questioning of our own mode of thinking. This 
is where we make a mark or a turn towards post-modernism – a way where we are raising our 
eyebrows towards the course we had been into. A more explication of the same will be seen in 
the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3 
The Dynamic Notion of Cultural Identity: A Reversion to the Essentialist Paradigm 
We begin this chapter by first focusing on the philosophical grounds on which one could start 
making a base for a deconstructed sense of the term Cultural Identity. Already lending ourselves 
into a thinking of questioning the existing, we try to help ourselves by making some references 
to the ancient and contemporary Political Philosophers.  
As for Homi Bhabha -- ‘Translation is the performative nature of cultural 
communication……..Cultural translation desacralizes the transparent assumptions of cultural 
supremacy, and in that very act, demands a contextual specificity, a historical differentiation 
within minority positions’. (Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 2004) 
 
As follows, this would further on be the underlying basis of my argument herein where I argue 
for a case of cultural identity, which is dynamic, more than just ‘dialogical’ or ‘authentic’. This 
identity is in a flux, a displaced one, dialectical, capable of changing rather ‘reverting’ the 
essential nature of the group or community in which it thrives, adapting itself to the simultaneous 
and contemporary externality, being morally justified, and, in action, consonant with an 
alternative understanding of Human Rights. I conclude, a corollary of this 'dynamic cultural 
identity' rights is an altercation of human rights. Making further inroads for an explication of my 
argument, I proceed first by Hegel. I begin my reference to Hegel’s 'Philosophy of Right' and, it 
would be evident at least theoretically that how the establishment of 'right' is related to the 
building up of a dynamic notion of the implied cultural identity herein. More significantly, 
Hegel's 'right' finds its complementarily with this 'cultural identity' in two of the theoretical 
conjectures – (1) the dialectics (2) actualization of the will. Hence, these account for our 
preliminary Philosophical Foundation.  
 
3.1 Philosophical Foundations 
 
In the Preface of 'Philosophy of Right', Hegel mentions the importance of ‘philosophy’ in order 
to understand what is rational. As he says, “What is rational is real and what is real is rational”. 
Because, by philosophy we can understand what is the reason for the actual existing rationality. 
Hence, the trajectory has drawn here follow linearity from reciprocity of the ''real'' and the 
''rational'', which comprises this ‘philosophy’.  This already sows the seeds for the interaction 
between the identity a person ‘inheres’ and his immediate contact with the outer world; the inner 
self being the ‘rational’ and the outer world being the ‘real’. Hence, a human personal identity, 
herein, is a first step towards the development of this cultural identity as such. It indirectly 
implies the fitting in of this ‘philosophy’ into the framework of identity referred to, herein. 
Subsequently, he proceeds in the Introduction; to begin with the philosophy of right is the Idea of 
right, the Idea with capital “I”. 
 
According to Hegel, the right is positive in general because it finds its expression in the law and 
it has validity in the state, sending out signals of Hegelian legal positivism. The origin of this 
right is in the will and the will, for Hegel, is not determined by anything. It is something infinite 
and blank and gains its actualization through the reality when it gets a definitive character 
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through its exposure to the outer world. Hence, for Hegel, it exists for itself when it has an object 
for itself. The will becomes a free will in the development of this Idea. The content of the Idea is 
its transcendental nature which supersedes the contradiction between its subjective and the 
objective element. Hence, for Hegel, 'A conception is equal to realizations.'1 Here again, 
undergoes the next step in the progression of cultural identity, since identity gets concretized, 
synthesized by this Idea, in the formation of a free identity, an identity which is free by the 
existence of its independent object which is unique to its own. It is this uniqueness, here again, 
which is determined by will of this identity, which is formed of the continuous interaction 
between the real and the rational. 
 
In Part I, Hegel mentions about abstract right and property. For him, the abstractness has to be 
given a reality. Through property, the inward free will has to come into contact with the outer 
world in order to exist as an Idea. As he puts it, ''I have the right to appropriation so as to own 
things which represent my actual will in them''. My free will undergoes a transition and becomes 
actual will. “I possess my life and my body, like other things, only in so far as my will is in 
them”. For Hegel thus, taking possession, use and alienation is what makes it a thing of property; 
the thing doesn’t have an end or belong to itself; it acquires the soul and will of the person after 
being owned. To reproduce it in terms of the 'cultural identity', it has been stamp-marked with 
ownership of the will, the abstract identity being converted into a real one, a realistically existing 
one in its spirit and substance; hence, a reproduction of the actually existing 'cultural identity' 
with the potential of being transcendental simultaneously. 
 
While delineating the concept of wrong, this is something which stands in opposition to the 
principle of rightness. In a way, the right transcends itself from the implicit to the explicit. The 
fact that it was standing in negation to itself doesn’t hold any longer. Hence, according to Hegel, 
it cannot be called objective in its execution and universally valid because the right assumes the 
character of being particular which is explicitly at variance with the universal will. To state it in 
other words, this established cultural identity acquires a particularistic subjective character, as 
opposed to the objectively existing one. Though a debate could worth be undertaken here 
between the Universal-Particular, but I would prefer to restrict to the elements of the objective 
and the subjective. 
 
Hence, the identity does acquire a subjective character herein as contrasted to the abstract, 
objective and the generalized one. Now the will is infinite not merely in itself but for itself. 
Hence, it is the subjective will which is now seen as actual freedom. The subjective will is 
something which has now acquired an outward existence. The externalization of the subjective 
will is the action. The cultural identity, thus, shifts itself from being objective to subjective; it 
lends itself in greater proportions to multiplicity of subjective relations; by continuous interaction 
with the outer world and by continuous inevitable effect created upon by the society around 
which it is thriving. Let us throw some light now on the Ethical life, which for Hegel is the 
concept of freedom developed into the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness. ‘That 
the ethical order is the system of specific determinations of the Idea constitutes its rationality,’ as 
Hegel says. The individual is related to these laws and institutions as to the substance of his own 
being. In duty the individual acquires his substantive freedom. Hence, for Hegel, Virtue is the 
ethical order reflected in the individual character. Ethical life appears as custom, and the 
substance of mind thus exists now for the first time as mind. The individual knows that his 
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particular ends are grounded in this same universal. In an ethical order individuals are actually in 
possession of their own inner universality. 
 
The right of individuals to their particular satisfaction is also contained in the ethical substantial 
order. In this identity of the universal will with the particular will, right and duty coalesce. The 
ethical substance is the actual mind of a family and a nation. The concrete person finds 
satisfaction by means of others, and at the same time by means of universality. The livelihood, 
happiness, and rights of one are interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all. The 
system of the ethical order constitutes the Idea's abstract moment, its moment of reality. The 
state is the actuality of the ethical Idea. The state is absolutely rational once the particular has 
been raised to consciousness of its universality. The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. 
The strength of the state thus lies in the unity of its universal end with the particular interest of 
individual. 
 
Rights play a crucial role in shaping identity by organizing the recognition of self by others and 
by legal and social institutions. For Hegel, legal rights lead to an abstract type of recognition 
based on the universality of the law. Human rights move in this direction, by validating both the 
similarity of claimants with abstract humanity and their difference and uniqueness. But law's 
necessary generality cannot meet the demands for the full recognition of the postmodern self 
with its polymorphous desires and its complex struggles for recognition as a unique individual.  
 
Hence, the resonance of Hegel that I see in debate on ‘cultural identity’ is in the fact that the 
whole process of the actualization of the will can be taken as a foreground for laying the basis for 
actualization or realization of the conditions of ‘cultural identity’; the dynamic cultural identity. 
Hegel does try to reason out the development of the Idea and the actualization of the Will on the 
basis of logic, which infact seems good, in our analogy to understand and uncover the aspects of 
the dynamism in an individual will and action, subsequently leading to a collective will and 
action. Going a step further, I move toward a more appropriate defense of my argument in light 
of the narratives of Bhabha wherein I have equated Cultural Dynamism with Cultural Hybridity.  
 
3.2 Dynamism as Cultural Hybridity 
 
Bhabha looks more intriguingly into the ''Postmodern Space'', the ''postcolonial times'' and ''the 
trials of cultural translation''.1 He dismisses any sort of essentialisation, to begin with, and brings 
forth a reversion of the essentialist. Through the narratives and trajectories Bhabha employs, he 
makes intrusions into the path to incessant inevitability of cultural transcendentalism. Hence, 
Bhabha invokes the deconstruction of cultural identity through one of the post-modern 
techniques of ''the trials of cultural translation''. He does express a concern over the 
overdramatized images of ''cultural identity'' as presented by Charles Taylor. Hence, a critique of 
Charles Taylor is provided herein, by theoretical criticism of Taylorian dialogical identity, 
stating it in terms of a mere farce, a mere drama, as Bhabha says, since Taylor does ignore to a 
considerable extent the underlying layers of ambivalence which will be proved further ahead in 
the forthcoming paragraphs. Hence, Bhabha precisely invokes a need to move ''beyond'' this 
recognition of identity by the others, since even the others do not make a difference to this 
cultural identity by falling into this vicious circle of essentialising the self and the others, in turn. 
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Hence, to begin with, it is in the ''Post-Modernism or the cultural logic of late capitalism'' by 
Fredric Jameson that Bhabha primarily marks as his starting point in order to delineate the 
conceptual clarity of ''ambivalence'' as such, as understood in the frameworks of literary genre or 
in terms of theoretical references. The ambivalence he identifies in Jameson's thought is the 
‘renewed’ surge of reverting internationalism by taking into account the varied cultural 
differentiation, the existence of this cultural hybridity, which questions the imposed 
transnationalism, in dire need of a reinvention. As Bhabha says ''The historical difference of the 
present is articulated in the emergence of a third space of representation which is, just as quickly, 
reabsorbed into the base-superstructure division’. Hence, it is the implied significance of the 
‘unrepresented’ which craves for a ‘temporal representation’ in the plethora of agencies of Trans 
and Multinational existentialities. 
 
‘The liminality of migrant experience is no less a transitional phenomenon than a translational 
one; there is no resolution to it because the two conditions are ambivalently enjoined in the 
'survival' of migrant life’.1 Here again, is made an attempt to gain greater precision of 
‘ambivalence’ since a transition is inevitably accompanied by a translation. And it is this 
‘cultural translation’ which solves the problem, to a considerable extent, of transnationalism, by 
making it more historically differentiated and invoking elements of cultural difference by giving 
space to the mis-represented. At this point, I would like to focus some attention on Fanon's take 
on Identity, as Fanon does make an impact, in this debate herein, being located in a 
''postcolonial'' situation and stating things out from a perspective of the oppressed. He brings 
about a social and collective psyche in his post-colonial prerogative, wherein he makes an 
analysis through the varied existentialities of social and historical facts, thus providing further 
aversion to the understanding of the black and the white. 
 
As Bhabha interprets it as ‘This image of human identity and, indeed, human identity as image – 
both familiar frames or mirrors of selfhood that speak from deep within Western culture – are 
inscribed in the sign of resemblance’. ‘Making further inroads onto the explication of this 
phenomenon of ''cultural difference'', is to state the differentially of these phenomenon in the 
minutest of their existence. It is the difference which functions as a first step towards the 
introduction of this ''colonial nonsense'', which is banished from the perspective of the existence 
of these hegemonic discourses.’ 
 
One of the significant outputs generated out of this ''cultural difference'' is the deconstruction of 
the coloniality, the colonial discourse as such, and what emerges from the dispersal of work is 
the language of a colonial nonsense that displaces those dualities in which the colonial space is 
traditionally divided: nature Vs culture, chaos Vs civility. Hence, further more than doing with 
the traditional divisions, it induces this 'cultural difference'. Hence, for Bhabha, it is this 'in-
between' culture which forms a part of the significant portion of the 'human culture' in its spirit 
and substance. Thus, so far, we have seen the reversion to this cultural identity in the form of the 
theoretical conjecture (Hegel) and further nuances through the post-modernist approach 
undertaken by Bhabha, who even goes a step ahead by claiming this human differentiation and 
equating it with the displacement of truth. As he says, ‘It is the displacement of truth in the very 
identification of culture, or an uncertainty in the structure of ‘culture’ as the identification of a 
certain discursive human truth’. 
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Thus, sundry other narratives furnished by Bhabha make a further claim and a viability for the 
explication of my argument in a more coherent manner more than just its literary implications. 
With Bhabha, we have been able to identify the ‘difference-approach’ not just in its literal sense 
but also in its practical implications. Through Bhabha, we have been able to put forth, atleast in 
theory, that a multiplicity of narratives does verify a ‘voice’ which is not just a homogenous 
voice but a voice of a ‘multiple-identity’. To further relate to these trajectories by Bhabha, we 
can see how well it is complimented by Literature, which here we discuss a bit in detail.  
 
The tool I would use here is a work of literature by V.S. Naipaul named “The Mimic Men”. With 
Naipaul, I introduce the debate in two of the more significant aspects herein (1) displacement of 
Identity (2) Cultural contexts. This novel brings out clearly the dilemmas of cultural 
displacement which the protagonist of this novel, Ralph Singh faces during the different phases 
of his life. Rather, it is a cultural experience which he indirectly undertakes in order to later 
realize the shift in the cultural contexts of his life. Furthermore, I would throw some light on the 
narratives depicted in this novel, which in turn would indicate at the concern for search of an 
‘identity’. 
 
3.3 Literature and Post-Modernism 
 
V. S. Naipaul's novel The Mimic Men is the memoir of protagonist Ralph Singh. It is a first-
person account of Ralph's life, ranging over his childhood in the fictional West Indian island of 
Isabella, his university days in London where he meets and marries a white woman. Ultimately, 
it also depicts his somewhat successful business and political careers back in Isabella. Ralph 
Singh is a colonial character, an intelligent and sensitive person confused by the plural but 
unequal society he's raised in and for whom identity is a primary issue. Ralph admits himself that 
his feelings, his actions, his life fit in within these 'patterns.' Now, I would make an attempt to 
analyze how Ralph's sense of alienation, and his struggle with a sense of personal identity, and 
his inability to connect with others are linked as various expressions of Ralph's sense of loss and 
disconnectedness.  
 
Though Ralph's public life is significant since it echoes the complexities and contradictions 
inherent in decolonization and post-colonial nationalism; at the heart of Ralph's fictional life in 
The Mimic Men is the story of how and why this sense of personal incompleteness grows to 
almost destroy him. Ralph is not unaffected by the corruption he perceives all around him. In 
fact, apart from all the external disorder, Ralph comes to realize that the "chaos lies all within 
him”. Ralph indicates elsewhere that many of his struggles with a sense of identity began during 
his childhood. His reactions to many of the events in his childhood are similarly characterized by 
disassociation and emotional withdrawal. He refuses to identify with his family's history in the 
island. Ralph accepts the Western European view of the world as the only correct one rather than 
one possibility among many. 
 
Ralph's conscious and imaginative identification with Britain and the West affects him 
psychologically in a number of interrelated ways. He conceives of himself as protected by the 
West, since he thinks he is one of their own, and imagines an "eye" that watches over him. Just 
as he disassociates his concept of home from Isabella, Ralph projects authority away from 
himself toward a symbolic, disembodied ''eye'' representing the watchful and superior culture. 
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This projection slowly begins to tap his sense of will and engenders the feeling of helplessness 
that corrupts him more as he grows older. And, as he grows, Ralph finds instead that London 
does not welcome him, he is not in his rightful place after all and he fails to integrate into the 
ideal culture presented to him through books. From childhood Ralph had disowned Isabellan 
history and culture, yet he doesn't find a place in British society either. 
 
Ralph's ultimate reaction to both public and personal events is emotional and physical 
withdrawal. Though his confused sense of identity contributes to an emotional distance between 
himself and others, further difficulties and a culmination of events intensify this tendency. At one 
point Ralph writes that he throws himself into various activities because they link him with the 
‘real’ world and distract him from his internal reality. But fear becomes the mediator between the 
external and internal, fear of the external propelling him inward where he discovers he has no 
resources with which to meet it. 
 
But what Ralph really fears is that the world around him is real. The confusion and disorder is 
incomprehensible to someone who wants, who needs at an emotionally primal level, the ‘simple 
and ordinary.’ He has rejected the cultural traditions of his people and with them, any comfort of 
traditional religious teachings. Ralph reflects on what he hopes to achieve by writing of his life: 
"It was my hope to give expression to the restlessness, the deep disorder, which the great 
explorations, the overthrow in three continents of established social organizations, the unnatural 
bringing together of peoples who could achieve fulfilment only within the security of their own 
societies and the landscapes hymned by their ancestors, it was my hope to give partial expression 
to the restlessness which this great upheaval has brought about". But he realizes he cannot do this 
because, as he says, "I am too much a victim of that restlessness which was to have been my 
subject". 
 
And it is interesting that while Ralph sees so clearly the difficulties facing those who want to 
change the political and economic conditions in Isabella, he focuses mostly on the pathetic 
nature of their plight rather than on the British rationalizations and responsibilities for 
constructing and maintaining the colonial situation. Hence, this leaves us, at the top of mounting 
disillusionments of varied human cultural experiences but still forges its way into understanding 
the core concept of cultural identity, not in the separatist sense but in the cooperative sense. 
Especially in the context of multiculturalism, the concept assumes significance in working out 
the dynamics of a culture-laden existence. 
 
With this picture of Ralph, one is drawn into the complexities of a human personhood – hence, 
the deep effect an externality can cast upon the internal human condition. The non-adjustment 
dimension clearly shows us as to how fluid is this identity, is it the ‘real, existing’ identity that 
we are and that we wish to talk about? With Ralph’s immigrant experiences, and his personal 
emotional dilemmas, we can rather decipher that if ‘this’ happens to ‘one, ‘it’ can ‘happen’ to 
anyone, simply following the logic of human transferability. But of course, we cannot deny the 
human subjectivity herein, in order to reflect the larger goals of our Project. How do we revert 
the essential is still the central concern of our Project.  
 
3.4 Reversion to the Essentialist Paradigm 
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In its final moment, we will be able to see as to how and in which manner, is this ‘reversion to 
the essential’ possible, as a matter of fact. We use the work by Upendra Baxi, which does go on 
to justify our previously mentioned claims of understanding and reverting the essential sense or a 
discourse – referring herein particularly to the discourse of human rights.  
 
Reiterating Baxi here whose quest is of interest to look into this complex dimension of human 
differentially? As he asks this question ‘Do identities get universalised all over again in positing 
a universal bearer of human rights, obscuring the fact that identities may themselves be vehicles 
of power, all too often inscribed or imposed ?’ Hence, to examine the work of Baxi here, is to 
state the two primary facets of what he discusses in his ''The Future of Human Rights'' – (1) 
Suffering (2) the theory of 'resistance'. It is through these two aspects that Baxi puts forth a case 
for a more justifiable human rights, the contemporary Human Rights as he calls it. 
 
For Baxi, Suffering takes more as a centre stage for an understanding of the concept of Human 
Rights. Hence, he indirectly invokes here the same rhetoric of taking into consideration more 
acutely the ‘bottom-up’ approach to Human Rights. Through Suffering, Baxi explicitly states the 
viability and productivity of the existing Human Rights from the viewpoint of those who suffer 
rather than granting rights in vacuum as is the mainstream discourse of Human Rights, in the 
contemporary scenario. Thus, I state Baxi here as one of the significant steps for marking this 
reversion to the essentialist paradigm, since he combines precisely the dynamic cultural identity 
phenomenon with the discourse of the contemporary Human Rights. 
 
Through the Theory of ‘resistance’, Baxi again claims to offer an understanding of the 
underlying predominance of resistance as a subject-matter rather than the ‘convenient’ 
policymaking which lacks the spirit and the strength of credibility for the populace. Moreover, 
by coining this terminology for the academic understanding Baxi lays grounds for reverting the 
theory of the continuous, imposed, hegemonic institutional decision-making, and putting forth a 
more widespread, acceptable, and a viable concept of Human Rights, which is more humanised 
and more people-friendly, in a layman’s terms. 
 
Drawing all these trajectories, as averting or reverting to the essentialist paradigm of Cultural 
Identity, I recall Amartya Sen ‘The illusion of cultural destiny is not only misleading, it can also 
be significantly debilitating, since it can generate a sense of fatalism and resignation among 
people who are unfavorably placed.’ Though Sen’s reference here may not be mistaken for the 
theoretical-ideological interpretations, I merely use it for a clarity on my position towards 
‘cultural identity’. Also, as an effort for greater understanding I quote Carens, who makes a case 
for a contextual understanding lending it a more vivid character by saying ‘…..an even closer 
attention to context will lead to a richer, more complex, and ultimately more satisfactory 
theoretical account…..an ideal of evenhandedness’. 
 
And not to forget Ratna Kapur at this juncture, ‘Revisiting the colonial encounter is critical in 
order to understand the limitations and possibilities of human rights in the contemporary period. 
It is essential for human rights advocates to embrace this history. Assertions about the 
universality of human rights simply deny the reality of those whom it claims to represent and 
speak for, disclaiming their histories and imposing another’s through a hegemonising move. 
Thus, the liberal tradition from which human rights have emerged not only incorporates 
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arguments about freedom and equal worth but — and this is the core of my argument — it also 
incorporates arguments about civilisation, cultural backwardness, racial and religious superiority. 
Further human rights remain structured by this history. This dark side is intrinsic to human 
rights, rather than something that is merely broken and can be glued back together. There are at 
least three different ways in which the ‘Other’ has been addressed in relation to rights discourse. 
The first is through the assumption that the difference can be erased and the ‘Other’ tamed and 
assimilated through some form of cultural or racial strip. The second is to treat the difference as 
natural and inevitable. And finally, there is the response that justifies incarceration, internment or 
even annihilation of the ‘Other’ because of the threat it poses. These are not rigid and absolute 
categorisations, but frequently overlap and leak into one another’ —Ratna Kapur, The Dark Side 
of Human Rights. 
 
Hence, Kapur rightly states that we need to move beyond debates between the universal 
character of human rights and their historical particularity. The human rights project will remain 
circular and non-productive if we linger in the debate about transcendence and immanence. 
Secondly, there needs to be a reorientation in human rights scholarship and education. Human 
rights advocates, including feminist scholars, have failed to adequately centre and interrogate the 
colonial trappings and ‘First World’ hegemonic underpinnings of this project, and frequently 
ignore or exclude the non-west from the conversation. Analyzing human rights from a 
postcolonial perspective provides an enriched perspective of how the terrain has operated and the 
politics of inclusion and exclusion that it has sustained and even justified. 
 
It is not only useful, but critical, for human rights scholars and advocates to consciously drawing 
on the experience of the postcolonial world. This is obligatory in order to revise both our 
thinking and understanding of human rights that has been so dominated by Western pontificating 
about the project, tied down to liberal utopian visions, or claims that human rights are something 
needed only ‘over there’, in the developing, less civilized world. ‘To draw on the experiences’ 
requires understanding and learning from the postcolonial engagement with rights that are 
informed by the legacies of the colonial encounter. It is, after all, in the postcolonial world where 
the dark side has been most obviously played out. Finally, a major shift in the location of the 
project, who is telling the story and how the story is told, can provide a different and critical 
trajectory from which to view human rights. 
 
Thus, this briefly leads us to think of this discourse of Human Rights from a deeply critical 
perspective, a critical thinking as to how the importance of a context does assume significance – 
the context here refers to a simple analytical trajectory of how Human Rights can very well come 
from ‘below’ – how they can be grounded on a more democratic ground and how they can be 
more widely based upon a more wide-ranging concerns of human capacities, rather than just 
being reflective of a single, homogenous and a hegemonic discourse, which is, a discourse of the 
West. Hence, Kapur it very succinctly as to how there needs to be an increasing reshaping and a 
remolding of these Human Rights in light of the larger concerns of the humanity, wherein a 
‘literal’ sense of humanity be taken into consideration rather than just mere superficial one.  
 
We can see these in exemplary forms also in some narrations by other scholars, for instance 
Judith Butler. Butler proposes two different kinds of claims that have circulated recently, 
representing a culmination of sentiment that has been building for some time. One has to do with 
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an explicitly Marxist objection to the reduction of Marxist scholarship and activism to the study 
of culture, sometimes understood as the reduction of Marxism to cultural studies. The second has 
to do with the tendency to relegate new social movements to the sphere of the cultural, indeed, to 
dismiss them as being preoccupied with what is called the ‘merely’ cultural, and then to construe 
this cultural politics as factionalizing, identitarian, and particularistic. She presumes that to link 
individuals to such views runs the risk of deflecting attention from the meaning and effect of 
such views to the pettier politics of who said what, and who said what back. 
 
It is, she would argue, impossible to perform a convincing parody of an intellectual position 
without having a prior affiliation with what one parodies, without having and wanting an 
intimacy with the position one takes in or on as the object of parody. Parody requires a certain 
ability to identify, approximate, and draw near; it engages an intimacy with the position it 
appropriates that troubles the voice. 
 
Hence, these are some reflections of Butler that we can refer to here in order to reflect and 
further delve into the theoretical parameters of how thinking inherently leads to an ideological 
formulation. 
 
One of my consistent efforts to bring together the works of such scholars is to unpack a plethora 
of normative claims which I have been claiming since the beginning of the presentation of my 
arguments. These will be highlighted more clearly to the next set of claims made by Fraser.  
 
In Fraser’s recent book, Justice Interruptus, she rightly notes that ‘in the United States today, the 
expression ‘identity politics’ is increasingly used as a derogatory term for feminism, antiracism, 
and anti-heterosexism.’ She insists that such movements have everything to do with social 
justice, and argues that any left movement must respond to their challenges. Nevertheless, she 
reproduces the division that locates certain oppressions as part of political economy, and 
relegates others to the exclusively cultural sphere. Positing a spectrum that spans political 
economy and culture, she situates lesbian and gay struggles at the cultural end of this political 
spectrum. Homophobia, she argues, has no roots in political economy, because  homosexuals 
occupy no distinctive position in the division of labour; they are distributed throughout the class 
structure, and do not constitute an exploited class: ‘the injustice they suffer is quintessentially a 
matter of recognition’, thus making their struggles into a matter of cultural recognition, rather 
than a material oppression. 
 
Both ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’ become part of ‘material life’ not only because of the way in which 
it serves the sexual division of labor, but also because normative gender serves the reproduction 
of the normative family. The point here is that -- struggles to transform the social field of 
sexuality do not become central to political economy to the extent that they can be directly tied 
to questions of unpaid and exploited labour, but also because they cannot be understood without 
an expansion of the ‘economic’ sphere itself to include both the reproduction of goods as well as 
the social reproduction of persons. If one continues to take the mode of production as the 
defining structure of political economy, then surely it would make no sense for feminists to 
dismiss the hard-won insight that sexuality must be understood as part of that mode of 
production. But even if one takes the ‘redistribution’ of rights and goods as the defining moment 
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of political economy, as Fraser does, how is it we might fail to recognize how these operations of 
homophobia are central to the functioning of political economy?  
 
Fraser’s most important disagreements — and the most fruitful for discussion — turn on how 
precisely to realize this shared project of reclamation and integration. She states – ‘We hold 
divergent views of what precisely constitutes the enduring legacy of Marxism and the still 
relevant insights of socialist feminism. We also diverge in our respective assessments of the 
merits of various poststructuralist currents and in our respective views of how these can best 
inform social theorizing that retains a materialist dimension. Finally, we disagree about the 
nature of contemporary capitalism.’ Central to her framework is a normative distinction between 
injustices of distribution and injustices of recognition. To be misrecognized, in her view, is not 
simply to be thought ill of, looked down on, or devalued in others’ conscious attitudes or mental 
beliefs. It is rather to be denied the status of a full partner in social interaction and prevented 
from participating as a peer in social life — not as a consequence of a distributive inequity (such 
as failing to receive one’s fair share of resources or ‘primary goods’), but rather as a 
consequence of institutionalized patterns of interpretation and evaluation that constitute one as 
comparatively unworthy of respect or esteem.  
 
In her conception, therefore, misrecognition is an institutionalized social relation, not a 
psychological state. In essence a status injury, it is analytically distinct from, and conceptually 
irreducible to, the injustice of mal-distribution, although it may be accompanied by the latter. 
Whether misrecognition converts into mal-distribution, and vice versa, depends on the nature of 
the social formation in question. In pre-capitalist, pre-state societies, for example, where status 
simply is the overarching principle of distribution and where the status order and the class 
hierarchy are therefore fused, misrecognition simply entails mal-distribution. Normatively, 
however, the key point is this: misrecognition constitutes a fundamental injustice, whether 
accompanied by mal-distribution or not. And the point has political consequences. It is not 
necessary to show that a given instance of misrecognition brings with it mal-distribution in order 
to certify the claim to redress it as a genuine claim for social justice. The point holds for 
heterosexist misrecognition, which involves the institutionalization of sexual norms and 
interpretations that deny participatory parity to gays and lesbians. Opponents of heterosexism 
need not labour to translate claims of sexual status injury into claims of class deprivation in order 
to vindicate the former. Nor need they show that their struggles threaten capitalism in order to 
prove they are just. 
 
Butler’s first argument appeals to some indisputable facts about the harms currently suffered by 
gays and lesbians. Far from being ‘merely symbolic’, these harms include serious economic 
disadvantages with undeniable material effects. In the United States today, for example, gays and 
lesbians can be summarily dismissed from civilian employment and military service, are denied a 
broad range of family-based social welfare benefits, are disproportionately burdened with 
medical costs, and are disadvantaged in tax and inheritance law. Equally material are the effects 
of the fact that homosexuals lack the full range of constitutional rights and protections enjoyed 
by heterosexuals. In many jurisdictions, they can be prosecuted for consensual sex; and in many 
more, they can be assaulted with impunity. It follows, claims Butler, from the economic and 
material character of these liabilities, that the ‘misrecognition’ analysis of heterosexism is 
mistaken. 
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From my perspective, therefore, the material harms cited by Butler constitute paradigmatic cases 
of misrecognition. They reflect the institutionalization of heterosexist meanings, norms, and 
constructions of personhood in such areas as constitutional law, medicine, immigration and 
naturalization policy, federal and state tax codes, social welfare and employment policy, equal 
opportunity legislation, and the like. What is institutionalized, moreover, as Butler herself notes, 
are cultural constructions of entitlement and personhood that produce homosexual subjects as 
objects. This, to repeat, is the essence of misrecognition: the material construction through the 
institutionalization of cultural norms of a class of devalued persons who are impeded from 
participatory parity. In another sense, moreover, the definitional argument accomplishes very 
little. Butler wants to conclude that struggles over sexuality are economic, but that conclusion 
has been rendered tautologous. If sexual struggles are economic by definition, then they are not 
economic in the same sense as are struggles over the rate of exploitation. Simply calling both 
sorts of struggles ‘economic’ risks collapsing the differences, creating the misleading impression 
that they will synergize automatically and blunting our capacity to pose, and answer, hard but 
pressing political questions as to how they can be made to synergize when in fact they diverge or 
conflict. Empirically, therefore, contemporary capitalism seems not to require heterosexism. 
 
With its gaps between the economic order and the kinship order, and between the family and 
personal life, capitalist society now permits significant numbers of individuals to live through 
wage labour outside of heterosexual families. It could permit many more to do so — provided 
the relations of recognition were changed. Thus we can now answer one of the questions posed 
earlier: the economic disabilities of homosexuals are better understood as effects of heterosexism 
in the relations of recognition than as hardwired in the structure of capitalism. 
 
The good news is that they do not need to overthrow capitalism in order to remedy those 
disabilities—although we may well need to overthrow it for other reasons. The bad news is that 
they need to transform the existing status order and restructure the relations of recognition. The 
question of what should replace functionalism bears on Butler’s third argument against my 
redistribution/recognition framework. This argument is deconstructive. 
 
Fraser seeks to delineate two elements which comprise a broad notion of modern justice, namely: 
redistribution and recognition. Redistribution is the ideal result of demands based on 
socioeconomic injustice, whilst recognition is the ideal result of demands based on cultural or 
symbolic injustice. Fraser notes, importantly, that these two conceptions of justice are merely 
analytically, but not practically, distinct. The particular dilemma with which Fraser is struggling 
is the “redistribution-recognition dilemma” wherein justice for specific types of groups 
(“bivalent collectivities”) requires both redistribution and recognition. Furthermore, Fraser 
deconstructs possible remedies into affirmative (outcome correcting, structure conservative), and 
transformative (structure correcting) types, noting that the ideal solution to the demands of 
“bivalent collectivities” would be redistributive-transformative as well as recognizing-
transformative. 
 
Hence, without further clarification, we are inevitably drawn into the trajectories of how 
deconstructed meanings can become in the understanding of an analysis of minority social 
movements or any kind of social phenomenon. By bringing in the claims of Butler and Fraser, 
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though they are both trying to move around the same concept or a lineage of collectivities and 
groups, but a difference in their understanding, which are reflective of concrete manifestations of 
differential groups or paradigms of a society, are themselves leading us to believe successively at 
every stage as to how it is in a basic-form the ‘local’ which goes on to form the so-called 
‘global’. To see this in rather other effective forms, we see how Jung has reflected upon the 
‘Indigenous’ in order to prove the credibility of our Project at hand. Hence, the narratives, now it 
seems, do not just exist in the abstract, they do bear concrete foregrounds in making a large 
estimate for the researchers.  
 
3.5 Indigenous Politics: The Post-Colonial Discourse 
 
Courtney Jung’s The Moral Force of Indigenous politics gives an account of the formation of an 
indigenous political identity in Mexico, situated within a constructivist variant of liberalism that 
provides a structuralist explanation of the formation of groups which also grounds the basic 
nature of the State’s obligations to the political identities that mobilize on the basis of these 
groups. In doing so, Jung succeeds in avoiding the difference-blind neutralism and the 
difference-centric multiculturalism. The nature of the State’s obligation to particular groups is 
grounded in the extent to which it constitutes the group itself through structural exclusion, the 
injustice of which is grounded in the very rights that the State has promised to enforce. Jung’s 
“critical liberalism” allows liberal-democracies to apply principled remedies to injustices that are 
true to the phenomena, to the particularity of the group’s claims. 
 
Jung’s book intervenes into theoretical debates surrounding multiculturalism and indigenous 
rights in favor of “group” rights (as opposed to neutralism) but in a way that preserves liberalism 
from the pitfalls that have occurred in other defences of group rights which tend to fetishize 
difference and lend normative weight to culture as such vis-à-vis the protective and restitutive 
role of the State. Much theory tends to argue that the normative status of a group is given by its 
status as a cultural group or societal bloc distinct from that of the majority population. Culture 
(or ethnicity) being, for such theorists the framework within which an individual’s life and 
dignity find meaning and coherence, it is incumbent upon liberal democracies, committed to 
respecting the dignity of the individual, to recognize the status of the culture or ethnicity, and 
provide for the means of its reproduction. Jung rightly points out that in many cases, the separate 
status of a culture or group is in many respects the product of the State’s own structural 
exclusion/oppression (obvious in the case of African Americans, but also implicit in the very 
category of indigenous); the obligations of the State are therefore connected to the nature of that 
very structuring, not to the group as such. Furthermore, by framing the obligation as an 
obligation to culture or ethnicity as such reproduces the “difference-blindness” of classical 
liberalism at the level of culture, and privileges cultural remedies over and against others that 
may be equally, if not more merited. Culturalism, case of the indigenous in particular, can be a 
straitjacket which limits the possibilities of restitution. 
 
Furthermore, the conception of culture and ethnicity as the necessary condition for the 
individual’s dignity slips into highly illiberal territory. Jung provides an alternative account that 
situates the claims of groups within the structural formation of inclusion and exclusion in the 
access to power and status within States. This simultaneously strengthens the case for state 
responsibility of actual injustices whilst removing the pernicious implications of previous 
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accounts of responsibility. The effect of critical Liberalism, the approach upon which Jung’s 
work is based, is to provide a “politics of difference” that is not only targeted to where it is 
actually needed, but can also make perfect sense of group claims within the normative horizon of 
liberalism’s commitment to the equal dignity of the individual; the trigger for the liberal 
democratic state’s responsibility to groups is its failure to live up to its own liberal foundations in 
having constituted a group itself through exclusion or oppression. 
 
My only concerns with Jung’s work are with certain perceived implications of Critical 
Liberalism for liberalism as a normative theory of politics. Jung concedes that the core of the 
approach that she chooses to apply in grounding the “moral” force of indigenous politics is that 
“blindness to injustices … is a permanent feature of social and political life”, and that “all of the 
ways in which states might organize access to power … are ultimately arbitrary and often 
pernicious”. I believe this insight carries great force and has yet to be disproven, but it must be 
difficult to sustain the “moral force” of a normative theory if it admits to being impossible to 
achieve even in principle. Theoretically we can admit to the never ending dialectic of injustice 
and restitution that results from the attempt to actualize universal principles in an imperfect 
world, but in practice the struggle for justice is motivated by a vision of repose. Critical 
liberalism would seem to foreclose the grand struggle as a viable possibility (and, looking back 
on the 20th century, this is perhaps for the best); if justice can only be achieved for the particular 
injustice(s), then successful struggles are necessarily particular and targeted in scope, however 
much they are motivated by the failed promise of universal ideals. Furthermore, as a 
constructivist theory, Critical Liberalism seems to ground the obligations of the liberal state in 
rights already promised, making it a potent immanent critique of liberal democracies, but it does 
not attempt to persuade the non-liberal world, or provide a firm foundation for liberal principles. 
Of course, if it attempted to do this it would not be Critical Liberalism, but Liberalism. 
 
Jung seeks to argue the case for “reframing indigenous and other social group claims in ways 
that are logically consistent with the origins and social character of such groups and more 
responsive to the needs such groups have as a consequence of the ways they have been shaped” 
.In general terms, Jung’s position is that identities are constructs and that such identities are 
shaped both by the agency of their constituents as well as the structures within which the 
constituents and groups operate. 
 
Therefore, there are two entities subject to scrutiny: i) Social groups and their identity, as well as 
ii) the structure within which these operate (a state, generally). These two entities though are, and 
are recognized as such by Jung, profoundly interconnected one to the other. Ultimately, it is 
important to note as well that in her assessment, Jung is driven by the pursuit of justice and 
equality within a liberal context, and therefore the poignancy of identities as constructs rests in 
their value as a ‘political resource’ (they serve as a locus of political traction with which to 
identify and redress inequities). 
 
In undertaking this study, Jung inevitably enters the theoretical debate that addresses 
questions/problematic on minority rights and pluralism within liberal (in the theoretical sense) 
democratic societies. Are liberal values more effectively and accurately espoused by adhering to 
a principal of negative rights distributed equally between all citizens, or would this better be 
done by positive rights that actively compensate for peripheral social groups’ otherwise unequal 
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standings? This debate has become generally characterized as one between, respectively, the 
“privateers” and “protectionists”. Rather than a binary though, Jung sees similarities between 
these two approaches, in that both privateers and protectionists root themselves in a universal 
‘essentialism’ of human identity, and that both therefore, albeit for different reasoning, “support 
the exclusion, or exemption, of cultural groups from democratic politics”. Rather than enter this 
traditional debate at hand, Jung effectively transcends it by arguing that the notion of culture and 
identity as a construct should be carried forth with to the full extent of its logic, whereby “culture 
itself is a process and outcome” and is not stable nor universalistic/essentialist. 
 
As constructs, Jung goes on to clarify that identities find their real purpose in the fact that 
humans build around these a “public and political salience”. This though is not a haphazard 
process; states in fact demark value and political salience onto certain identities and are therefore 
responsible for structuring a polity’s identity landscape. “Identity is not only the source of 
politics; it is also the effect of politics”, a polity’s power dimensions/relations are reflected 
through its identities, and logically, identities can therefore serve as a point of leverage and 
traction around which to enforce, or contest, such power relations. 
 
Jung is interested in contesting inequitable power relations. ‘Membership rights’, she argues, are 
a means by which minority rights can be afforded to individuals within certain groups and in a 
manner that is soundly in line with liberal philosophy. The case study that demonstrates how this 
can be done is that of the indigenous of Mexico’s Chiapas state. There, as per her book’s ‘case, 
and as per the above, indigenous identity has been reframed “in ways that are logically consistent 
with the origins and social character of such groups” (as a construct) in order that they be “more 
responsive to the needs such groups have [thereby helping to alleviate injustice]”. Identity 
therefore can be understood as an artefact shaped by historical/political conditions as well as one 
shaped through the efforts of its constituents agency (hard work). 
 
Jung goes into great detail in explaining how identity has been shaped in Chiapas by Mexico’s 
political history, how conditions have altered the landscape in which the identities operate 
(whether the fall of communism, state tactics of patronage, the rise of neo-liberal ideology and 
practice), and the agency which has shaped identity from bottom-up through hard work. This 
Chiapas-specific content though, if one seeks theoretical, broader meaning, is but a vehicle for 
the abovementioned arguments. Ultimately, some concerns I think do arise naturally in the 
process of adopting such an orthodox constructivist understanding of group identity. Culture, 
notes Jung, does indeed “sometimes”, in “some places”, play an important role as a “mediator of 
human identity”. However, this as aspect of culture vis-à-vis identity occurs unreliably and 
cannot be banked on in understanding the nature and political traction of identity. In this way, the 
constructivist reasoning Jung uses seems to land on its own ‘essentialism’, one shaped by the 
material parameters of power and socio-economic value. Such parameters together form the 
“crosshairs of a particular historical movement” through which identity such as that of 
indigenous in Chiapas is formed and acted upon. 
 
On a final related, final, and interesting note, it is also plausible that through the elimination of 
the cultural elements of identity—though perhaps tactically better equipping indigenous groups 
in attaining greater ‘material’ equity in the face of the neo-liberal project—the indigenous effect 
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a change that would, in fact, strongly favor the neo-liberal project’s long-term advances of 
political and economic liberal ‘homogenization in uniformity’ of all peoples/individuals. 
 
Hence, through the ‘potent’ force of the ‘Indigenous’, Jung has been able to show as to the 
varied dimensions to the Indigenous – how the Indigenous act and react upon themselves and for 
the others in a manner to forge a more vivid, vibrant discourse of their development; a 
development not only in economic terms but also in terms of its mental capacities, which does 
come out as an effective and especially in the contemporary arena of International Politics a 
significant force for change or a reform of the society, a polity or an economy.   
 
Contrary to the above-mentioned paradigms, Will Kymlicka, in ‘The Politics of 
Multiculturalism’, considers the risks and damage caused by equivocating different minority 
groups within the same ‘multicultural’ terminology. Nancy Fraser’s “From Redistribution to 
Recognition?” divides the aspirations of minority groups into traditional socio-economic 
redistribution, and novel demands for recognition, examining the tension and interference 
inherent in these goals. Charles Taylor, “Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition”, 
demonstrates how two processes in the modern liberal condition, the collapse of social 
hierarchies and the quest for individualized identity, have resulted in two contrasting positions: a 
politics of universalism and a politics of difference, each calling for different approaches to 
pluralism, recognition, and the valuation of difference and different cultures. 
 
Kymlicka’s article is the most uncontroversial and the least substantive. His concern lies with the 
generalizations in debates over multiculturalism – both in the claims of advocates and detractors 
regarding its effects and regarding its classification of minorities. While he believes the 
terminology chosen is unimportant, a differentiation must occur between ‘national minorities’ 
and multinational states on the one hand, and individual or familial immigrants and polytechnic 
societies on the other. While both national minorities and immigrant communities identify with a 
nation different from the majority culture, their experience of history, relationship with the state 
or majority culture, and demands for rights and recognition therefore, diverge dramatically. That 
immigrants, who largely desire to integrate themselves into a new culture, should be considered 
analytically distinct from national minorities, who have often had that culture imposed upon 
them, should be commonsensical. 
 
 
Fraser aims similarly to subdivide approaches to pluralism, but from the standpoint of post-
socialist social movements. Where the Marxian conception of ‘class’ led to demands for 
socioeconomic redistribution, the new era of ‘identity’ requires ‘recognition’. In large part, 
recognition is necessary to address negative self-esteem and violence imposed through 
denigratory reflections of relationships of power, often linked to Hegel’s original Master-Slave 
dialectic. While Fraser’s deconstruction of the struggle for justice into demands redistribution 
and recognition, and through affirmative or transformative approaches, is not intuitively obvious, 
it only engages with straw men. Very self-aware that no prototypical ‘culturally marginalized’ or 
‘socioeconomically marginalized’ exists, and similarly no purely ‘affirmative’ or 
‘transformative’ approach is implemented, Fraser plods forward. Her overgeneralizations 
continue, claiming that affirmative measures will reinforce group differentiation while 
transformative ones erase these lines. This seems questionably applicable, if not outright false. 
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‘Queer politics’ and ‘socialist revolution’ are seen as approaches for transformative recognition 
and redistribution respectively. Historically, however, queer politics have highlighted the divide 
between ‘mainstream’ heterosexuality and those demanding queer recognition. The Soviet 
Union, similarly, was unable to implement a society in which class was “out of business” as a 
category. This is not to say their attack on institutionalized categories is not warranted – only that 
in its idealized form it is patently difficult and potentially destructive. 
 
Fraser’s dismissal of affirmative policies is similarly weak. She argues that ‘surface’ recognition 
or redistribution will leave sociological structures in place, requiring further adjustments in 
future. This will lead to a perception that the marginalized group is actually being overly 
benefited. In turn, once demands for recognition are raised this will ‘pour oil on the flames’. Not 
only does the possibility of historically marginalized groups being overwhelmingly perceived as 
unfairly assisted seem unlikely, there is no reason for Fraser to assume redistribution will 
precede recognition.  
 
In Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, Charles Taylor examined two different 
approaches to the politics of equal recognition: the politics of universal dignity, which origin 
from the collapse of social hierarchies, the basis for old concept of "honor" and the politics of 
difference which origin from a notion of individualized identity, and we called it "authenticity". 
There is a conflict between "the politics of universal dignity" and "the politics of difference": 
while the former supports the non-discrimination through being difference-blind, the latter 
believes the value of any different identity is equal and different identities deserve equal 
recognition, but not necessarily equal treatment. The former criticized the latter that it violates 
the principle of non-discrimination and the latter criticized the former that first, it negates 
identity by forcing people into a homogenous mold that is untrue to them. And second, the 
supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a 
reflection of one hegemonic culture. The second critique is actually raising the idea of 
multiculturalism. Taylor fundamentally supports the multiculturalism which assumes all the 
culture have the equal value. Taylor believes this assumption is just a start of the analysis. 
"Fusion of horizons", is operating through our developing new vocabularies of comparison, by 
means of which we can articulate these contrasts, should be taken into account. However, Taylor 
just raised this idea without a deeper analysis of how it works. He said "what the presumption 
requires of us is... a willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must 
displace our horizons in the resulting fusions. What it requires above all is an admission that we 
are very far away from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures 
might be evident. This would mean breaking with an illusion that still holds many 
'multiculturalists' -- as well as their most bitter opponents—in its grip." 
 
Again reflecting Kymlicka in The Politics of Multiculturalism, he believes there are two broad 
patterns of cultural diversity. National minorities wish to maintain themselves as distinct 
societies alongside the majority culture, and demand various forms of autonomy or self-
government to ensure their survival as distinct societies because their culture arises from the 
incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into a larger state. 
Ethnic groups, which culture arises from individual and familial immigrations, wish to integrate 
into the larger society, and to be accepted as full member of it. What's more, both of these 
patterns can be distinguished from "new social movements", in which people have been 
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marginalized within their own national society or ethnic group. All liberal democracies are 
multinational which is composed by national minorities or poly-ethnic which is composed by 
ethnic groups or both. He discussed three important ways in which democracies have responded 
to the demands of national minorities and ethnic groups. First, in most multination states, the 
component nations are inclined to demand the self-government rights, a form of political 
autonomy or territorial jurisdiction, so as to ensure the full and free development of their cultures 
and the best interests of their people. Second, immigrant groups demand the poly-ethnic rights 
which intended to help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity 
and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the 
dominant society. At last, national minorities, ethnic groups and other non-ethnic social groups 
are increasingly interested in the idea of special representation rights which are often defended as 
a response to some systemic disadvantage or barrier in the political process which makes it 
impossible for the groups' views and interests to be effectively represented. 
 
In From Redistribution to Recognition, because of the struggle for material equality and 
recognition, two analytically distinct understandings of injustice, Fraser assumes that justice 
today requires both redistribution and recognition as the approaches to eliminate injustice. The 
redistribution is the remedy for economic injustice which requires a political-economic 
restructuring of some sort while recognition is the remedy for cultural injustice which requires 
the cultural or symbolic change. Since redistribution tends to promote group differentiation and 
recognition tends to undermine it, these two kinds of claim stand in tension with each other. 
They can interfere with or even work against each other. People who are subject to both cultural 
injustice and economic injustice and need both remedies will face this contradiction which is 
called redistribution-recognition dilemma. Then she examined alternative conceptions of 
redistribution and recognition: affirmation and transformation. Affirmative remedies for injustice 
aims at correcting inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying 
framework that generates them while transformative remedies aim 
at correcting inequitable outcomes by restructuring the underlying generative framework. By 
combining the approaches together, we get four pairs of remedies to solve the redistribution and 
recognition dilemma.  
 
Charles Taylor's work provided us a new perspective to analyze multiculturalism. I doubt 
whether we can achieve the "fusion of horizons", because it requires deconstructing our current 
culture system which is the very basis of "fusion of horizons". However, it can be regard as a 
ultimate goal of multiculturalism research and a standard to find out fallacies of other analysis. 
Will Kymlicka analyzes multiculturalism from the perspective of the origin of cultural groups 
while Nancy Fraser analyze multiculturalism from the perspective of the root of injustice. 
However, both of them failed to achieve the ultimate horizon. Especially in Fraser's well 
organized and coherent work, I found she ignored the point that socialism is also constructed by 
the powerful group. Socialist-feminist redistribution and deconstruction of women could lead to 
the problem that women may be suppressed by the ideology of class, a masculine ideology. 
Chinese Cultural revolution is a perfect instance of the combination of Socialist-feminist 
redistribution and deconstruction of women. What we can see is that women did get some 
equality but were suppressed in a greater masculine socialist structure. The same happens in the 
racial problem. Deconstruction of a certain identity under the current normative horizon would 
harm the unity of the group and cover the inequality among groups. 
41 
The Dynamic Notion of Cultural Identity: Implications for Human Rights 
Dhruv Pande LUISS Guido Carli 
 
 
Comparing with other approaches, the combination between socialism and deconstruction of 
cultural politics may be the best way to finesse the dilemma for the bivalent collectivities. But it 
still has its own defects. 
 
In The Politics of Multiculturalism, Kymlicka defines and differentiates what he identifies as 
“multination states and polyethnic states”. In doing so, he identifies what he sees as marked 
differences in the way that these groups are founded and maintain existence. Multination states, 
for Kymlicka, are formed by absorbed, often Indigenous groups that share a language and are 
often granted distinct rights or claims to language and land within the given territory. This is in 
contrast to polyethnic states, which normally have a non-homogenous citizenry and large 
immigrant populations that usually speak the dominant language of the state in which they 
reside. While it is possible for an immigrant group to become a national minority, this is not the 
norm. These groups often band together to remain distinct from the hegemonic culture of the 
state. Kymlicka identifies three ways that minority groups may wish to ensure the 
accommodation of distinct group rights. These measures are, “self-government rights”, 
“polyethnic rights”, and “special representation rights”. Self-government rights are described as 
Kymlicka as being presented as “inherent” and therefore, “permanent”, which would perhaps put 
self-government at odds with progressive liberal modes of thought. 
 
Polyethnic laws are presented as being involved in “exemptions” from laws, often for the 
preservation of religious practices and seek to preserve distinct cultural norms that are perhaps at 
odds with the states prescribed modes of being. Polyethnic rights are also seen as a permanent 
measure, meant to preserve distinct cultural aspects, rather than eliminating differentiations. 
Group representation, in contrast to polyethnic rights and self-government rights, are seen as 
temporary measures meant to provide an advantage for minority groups so that they may gain an 
equal footing with the state's dominant society. 
 
While not the focus of the text, Kymlicka recognizes that there has been neglect in the 
recognition of national minorities in the past, due in a large part to the colonial history of many 
Western state. This practice, says Kymlicka, infers a sort of inferiority toward noncolonial 
histories, cultures and heritages This relates directly to the article by Taylor, who discusses the 
political importance of recognition in states. Taylor identifies his thesis by stating “our identity is 
partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a 
person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around 
them reflects a confining, demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. This thesis identifies 
the importance of recognition in societies and locates meaning and identity not within the 
individual alone but presents it as a complex relationship between the individual and others. 
When studied in this manner, recognition becomes the duty of not only individual and groups 
who are marginalized, but a problem that affects and is effected by the greater whole. So in 
contrast to Kymlicka, Taylor focuses not on the liberal individual but instead on a state or society 
as a whole. 
 
Recognition, for Taylor, does not rest in an easily universalizable set of principles to which a 
group can subscribe. Taylor illustrates that a critique of policies that seek to absorb minority 
groups rather than preserve distinctions by stating “the supposedly neutral set of differenceblind 
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principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture as it 
turns out, then, only the minority or suppressed cultures are being forced to take alien form”. 
This points to the greater problem of non-recognition in a society. Policies which do not offer 
recognition may be masking discriminatory actions under the guise of difference-blindness. Like 
Kymlicka, Taylor describes modes used to preserve differences in Canada. But rather than 
identifying broad modes that identify how groups obtain these rights, Taylor focuses on 
particulars drawn somewhat from First Nations but focused mainly on moves made by 
Quebecois to preserve their language and culture. By illustrating the problems presented by 
liberal policies that point toward universal goals for a homogenous culture, Taylor points to 
issues that these liberal democracies may face, stating “the rigidities of procedural liberalism 
may rapidly become impractical in tomorrow's world”. Therefore, we must move toward a 
politics which recognizes the worth and dignity of other cultures, not based on a preexisting 
colonial (or non-colonial) modes of judgment but toward “the ultimate horizon from which the 
relative worth of different cultures might be evident”. 
 
Much like Taylor, Fraser also focuses on issues of recognition. However, Fraser chooses to focus 
on the intersection of inequalities and a lack of recognition of or respect for minority cultures. 
Fraser sees the enmeshment of inequality and disrespect within Western culture and seeks to 
nuance and problematize these issues, showing that they are not mutually exclusive, but rather 
form a complex relationship that cannot be disentangled. Fraser points out that the analytic 
approaches to economic and cultural injustices often aim to separate these two issues. However, 
Fraser seeks to show the intimate relationship between these two issues and states “overcoming 
class exploitation requires restructuring the political economy so as to alter the class distribution 
of social burdens and social benefits’. In showing the relationship of these two issues, there can 
be a move toward policies that treat both of these endemic issues in contemporary societies. She 
identifies both affirmative and transformative modes of redistribution as ways in which the 
dilemmas of recognition are being broached, and states that “affirmative remedies can have the 
perverse effect of promoting class differentiation, transformative remedies tend to blur it”. 
 
Transformative redistribution tends to re-think the current ways of identifying and relating to 
other groups, replacing traditional dichotomies with a rich, complex and ever-evolving 
understanding (or dismantling) of cultural relations. While transformative approaches appear to 
be endorsed by Fraser, ultimately the conclusion of the article is that “(t)he redistribution-
recognition dilemma is real. There is no neat theoretical move by which it can be wholly 
dissolved or resolved”. This conclusion does not negate, nor minimize the necessity for a re-
thinking of cultural and economic relations. 
 
The articles of Kymlikca, Taylor and Fraser serve to give a greater understanding of societal (and 
economic) relations and the necessity for policy and societal shifts in attitudes toward minority 
groups. As we move toward societies that are increasingly heterogeneous, there mustbe 
accommodation and recognition of those with whom we share our space and coexist. The articles 
highlight several approaches with which we may attempt to move toward more positive inter-
cultural interactions, and identify gulfs between minority and hegemonic groups that cannot be 
ignored. The readings for this week broadly focus on questions of recognition and 
multiculturalism. Reading Taylor, Kymlicka and Fraser in sequence served to complicate my 
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existing views on multiculturalism and brought to light many of the challenges – theoretical and 
empirical – inherent in the politics of multiculturalism and recognition. 
 
Charles Taylor articulates a pro-multiculturalists argument in his piece The Politics of 
Recognition. Taylor points out that the multiculturalists thesis centres on misrecognition. He 
examines the theories of Rousseau, Kant, Herder and Hegel to trace how identity recognition has 
become a vital human need. Taylor believes we construct our personal identity through dialogue 
with ourselves and with others. In considering the practical implications of these theories, Taylor 
asserts that recognizing difference in modern states means ending discrimination and second-
class citizenship in these states.  
 
Will Kymlicka puts forth a self-described liberal theory of multiculturalism in his book 
Multicultural Citizenship. Kymlicka discusses two types of states – multination and polyethnic – 
and the barriers to recognition that exist within each. Typically, multination states are comprised 
of different groups with distinct cultures, many of which Kymlicka suggests, may deserve 
autonomy or self-government rights. By contrast, polyethnic states are comprised of different 
immigrant groups who possess distinct cultures and demand recognition within the confines of 
the liberal state. Kymlicka asserts that to test the liberality of a societies’ immigration policy, one 
can examine how it defines the concept of national membership. A liberal state, according to 
Kymlicka, will define national membership as a question of integration rather than as a question 
of descent. While, I agree with Kymlicka that this should be true of liberal states, I fail to see 
how he can promote a form of particularize such as the politics of recognition and liberal 
integration policy for immigrants in the same theory. To me, these two concepts are 
fundamentally at odds with each other. Finally, Kymlicka articulates three forms of group-
differentiated rights – self-government rights, polyethnic 
rights and special representation rights, which, unless they are temporary measures, I disagree 
with. In a liberal society, the principles of equality and universalism should hold and any 
differentiated treatment seems to me, to be very unjust. 
 
Fraser argues that in the post-socialist age, questions of culture triumph over questions of class 
and as such have become the mobilizing force for group politics. She believes this is problematic 
and that the development of a critical theory of recognition needs to be established in order to 
redress this imbalance. She believes that economic and cultural injustices reinforce each other 
dialectically, producing a vicious circle of cultural and economic subordination. The dilemma is 
that those fighting against cultural injustice are attempting to promote differentiation and seek 
recognition, while those fighting against economic injustice are aiming to promote a greater 
sense of unity and seek redistribution. Affirmation, which aims to correct inequitable outcomes 
without disturbing the existing societal framework, and transformation, which aims to correct 
inequitable outcomes through 
the reconstruction of the existing societal framework, are approaches to remedy these injustices. 
Four scenarios are put forth by Fraser based on the recognitionredistribution/ affirmation-
transformation dichotomies she outlined. These are the liberal welfare state, socialism, 
mainstream multiculturalism and deconstruction. She asserts that the liberal welfare state is 
compatible with mainstream multiculturalism and that socialism is compatible with 
deconstruction. Ultimately, Fraser concludes that the combination of socialism and 
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deconstruction will provide the best results because it covers a wide variety of intersectional 
scenarios in its approach. 
 
While Taylor believes his critics would call the politics of difference an exercise in undue 
favouritism, my issue with Taylor’s argument centres on his approach to recognition. I think he 
focuses too much on the cultural side of recognition, while failing to take into account the 
socioeconomic implications that distinct cultural minorities often face. Indeed, while he does not 
share this view, Kymlicka asserts that opponents to multiculturalism argue that it ghettoizes 
minorities and impedes their integration into mainstream society. If Taylor were to focus on 
these types of problems his work would have greater practical implications. This is because he 
would ensure that socioeconomic imbalances take primacy over matters of cultural difference. 
And this, I think, is more in line with liberalism in its most pure sense. 
 
Kymlicka is also guilty of limiting his treatment of the politics of recognition and the groups that 
should be represented by this kind of politics. Indeed, Kymlicka explicitly states that he will not 
consider the groups that fall under the ‘new movement’ group of politics. Most problematic, 
Kymlicka asserts that those who are marginalized based on ‘new movement’ categories are 
marginalized by their own national society or group. So, both Kymlicka and Taylor leave out 
questions of gender, sexual orientation, race and class thus ignoring the intersectional forms of 
discrimination that many immigrants face. In my opinion, Nancy Fraser gives this question more 
due than either Kymlicka or Taylor. Indeed, in considering a four-scenario intersectional 
mapping of approaches to cultural and economic injustice, Fraser makes it her project to examine 
the best way to rectify the types of injustice that people livng at the margins of mainstream 
society often face. 
 
In the “Politics of Recognition”, Charles Taylor discusses how the need for recognition is 
predicated on identity, which he defines as “a person’s understanding of who they are”. Concern 
for acknowledgement of one’s identity is a modern phenomenon, related to two social 
transformations. First, democracies have dismissed the concept of honour (which is necessary 
exclusive to certain individuals), and replace it by the notion of dignity (which equally applies to 
everyone). The second change that has made the new preoccupation with identity salient is the 
development of the idea of “authenticity”, according to which individuals are endowed with 
“inner depths” that make them singular. Taylor argues that the development of authenticity as an 
imperative of being true to one’s self resulted from the decline of hierarchies, which specified the 
content of a person’s “identity” in function of her social position. Therefore, recognition of one’s 
identity is not anymore given by the common acceptance of social roles, but must be earned in a 
continuous dialogue with others. For Taylor, the concern for recognition is not limited to private 
identities, but has entered the public sphere as well. Taylor identifies a tension between two 
types of demands, similar to the one underlined by Nancy Fraser in the principle of universal 
equality paradoxically leads to the recognition of the particular. “The universal demand powers 
an acknowledgment of specificity”. Whereas the politics of universal dignity aims at eliminating 
inequalities in a difference-blind manner, the politics of difference seek to maintain and protect 
group’s distinctiveness. For Taylor, a strict liberal politics that insists on the procedural respect 
of uniform rules is in fact inappropriate for a society that pursues collective goals such as 
“survival”. Ultimately, cultures that “have provided the horizon of meaning for a large numbers 
of human beings” deserve to be recognized as valuable and to be protected. If Taylor illustrates 
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how the concept of identity has developed historically without apparently endorsing it, in the 
end, he does not question the legitimacy of this concept as a basis for politics. Moreover, it may 
well be that cultural groups in Western societies use the language of recognition and rights to 
secure their religious practices, for example, without this constituting an attempt to have their 
identity acknowledged. 
 
In the chapter “The Politics of Multiculturalism”, Will Kymlicka seemingly attempts to dispel 
some common misinterpretations of multiculturalism in the public debate. He argues that there 
are in fact two modes of incorporation of minority groups, each of which entail different 
legitimate claims and corresponding political solutions. Multinational states integrated into their 
realm independent nations that formerly governed themselves. Kymlicka defines nations as 
entities possessing political institutions, that are located on a given territory and that possess a 
distinct culture. For their part, poly-ethnic states are formed by a large fraction of immigrants 
that voluntary joined the country. Unlike Taylor, recognition does not derive from the equal 
worth of cultures that would be depreciated if not granted proper acknowledgement. Rather 
recognition is based on political relations of cultural groups to the larger society. Different 
historical modes of integration require “special group-specific measures for accommodating 
national and ethnic differences”: “(1) self-government rights; (2) poly-ethnic rights; (3) special 
representation rights. Both Taylor and Kymlicka solely address questions of political/cultural 
rights in their discussion of recognition, which is symptomatic of a tendency in society to make 
the “struggle for recognition” “the paradigmatic form of political conflict in the late twentieth 
century”.  
 
Fraser identifies a tension between, on one hand, recognition, which encourages group 
differentiation and, on the other, redistribution, which aims at eliminating inequalities between 
groups. In search for a solution to the dilemma between redistribution and recognition, Fraser 
attempts to elaborate a politics that reconciles the two (or rather, save the former from 
disqualification). While she admits that both types of inequalities intersect in actuality, Fraser 
analytically distinguishes between the two in order to articulate two sets of remedies: affirmation 
and transformation. In the domain of recognition, affirmation endorses existing categories, but 
tries to valorise them in subverting their pejorative content. In contrast, transformation seeks to 
deconstruct group identities. Similarly, affirmation does not aim at modifying the economic 
structure, but at providing welfare-state measures that ensure a better redistribution without 
eliminating socio-economic groups created by the economic system. Alternatively, 
transformation, which can be associated with socialism, seeks to alter “the social division of 
labour” and eliminate classes themselves. 
 
Fraser’s main argument is that the project that allies transformation in both the realm of 
redistribution and recognition is the more apt at addressing the dilemma. I believe the tension on 
which Fraser builds her entire argument could have been more elaborated. For example, it may 
easily be argued that differences between groups must initially be acknowledged to overcome 
corollary economic inequalities (see for example the case of Brazil as discussed by Anthony 
Marx). Similarly, economic distribution does not have for goal “to abolish race” but to reduce 
the inequalities between “races”, so that they become economically irrelevant even if they may 
(or may not) This response argues that multiculturalism is caught in a bind despite attempts to 
resolve its flaws. First, it outlines the case for a politics of recognition. Next, it raises and 
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resolves the tensions that Taylor and Kymlicka identify with multiculturalism. Finally, it shows 
that Frasers critique of multiculturalism strikes multiculturalism at a more foundational level that 
Taylor or Kymlicka has resolved, but her solution is less acceptable to the affected groups. Thus, 
the politics of recognition is caught between a difficult battle for a solution that fixes its flaws, or 
an easy solution which keeps them. 
 
The case for a politics of difference is made by Taylor. He suggests that an individual’s authentic 
identity is not entirely self-determined, but formed exogenously by societal group recognition. 
Thus, he suggests that the misrecognition of one’s identity by society, such as with liberalism’s 
universal application of rights, is oppressive and undermines an individual’s flourishing. 
Therefore, Taylor advocates for multiculturalism’s support for group identity to promote the 
societal affirmation of the individual’s self. While this argument for recognizing identity is 
useful, Taylor and Kymlicka find problems in it which they attempt to resolve. Taylor raises the 
tension between multicultural group rights and liberal individual rights. While the bulk of his 
essay argues for necessity of difference, he still believes in some liberal conception of equality 
rights, such as habeas corpus. Thus, he examines whether liberalism is always homogenizing or 
whether it can co-exist with multiculturalism. In the end, Taylor’s resolution is that while 
liberalism is inhospitable to difference, variants of the liberal model that calls for defending 
certain fundamental rights, but allowing flexibility on others, can allow multiculturalism’s 
politics of difference and liberal equality rights to coexist. 
 
Kymlicka problem with the “multiculturalism” is that it is too ambiguous. That is, the above 
defence of the politics recognition makes it appear that every minority should be afforded equal 
recognition of their distinct identity. Kymlicka suggests this harmfully downplays the stronger 
group rights that should be accorded to national minorities as compared to that of ethnic 
immigrant minorities. Indeed, he claims the lack of this distinction and the subsequent belief that 
“New World” countries, such as the US, are entirely immigrant nations have led to the denial of 
indigenous people’s right to self government. Thus, Kymlicka’s resolution is to define the 
differences between national minorities, with a legitimate claim to a distinct self-governing 
society, and ethnic immigrant minorities, who should largely integrate into the dominant 
culture’s society. 
 
Despite Taylors and Kymlicka’s defence of multiculturalism, Fraser’s discussion on recognition 
and redistribution raises two challenges to multiculturalism. Her first challenge is that 
multiculturalism only deals with recognition but not redistribution. This is a problem because 
some “bivalent” groups, such as gender and race, require both. Yet, this creates a dilemma as the 
two solutions work in contradictory fashions; recognition solidifies difference but redistribution 
undermines it. Thus, in general, it appears that race cannot be addressed by multiculturalism as 
the redistributive remedies that race socioeconomically requires, contradicts the cultural need for 
differentiation. 
 
Second, Fraser further nuances her criticism to show that even if redistribution and recognition 
are reconciled to not have conflicting goals, multiculturalism is still problematic. She does this 
by separating affirmative with transformative remedies. Both remedies deal with injustices. But 
while affirmative remedies do not change the underlying structural framework, transformative 
remedies undermine it. Thus, affirmative remedies are coherent if applied to both recognition 
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and redistribution in so far that both remedies maintain difference; this she states would be 
multiculturalism and the liberal welfare state. However, affirmative remedies are incoherent in so 
far that the affirmative redistribution creates societal stigmatization due to the perception of 
unfairly benefiting from the larger society. Thus, even if redistribution and recognition do not 
work in contradictory fashions via having both remedies be affirmative ones, this creates the 
additional problem of stigmatization due to affirmative redistribution. 
 
Consequently, Fraser believes transformative redistribution and remedies (economic socialism 
and cultural deconstruction) would overcome contradictory goals by focusing on undermining 
differences, as well as not result in stigmatization. The principal drawback she sees however is 
that socialism and deconstructionism are too removed from the interests and identities of people 
of colour. In conclusion, multiculturalism is caught in a bind. On one hand, as Taylor 
emphasizes, the discourse of recognition that is the basis of multiculturalism is comfortable to us 
because it is the result of certain historical developments. But multiculturalism suffers from the 
foundational contradiction that Fraser raises. On the other hand, Fraser’s conception of 
transformative remedies overcomes the problems of multiculturalism more so than Taylor and 
Kymlicka have addressed. Yet, unlike multiculturalism, socialism and deconstructionism is far 
removed from what society is comfortable of working towards. 
 
Will Kymlicka, in “The Politics of Multiculturalism,” engages with the “multicultural question.” 
He critiques public multicultural discourse for merging different types of minorities into one 
lump conception in the minority/majority dichotomy. He prefers a clear differentiation of 
cultural diversity and corresponding types of minority groups: National minorities, consisting of 
previously autonomous and independent collectivizes which are (implicitly; forcefully) 
amalgamated into a larger state; and mass immigration, leading to a consolidation of these 
peoples into “ethnic groups” and “polyethnicity.” For Kymlicka, most states are multinational; 
they consist of both national minorities and “ethnic groups,” and these diverse groups must, 
somehow, feel allegiance to the state for the survival of this. The challenge, then, of 
multiculturalism is the incorporation of these minority groups – national minorities and 
“polyethnicity” - into this larger state in a feasible and just manner. He concludes that liberal 
democracy and the corresponding protection of (individual) rights is the best way to go about 
this.  
 
Charles Taylor’s arguments result, like Kymlicka’s, from his critique of multicultural discourse 
and the politics of this. Unlike Kymlicka, however, Taylor does not engage with this 
multicultural question through ‘mere’ terminology. Instead, he examines linkages between 
identity and recognition, and the relational (or dialogical) nature of these. Two differing, and 
temporally specific, notions of the identity-recognition relations are examined: The “politics of 
universalism” and the “politics of difference.” The first arose from a collapse of historically 
specific conceptions of “honour” as rooted in hierarchical social structures to a focus on 
“dignity,” and the universality of this concept as pertaining to all people (read: men) equally. The 
shift from honour to dignity entailed the “equalization” of rights and entitlements among and 
across men, leading to the universality of this approach to recognition. It rests on a “difference-
blindness,” and related focus on the commonality of (hu)man existence and sense of self (i.e., 
identity). Contrastingly, however, is the focus on the particularity of (hu)man experience and 
existence. A “politics of difference” emerged, where the recognition of difference, or 
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particularity, is vital for due recognition. While both, Taylor argues, are centered around the 
issue of respect, and correspondingly I would venture, justice, these two “politics” are clearly in 
conflict with each other. Particularly concerning is the perversion of the former (universalistic 
principles of recognition) through the reproduction of inequality and non-recognition under the 
guise of universalism. This is to say, universalistic principles of “difference-blindness” enables 
the imposition of hegemonic conceptions of identity and recognition onto “minorities.” I find this 
similar to previous discussions on “race-blindness” and gender; the notion of ‘going beyond our 
differences’ to the ‘essence’ of humanity enables the gross marginalization, and here, non-
recognition of those who do not necessarily fit into this hegemonic ideal. 
 
This issue of recognition and the universal/particular dichotomy is taken up by Nancy Fraser. 
Her chapter “From Redistribution to Recognition?” presents our current societal structure as 
“postsocialist,” with a shift from redistribution (economic equality) to recognition (identity 
recognition) as the main arena of conflicts. Group identity, cultural domination and cultural 
recognition replace class identity, (economic) exploitation and socioeconomic redistribution in 
the political struggle(s) for justice and equity. Two sources injustice are presented: (1) 
socioeconomic injustice, connected to the socioeconomic structure of society, and hence the 
politics of redistribution, and (2) cultural-symbolic injustice, connected to the production of 
social meaning in representation and interpretation, and hence the politics of recognition. 
 
Fraser does concede that this distinction is analytical, yet builds upon this her argument for 
different remedies for the two types of injustices. These then come into conflict with each other, 
and result in the redistribution-recognition dilemma. This dilemma is due to the oppositional 
nature of the two modes of remedying injustice; recognition tends to promote “group 
differentiation” (particularity) while redistribution aims to eliminate this (universalism). Fraser 
goes on to illustrate how remedies may be conceptualized as affirmative or transformative. The 
former involves rectifying the outcomes of inequality, while the latter involves rectifying the 
processes/structure of inequality. Again, the issue of universalism/particularism is present in the 
discussion; Fraser argues that affirmative remedies promote group differentiation; transformative 
remedies promote the “destabilization” of differences. She concludes that the most feasible way 
of dealing with injustice and the redistribution-recognition dilemma is a combination of 
affirmative/transformative remedies dependent upon the type of injustice; whether it is 
socioeconomic or cultural in nature. 
 
Although she states that injustices and the struggles to rectify these are intersectional, her 
analysis is highly, and problematically, paradigmatic. I find the dichotomy of universalism and 
particularism fascinating in the debate of minority/majority relations, recognition of identity, and 
the just acknowledgement and engagement with human differentiation (perhaps; individuality?). 
This tension is inherently foundational to Taylor’s and Fraser’s discussions. Kymlicka’s chapter, 
however, does not engage with the dilemma in the same way; his treatment of group-specific 
rights (self-government rights, poly-ethnic rights, etc.) is based on a particularistic understanding 
of (group) identity. I remain, however, unconvinced of the superiority of either universal or 
particular approaches to just human coexistence, relations, and (relational) identities. While the 
readings illustrate considerations stemming from this dichotomy, none of them are sufficiently 
convincing regarding how to understand others, and thus ourselves, in “multicultural” society. 
 
49 
The Dynamic Notion of Cultural Identity: Implications for Human Rights 
Dhruv Pande LUISS Guido Carli 
 
Hence, with this detailed comparative study of Taylor, Kymlicka and Fraser, we have been able 
to look into the much existent factors of the differences in discourses, out of which comes out a 
more justificatory position of the post-colonialists’. Hence, even if there might be debates on the 
questions of Multiculturalism, the very concepts are being questioned, as to the efficacy and the 
ensured long-lasting credibility of such concepts especially at a time when we have come out 
free of the colonial rule; but to raise the question as to how free be us in the minds. In the debates 
above, we have discussed at length about the Poly-ethnicity, but we can see a clear distinction as 
to the grounding of ethnicity in these issues, and then we can aim toward a poly-ethnic platform. 
A further in-depth analysis of a statement of anti-essentializing tendency is explained in the next 
section.  
 
3.6 Other Anti-Essential Dimensions 
 
The very interesting insight about the relation between certain mechanisms of representation, 
recognition and redistribution and the logic of power between the governmental actions, allows 
me to raise a question about the concept of “identity”. According to Jung, “the Mexican 
Revolution did not merely mobilize a peasant base, it set out to create a peasantry, both 
materially, through land distribution, and epistemologically, through the formation of class 
consciousness”. Through the reading of Mexican history, we testify various ideas (or strategies?) 
related to the indigenous identity: in the colonial era the racialized society originated the 
República de indios and its autonomy; the liberal component of the independence movement 
abolished the separated status of the Indians; the Mexican Revolution incorporated indigenous 
people into the farmer’s class; finally, contemporary efforts point toward a renovated importance 
of the indigenous identity and their cultural richness. All of these strategies are related with some 
forms of propriety, some understandings of the notion of “Indian”, etc. 
 
My first reaction would be related to the idea of disempowerment: the history of the relations, 
definitions and even progresses of Mexico’s most vulnerable group answers to a logic of 
disempowerment, in the sense that every strategy of representation, redistribution or recognition 
ends up silencing the group’s capacity to counteract political establishment. Of course, this 
framing process is not absolutely evil, as Jung correctly notices: “They make the public sphere 
more manageable, less chaotic than it could be if literally everything were subject to 
contestation”. Anyway, I think that government needs are, finally, the motor of this strategies 
and framings. But, aren’t this government’s strategies (often) unavoidable? I mean, doesn’t 
government define such strategies as a kind of reaction against change? When something 
disturbs the status quo, and the original understandings and definitions cease to be effective, 
government’s reaction appears in the form of these strategies. So, although every government is 
granted with some kind of liberty (or choice) to carry on some strategies while avoiding others, 
they seem also fettered by the force I have called “change”. My question is, then, how (if so) can 
we sculpt healthier meanings of “identity” by understanding the structure of change? And more 
important, can governments anticipate change, or the latter imposes upon the former? I would 
like, finally, to ask Jung a marginal question. I noticed that she didn’t explore the Zapatista 
insurrection of 1994. I believe that this guerrilla shocked the government and forced some 
important changes (in the sense I have described above) in the relationship between the 
indigenous people and the government. So, why to leave his movement aside? 
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When reading Foucault and those he has influenced, like Judith Butler, it sometimes seems to me 
that the image of humanity he presents us with is somewhat like those poor sods bound up in 
Plato’s cave, except this is a cave without any way out. Forgive this conceit, but for me it 
captures some of the difficulties we had last week with Foucault’s eventalization of history and 
his concomitant refusal of normative categories. Judith Butler, at times, seems to want to have it 
both ways; she calls into question the reality of agency, but they seems to shy away from the 
consequences of this move. To my mind, this emerges most forcefully in her treatment of 
subjectivity. Butler contends that a subject, any given ‘I’, is not merely ‘situated, but constituted’ 
by “organizing principles of material practices and institutional arrangements, those matrices of 
power and discourse that produce me as a viable ‘subject’.” These principles and discourses do 
not merely preside over the subject’s coming-to-be, shaping and molding the individual through 
the (always contingent and haphazard) process of self-articulation, but rather permeate and 
constitute the individual.  
 
Butler contends that the implication of this problematization of subjectivity “is not the advent of 
a nihilistic relativism incapable of furnishing norms, but, rather, the very precondition of a 
politically engaged critique.” I am not persuaded by her qualification. For one, the word 
‘critique’ is revealing in several ways. If any subject position is at all times pervaded by 
dominant discourses and power relations, what is it that critiques? It seems at times that the 
‘contestations’ Butler writes of are performed by competing principles and contrasting 
grammars, and the human beings that are the carriers of these overriding structures are merely 
the tools through which these battles are conducted. Moreover, it is telling that Butler writes here 
of ‘critique’ and not dialogue. Admittedly, in any dialogue, the terms of any debate are framed in 
some way that will favor some positions over others, and will condition, in some sense, the 
outcome. Yet I’m not sure that a notion of critique alone grounds the sort of political ends that 
Butler has in mind. For one, persuasion and education begin to appear as power-relations - for 
the former, the victory of one voice over another, and for the latter, the insidious domination and 
silencing of alternate voice. I’m not denying that these are often, perhaps almost always that - but 
I worry about this tendency to elide the differences between forceful coercion, and 
communication, persuasion, and judgment. Figuring power as the be-all and end-all of human 
phenomena - rather than a merely dominant phenomena that tends to overrule all things - seems 
to foreclose the possibility of fostering human judgment and allowing for communication 
between solitudes.  
 
A politics that is only critique, and no dialogue, a democracy of agonisms and contestations, 
seems in this way to endanger the radical democratization and transformation that Butler seems 
to aspire to. For this means that the call for a more radical democratization, for a transformative 
politic is yet another form of contestation, another claim to power. What grounds this call, by 
what standards can we call this good? Followed to its conclusions, an emphasis on agonism and 
contestation alone tends 
to disregard the content of what it is that is contested. How do we adjudicate between these 
claims, or should we? How do we ground even the claim that contestation itself is good? I don’t 
mean to sound too harsh; I think Butler’s work often forcefully articulates the genesis of 
subjectivity, underscoring the ways in which it is something that comes to be, rather than is 
already. 
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Jung’s work follows in this path, effectively unearthing the genealogy of these contingent 
categorizations of humanity and convincingly arguing for their insidious political consequences. 
Yet I wonder about the ontological grounds of this critique. Jung writes that “The terms in which 
we articulate justice claims also work to sustain hegemonic political projects. This... points 
primarily to the ways in which the politics of representational, redistribution and recognition act 
as constraints on (autonomous) political agency.” I think this captures something essential about 
the mechanisms of power and its political consequences. Yet in the end, unlike Butler, Jung 
appeals to agency, and stakes a normative claim on its behalf. I think this points to the 
inconsistency or a problem in Butler’s work that I attempted, rather crudely, to sketch above; she 
problematizes agency itself, but wants to strive for the liberation of agents-that-are-not-agents; 
she wants to depict political engagement as a critique, as a permanent realm of contestation, but 
neglects the ways in which this assertion relies on the normative force of her particular 
contestation- that this sort of agonism is itself a good thing. I worry that this valorization of 
contestation, in and of itself, might lead us to disregard the content of this contestation, and thus 
abdicate the responsibility to consider and adjudicate between these claims, so as to come to 
some sort of political consensus, no matter how provisional. 
 
Butler and Jung ask us to look conceptualization and theorizing as similar types of practice 
which constitute forms of domination and containment. Butler is thus concerned with 
foundationalism in political and social theorizing, if I have it right, because foundationalism 
must necessarily impose universal standards upon theories which necessarily exclude persons 
and practices. As such, such foundations must be always left open to a process of critique and 
reflexivity: “I am not doing away with [universalism], but trying to relieve the category of its 
foundationalist weight in order to render it as a site of permanent political contest.”1 Jung applies 
and builds upon this approach in her case study of indigenous politics in Mexico by looking at 
how concepts usually thought of as related to justice were used to reinforce state power at the 
expense of the indigenous population. 
 
Jung’s fascinating study bespeaks the power and advantages of such an approach. Yet, it seems 
as though this take must ultimately reckon with its own premises. That is to say, if we are to 
leave the foundations of our theories open to contest and questioning, how does the theorist, even 
the most critically-minded theorist, proceed? It appears to me as though there are un-interrogated 
premises in each of these pieces regarding the abhorrence of arbitrary power and the virtues of 
radical politics. Butler takes it as a given that we are “committed to democratic contestation 
within a postcolonial horizon,” and Jung seems committed to challenging containment strategies 
in the name of “transformative politics.” Are we to leave these premises open to contest as well? 
How are we to know “containment strategies” as necessarily detrimental? Put differently, even a 
theoretical approach committed to ongoing and perpetual interrogation of foundations must itself 
be grounded in some position from which to interrogate. It seems that this position can only be 
maintained by either falling into a constant paralyzing project of reflexive critique or by 
ultimately not following the project to its conclusions, picking a radical position, and critiquing 
the status quo from there. 
 
Now we turn to James Tully, one of the foremost voices on Post-Modernism, who states politics 
are first and foremost activities of disclosure and acknowledgment—that is, identity politics are 
primarily (a) practices oriented toward the public unveiling of an identity-related difference that 
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has been neglected, distorted or silenced by the majority, and (b) demands addressed to this 
majority to acknowledge the disclosure of this non-recognized identity. The principle which 
underpins the politics of disclosure is not primarily dignity, self-respect or self-esteem, but 
freedom: the democratic freedom to compete for the modification of the current structure of 
recognition as our identities change in the course of the very process of identity criticism and 
disclosure. This freedom of bringing something new to the public realm can be re-described as 
what William Connolly appropriately calls “the politics of becoming.” The politics of becoming 
problematize and transform the often sediment “politics of being” (the current structure of 
recognition). 
 
For Tully, the inter-subjective and agonic activity of disclosure and acknowledgment is “an 
intrinsic good of modern politics” and should therefore “be examined in its own terms, rather 
than as a failure of recognition”. Even when the acknowledgment takes the form of a politics of 
non-recognition, as was the case for gays and lesbians for numerous years, the politics of 
disclosure remains utile and productive for two main reasons. The first reason is that disclosure 
initiates a session of public deliberation around the contested form of recognition. 
 
Public deliberation, as we will see, fosters specific civic virtues that are much needed in 
conditions of moral and cultural pluralism. The second reason is that disclosure acts as a kind of 
public catharsis: it forces minorities to convert their alienation into public argumentation rather 
than into private frustration any settlement, as Tully points out, “will always involve varying 
degrees of the injustice of misrecognition and non-consensus. The rules of recognition will 
always be a structure of domination for some and dissent will be inevitable”. 
 
From this vantage point, the “goal of undistorted and unrestricted recognition” that Honneth sets 
forth for his “social theory with a normative content” appears to be problematic even as a 
regulative ideal. Similar to Chantal Mouffe, Tully is aware that a partially or reasonably unfair 
decision ought to be taken at some point in the deliberative process. This decision “is taken in the 
face of disagreement and dissent, and the dissenters may turn out to be correct in the long run” 
Consequently the ethical Tully sums up, in a free and open constitutional democracy we will 
always be in a position of beginning again: entering into discussions and negotiations over 
reasonable demands to modify some existing rule of the global system, and being prepared to 
acknowledge and respond to the voices of dissent that will inevitably arise in turn in response to 
the last reconciliation. Constitutional democracy must be seen as an activity, a system of 
discursive practices of rule following and rule modifying in which diversity is reconciled with 
unity through the continuous exchange of public reasons. 
 
The politics of recognition, as one of the driving forces of the “continuous exchange of public 
reasons” characteristic of democratic societies, do not seem to be withering away. It has become 
increasingly difficult to advocate for the confinement of identity within the limits of the private 
sphere alone. Nevertheless, this concept is, at least in its customary understanding, if with 
difficulties. Contemporary political struggles are too plural, convoluted and unpredictable to be 
theorized as quests for substantive and definitive recognition. Focusing on the activity of fighting 
for recognition directed our attention to the virtues (in terms of self-knowledge, self-respect and 
self-esteem) of disclosing un-recognized identities and of deliberating with other citizens about 
what should count s an appropriate form of recognition. 
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Along similar lines, group rights, rather than entailing an essentialized conception of culture, can 
be seen as the expression of disapproval and dissent toward the prevailing mode of governance 
and as particular moments in the ongoing quest for self-determination. 
 
Accordingly, identity politics can be thought of as concrete manifestations in the present of the 
unending political activity of trying to introduce new modes of being, to disrupt the sedimented 
structures of validity and legitimacy and to rearrange the configuration of the social imaginary. 
As every particular embodiment of justice means domination or some, identity politics point 
toward the undefined practice of freedom rather than to the conceptualization of a 
comprehensive theory of justice. Moreover, although normative political theory has greatly 
contributed to the understanding of temporary struggles for recognition, identity politics must 
also be thought as a democratic activity that always evades the categories of normative theory. 
Recognition may lead to awareness of the injustices being suffered, and support for temporary 
affirmative action to restore liberal universal rights. 
 
This has left precious little space for Taylor, whose examination of Quebec’s place in Canada 
within a broader discussion of identity, recognition, and the critiques from the ‘politics of 
difference’ to liberal ‘blind’ policies is the most insightful. Taylor rescues liberalism from two 
poles: the Rousseauian ‘general will’ and a strict Kantian universalism that leads to ‘procedural’ 
equality. The former requires a narrow political program, lest it justify the ideological menace of 
the Jacobins. The latter, particularly prominent in American constitutional frames, ignores the 
discriminatory effects of prima facie equal laws, and does not allow for collective goals. Instead, 
he endorses a third way – a liberalism unquestioningly attached to fundamental liberties, but 
willing to weigh ‘cultural survival’ as a collective and necessary public good. This approach, I 
believe, is a subtle endorsement of liberalism like Canada’s, as enshrined in the Charter’s 
principle of ‘reasonable accommodation’. 
 
Taylor brings liberalism into the contemporary era. His understanding of the central role of 
identity, and the dialogical process of its formation, is an improvement on the Enlightenment 
individual – rational, unattached, and atomistic. He recognizes the undeniable trend towards 
pluralism and diverse societies, and acutely maps the emerging conflict between individuals and 
groups dedicated to their ‘difference’ and a liberal state that (blindly) maintains its ‘blind’ 
policies are just. Nevertheless, he resists the slide towards relativism and nihilism. In fact, Taylor 
argues for a robust defence of liberalism as a value system. “All this is to say that liberalism 
can’t and shouldn’t claim complete cultural neutrality. Liberalism is also a fighting creed. The 
hospitable variant I espouse, as well as the most rigid forms, has to draw the line” Liberalism is 
not value-neutral. A ‘politics of universalism’ will cause friction with an emergent ‘politics of 
difference’. Despite these criticisms, Taylor shows that liberalism needn’t roll over. In fact, it is 
capable of justly handling the complexity of pluralism in today’s world. 
 
With the bringing in of these differing moves towards the support of my main argument here, 
lies underneath a tendency to make an attempt to apply these divergent perspectives into 
practice. Hence, by making an analysis of and covering aspects from the Hegelian tradition to 
James Tully, this is reflective of a trend of sorts toward a questioning the existing; hence, the 
challenge now lies in how to make an application of such a Theory into Practice. This is yet to be 
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seen in the context of existing discourses on Human Rights, before I turn towards the 
Conclusions.  
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Chapter 4 
Implementation: Application of ‘Cultural Identity’ to the Discourse of Human Rights 
Legislation(s) 
 
As discussed briefly about the challenge to apply in practice the theories mentioned in the three 
chapters, we arrive at a stage wherein I make an attempt to put this in the form of an experiment 
in this chapter. We study here the concept of Inter-Culturalism rather than Multiculturalism, we 
start by outlining some basic aims and objectives and then highlight the action-oriented tasks as 
to what we analyzed in the perspective of a dynamic cultural identity, how we put it into practice 
at the level of a conglomeration of European Nations. Thus, here is a form of Project Proposal in 
lieu of the Implementation and Application of the discourse in question. 
 
4.1 Inter-Culturalism: A European Experiment 
 
The Contextual Reference -- Intercultural Dialogue and Cross-cultural Mediation 
Overall Objectives:  Improving Intercultural skills and competence of students  Strengthen 
cooperation between social partners  Strengthen connection between education and labor 
market 
 Intercultural Dialogue and cross-cultural mediation at workplace  Intercultural Dialogue 
among Nations and a more close-knit civil society  Education pursued through Intercultural 
Dialogue  Cross-cultural imprint in the work place  A well enriched civil society  
Significant contribution to EU Global Citizenship  Shift in the profile of the Youth  
Showcasing of this implied inter-culturality by the media  Contribution to the rectification of 
Inter-generational problems 
 An alternative Identity solution 
 
Specific Objective: 
Promotion of inter-culturalitsm among youth through education, labor sector, media and the 
civil society 
 
Relevance of the Action:  Ideals and values of a multicultural environment  Civil Society 
Organizations  Local Authorities  Government Bodies  University Training Institutes  
Cooperation Agencies (Donors)  Private Sector 
 
Implementation: An Introduction -- Description of the Action and its Effectiveness:  
Visits to Migrant Centers  Special Focus on Inter-generational activities  Hold symposia on 
youth from different cultural backgrounds  Workshop for an alternative critical media 
paradigm  Inculcate common universal values/ideals through a widespread Charter  Replicate 
models of a considerable successful multicultural work-place  Create innovative recreational 
activities among all age-groups  Organize lectures on Multiculturalism from an academic 
perspective  Undertake case-studies of multicultural societies ( also through video 
conferencing )  Set parameters for other organizations/institutions 
 
Methodology: 
 Monitoring and Evaluation, Ethnography, Open Interaction, Inter-generational 
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Activities  Experiential understanding and empirical analysis  Principle of specialization and 
efficiency, based on differential human capacity  Transport, personnel for administering the 
recreational activities, stationery, managerial tasks, well versed researchers on conducting 
surveys, analysis of indicators  Post-colonial Perspective; the concept of 'demandingness'; the 
'hybrid' theory of Justice 
 
EU Official Documents:  UNESCO: Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions  European Cultural Parliament: Sibiu Declaration on 
Intercultural Dialogue European Year of Intercultural Dialogue – 2008 
 
The Significance of Academic References: Multiculturalism, The Politics of Identity and 
Recognition, Rights, et al. Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, Anne Phillips, Gurpreet Mahajan, 
Bhikhu Parekh 
 
Cultural Case Studies:  Unity in Diversity (India): Cultural Diversity, Active European 
Citizenship, Culture and Creativity as sources, A stronger voice for Europe in the world. 
 
Concluding Remark: The need for Intercultural Dialogue – Human Rights – Democracy – 
Global Justice and Cosmopolitanism. 
 
After a brief introduction to the Project Proposal, we analyze the phenomenon in light of some 
examples of a case-study of India as an exemplar in establishing ‘Unity in Diversity. And 
subsequently, we look into the academic-theoretical traditions again herein, to grasp in the 
popular mainstream the aspect of Multiculturalism and Immigration.  
 
4.2 Theoretical-Practical Evaluation 
 
UNITY IN DIVERSITY – A CASE STUDY OF INDIA1 
 
Cultural Diversity in India does have a potential for developing Active European Citizenship, 
wherein Culture and Creativity are taken as sources for forging a stronger voice for Europe in the 
world. Furthermore, the phrase is widely used to describe India, which is home to a multiethnic, 
multi-lingual and multi-religious society. The subcontinent's long and diverse history has given it 
a unique eclectic culture. The philosophy is the underlying pan-Indian philosophy echoed in 
textbooks throughout India. 
 
India's diversity has always been recognized as a source of its strength. When the British ruled 
India, women and men from different cultural, religious and regional backgrounds came together 
to oppose them. India's freedom movement had thousands of people of different backgrounds in 
it. They worked together to decide joint actions, they went to jail together, and they found 
different ways to oppose the British. Interestingly the British thought they could divide Indians 
because they were so different, and then continue to rule them. But the people showed how they 
could be different and yet be united in their battle against the British. 
 
In his book The Discovery of India Jawaharlal Nehru says that Indian unity is not something 
imposed from the outside but rather, "It was something deeper and within its fold, wildest 
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tolerance of belief and custom was practiced and every variety acknowledged and even 
encouraged." It was Nehru who contained the phrase, "unity in diversity" to describe the country 
India. India being the largest democracy in the world with a civilization more than five thousand 
years old boasts of multiple cultural origins. The cultural origins of the Indian subcontinent can 
be traced back to the Indus Valley Civilizations, the remains of which are cherished even today. 
Since the late 16th century India was under the influence of the British Empire until 15th August 
1947 the day when India gained independence. India is a land of diverse cultures, religions and 
communities. There is great diversity in our traditions, manners, habits, tastes and customs. Each 
and every region of the country portrays different customs and traditions. But though we speak 
different languages yet we are all Indians. 'Unity in Diversity' has been the distinctive feature of 
our culture. To live peacefully has been our motto and this motto has helped us to achieve 
independence. As history tells us that there has been active participation from people of different 
caste and religion. In our struggle for freedom people from different communities participated 
keeping one thing in mind that they all are Indians first. But unfortunately this peace and 
understanding among different communities has been endangered lately. India at present is 
facing many problems. The biggest of these is the problem of communalism. In their personal 
fight they are destroying their life only. In fact, it is the biggest threat to humanity and to the 
unity and integrity of the country. 
 
People from different background and culture participated in India's struggle for freedom. The 
national leaders, particularly Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, Azad and Bose had coined the slogan 
unity in diversity There are numerous others who were also involved. Be it Hindu, Muslim, 
Buddhist, Jain and Sikhs everybody had a single identity of being an Indian. It should be 
understood that all of us have multiple identities religious, linguistic, cultural, and regional and 
caste identities. No one can claim single identity. One who demands single identity i.e. national 
identity does not recognize the reality but during India's struggle for freedom no one thought in 
that manner they just thought of India's independence. Modern India presents a picture of unity 
in diversity where people of different faiths and beliefs live together in peace and harmony. Still 
today also India remains one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world. 
 
As India has always been considered as the country of Unity in Diversity, this is the land with 
Unity in Diversity. India is a land of different religions and communities. There is great diversity 
in our manners, habits, tastes and customs. We speak different languages and yet we are all 
Indians. "Unity in Diversity" has been the distinctive feature of our culture. India being the 
largest democracy in the world with a civilization more than five thousand years old boasts of 
multiple cultural origins. 
 
A lot of festivals are celebrated with a great zeal in India in spite of all whether the festival is 
Hindu oriented or Christian or whatever. This is Unity in Diversity of different festivals. All 
religions are treated equally in spite making any partiality to anyone of a specific religion .All 
religions are given equal preference. Thus India is diverse in its religions. Different Languages 
are spoken in different regions. Different cultures and different traditions are followed by 
different people of different regions. Thus we can say that Modern India presents a picture of 
unity in diversity where people of different faiths and beliefs live together in peace and harmony 
and world peace is the only motto of all Indians. Culture can be defined as a combination of 
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beliefs, values and attitudes that is shared amongst a population of people. Cultures can 
encourage creativity and they can seriously hinder them. 
 
Enabling beliefs 
 
We hold beliefs about many things, but in creativity three important areas are important: beliefs 
about possibility, beliefs about other people and beliefs about ourselves. 
 
Beliefs about people 
 
If I believe that people are generally selfish or are out to get me, then I will take a defensive 
stance when others are around and will not offer ideas that I believe will be criticized. I may also 
take the same approach towards them. Thus a Mexican stand-off is created, where neither of us 
will be creative, for fear of being criticized. If, on the other hand, I believe that people are 
basically thoughtful and caring, even though they may not always act that way, I will be more 
willing to take a chance with them. I will also be supportive of them, thus enabling them to be 
creative and encouraging them to do the same for me. 
 
Beliefs about myself 
 
If I believe that I am not creative, that it is a skill beyond me, that I am inferior to others or must 
conform at all costs, then even if others encourage me, I will be loathe even to be privately 
creative in my thinking. If, however, I believe that, given the chance, all people are creative - 
although some may be differently creative from others - and that I can be creative as the next 
person, then I will feel empowered to offer ideas whatever the situation. Cultures that embody 
beliefs that enable and encourage creativity will get just that. This need not mean setting fires all 
over the place, and other beliefs and values, such as the importance of balancing today with 
tomorrow, or the criticality of customer satisfaction, may effectively channel our thoughts and 
actions. 
 
Beliefs about possibility 
 
If I am given a crazy suggestion and think it crazy then I will treat it as crazy and nothing else. If 
I believe in black and white and less about shades of gray or colors in between, then I will see 
just black and white in everything. Perception is reality, at least inside our heads, and limited 
beliefs about what is possible will constrain our creative thinking. On the other hand, if I believe 
that all thing are possible, even though I may not achieve everything I set out to do, I will 
accomplish far more than if I believed in impossibility rather than possibility. 
 
Supportive values 
 
Values are social rules that regulate our behavior, telling us what is more or less important, what 
is right and wrong, good and bad. 
 
Negative values 
 
59 
The Dynamic Notion of Cultural Identity: Implications for Human Rights 
Dhruv Pande LUISS Guido Carli 
 
Values that say 'first achieve your personal objectives' will lead to people putting work above 
other people. Values that say 'first, obey the boss' will lead to people looking fearfully towards 
their superiors and keeping their heads down for fear of being chastened. Values that say 'don't 
rock the boat' will lead to people being risk-averse and avoiding dangerous ideas. 
 
Creative values 
 
On the other hand, values which say 'work together' or 'it is good to explore ideas' or 'managers 
should support the development of employees' or 'we must build tomorrow's company as well as 
sustaining today's business' will legitimize innovative thinking and action, and lead to people 
who value creativity and making use of ideas. 
 
Progressive attitudes 
 
Attitudes are the externalization of combinations of beliefs and values. They signal to others our 
intent and enable them to adapt accordingly. Attitudes that care only for short-term gain or 
cultural conformance send signals that discourage innovative thinking. Disapproving frowns or 
worse signal the punishment that transgressors may receive. More progressive attitudes signal 
interest in ideas and approval of innovation and creative thinking. Even if ideas are not 
implemented, their originators are rewarded with admiration for their cognitive efforts. 
 
Visible signs 
 
Artifacts, signs and symbols of culture are all around us. 
 
Artifacts 
 
Artifacts are the physical things that are found that have particular symbolism for a culture. They 
may even be endowed with mystical properties. The first products of a company. Prizes won in 
grueling challenges and so on are all artifacts. Artifacts of creativity may be instances of 
previous successes and failures. Failures are important as learning opportunities and may be thus 
imbued with special meaning. 
 
Symbols 
 
Symbols, like artifacts, are things which act as triggers to remind people in the culture of its 
rules, beliefs, etc. They act as a shorthand way to keep people aligned. There may be many 
symbols around an organization, from pictures of products on the walls to the words and 
handshakes used in greeting cultural members from around the world. Creative symbols include 
artwork, architecture, furnishings and other aspects of the environment. Frivolity and intrigue 
appear on desks and walls. 
 
Since we are already undertaking a study of theoretical-analytical paradigm of Inter-Culturalism 
and its relation to Human Rights Discourse, here are a set of Contemporary Issues, which could, 
directly or indirectly, relate to the process in question -- Contemporary Critical Issues: Modes of 
60 
The Dynamic Notion of Cultural Identity: Implications for Human Rights 
Dhruv Pande LUISS Guido Carli 
 
Contention  Religious Tolerance  The Debate on National Identity  The Status of 
Immigrants  The Status of Refugees/Asylum seekers 
 The Right to Self-Determination  Protective Discrimination  Cultural Citizenship 
 An Alternative Displaced Identity  Mechanistic Homogeneous Institutional Framework 
 The Gap between Generations  
 
"Understand the differences; act on the commonalities."1 - Andrew Masondo, African National 
Congress “The minister of national identity.....is also the minister of immigration” 
 
With a reference to these statements is reflected a tendency to develop an all-inclusive approach 
in creating a better understanding of the issues of identity and culture. However, one cannot 
dismiss the significance of academic analogies and references in awakening us to think and be 
more widely-read on the issues of Multiculturalism and Immigration.  
 
EVALUATION IN ACADEMIC TERMS 
 
Academic References and Relevance: 
 
First, I would like to make my own analysis as to why and what is the importance of these 
academic references to work in consultation with these Projects. Through these academic 
references, one can deduce the evaluation of this Project in terms of how relevant is this Project 
by undertaking a brief study of academicians, which have produced work based on Cultural 
Theories and Case Studies. Some of them are discussed herewith. First, I would like to discuss 
the need for these academic inputs and the relevance of this Intellectual Culture. Intellectual 
Dialogue and the Creation of a Culture: In the production of a body of knowledge, intellectuals 
create a 'culture', which is unique of them. Considering the contemporary Information-driven 
Age, the role of intellectual 'culture' cannot be denied in the creation of a knowledge-based 
society, or even, knowledge economy. One of the primary contribution can well be attributed to 
the exchange of ideas among the intellectuals, leading to a conflation of the knowledge-driven 
paradigm in the 'public'. Hence, this can also be accounted to the after-effect of an intellectual 
exchange, consequently leading to its recognition, by its implementation in the public, in its 
societal-pragmatic paradigm; the intellectual exchange based upon engagement in critical 
assessment, thus leading to remodulation of the existing, the essentialist. This after-effect of 
intellectual exchange is the pin-point of this paper, making it indispensable for reverting on what 
is 'dialogue' in the essentialist mainstream sense. This 'dialogue' is particular to the intellectuals, 
with an aim of creating an impact, not in its universality, but in its immediate particularity, the 
particularity around which it is thriving. 
 
The first reference made here is by an Indian Scholar, Gurpreet Mahajan. 
 
‘Rethinking multiculturalism 
 
Plural, diverse and multicultural are terms commonly used to describe societies that comprise of 
different religions, races, languages and cultures. In everyday conversation these words are 
applied interchangeably, the assumption being that each of these expressions represents the same 
thing – namely, the presence of many, different communities. While it is true that plural, diverse 
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and multicultural point to the existence of ‘many’, it is less realized that they embody three quite 
distinct conceptions of ‘many’.  The idea of multiplicity and difference that they incorporate are 
dissimilar in significant ways. Far from being synonyms they are discrete concepts with distinct 
meanings, contextual parameters and symbolic spaces. It is this dissonance in meaning that we 
need to apprehend if we are to understand both the discourse on multiculturalism and its 
relevance in contemporary political theory. 
 
While pluralism indicates the presence of differences, and tries to ensure legal equality for all the 
communities, multiculturalism goes beyond that. By pointing out that culture-based 
discrimination continues even when legal equality is ensured, multiculturalism has radically 
redefined the democratic theory. It has challenged the prevalent notions of citizenship and 
tolerance by promoting cultural diversity. 
 
The book by Parekh examines existing multicultural alternatives and tries to reconcile cultural 
rights with individual freedom. The author raises the issue of group equality by examining 
whether different communities occupying the same social space have the same status in the 
public domain. This is important as inequality often coexists with degrees of social and legal 
pluralism. Collective cultural participation does not mean the absence of hierarchy. It exists in 
the form of authority of the dominant community and the symbols of its power. This book speaks 
of issues that are central to democracy. The author has taken up new issues and has attempted to 
provide a framework within which the rights of the minorities may be discussed. 
 
She has raised a whole set of important questions about heterogeneous public culture as against a 
homogeneous national culture, about political and civil rights of the minorities and about 
discriminatory state policies. The author argues that individual rights and community rights must 
go side by side.’ 
 
The second significant reference is by Lord Bhikhu Parekh. An important book that deals with 
vital social and political issues based on the Indian experience Bhikhu Parekh ( Indian, based in 
London – Member, House of Lords, Westminster Parliament) Bhikhu Parekh's Rethinking 
Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory sets out to design paths for 
multiculturalism understood both as political theory and a framework for political practice. The 
past decade abounded in works on multiculturalism and the challenge it poses for the concept of 
society and its self-understanding; on cultural diversity and intercultural relations (including the 
dynamics of hegemony and recalcitrance); on social cohesiveness and collective identity; on the 
integrity of culture and processes of hybridization; and, last but not least, on the traditions of 
political thought nurtured in academia and implied in the structures of authority that 
contemporary western democracies have developed. Parekh's account of multiculturalism is 
located, then, on the highly contentious ground of debates within liberalism and presented from 
such perspectives as post-Marxism, postcolonialism, race theory and feminism, and from a wide 
range of disciplines: philosophy, political theory, cultural studies, cultural anthropology, and 
pedagogy. 
 
Parekh's book, set against the background of these current debates, is immediately distinguished 
by its coherence and lucidity. In the situation when so many critics bemoan the impossibility of 
arriving at a consistent language of analysis - not to mention a coherent perspective - in their 
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efforts to embrace the complexity of multiculturalism, Bhikhu Parekh manages not only to 
maintain the focus and order of analysis, he also succeeds in reading multiculturalism from 
within the liberal tradition and against it at the same time. This paradoxical agenda is Parekh's 
most consequential contribution to the multi-culturalism debate. Where other attempts to spin the 
yarn of multiculturalism out of the tradition of liberalism, albeit in most cases salutary, would 
leave us with more unease about the assumptions concerning the respectability of cultures, 
shared supra-particularist values, the nature of human nature (as a primary context for stating the 
rights of individuals and groups), and the most unfortunate and necessary question of tolerance 
(of difference and diversity), Parekh's analysis addresses these tender spots in the theory of 
multiculturalism, and, even if not quite resolving them, it proposes possible ways of handling 
them in practice. 
 
'Multiculturalism is about the proper terms of relationship between different cultural 
communities. The norms governing their respective claims, including the principles of justice, 
cannot be derived from one culture alone but through an open and equal dialogue between them. 
. . . By definition a multicultural society consists of several cultures or cultural communities with 
their own distinct systems of meaning and significance and views on man and the world. It 
cannot be therefore adequately theorized from within the conceptual framework of any particular 
political doctrine which, being embedded in, and structurally biased towards, a particular cultural 
perspective, cannot do justice to others’. 
 
 
A commitment to cultural pluralism 
 
All societies today are culturally heterogeneous in different degrees. Thanks to such forces as 
industrialization, the easy mobility of goods and people, and the global reach of the multinational 
media, members of even the most traditional and isolated societies are daily exposed to new 
ways of life and thought. The influence on their language, aspirations, patterns of consumption, 
life-styles, self-understanding and innermost fears is often so subtle and systematic that they do 
not even notice it. A culturally homogeneous society whose members share and mechanically 
follow an identical body of beliefs and practices is today no more than an anthropological fiction. 
 
In some societies cultural heterogeneity is not a result of contingent external influences but 
communally grounded. These societies include several more or less well-organized cultural 
communities, each held together by a distinct body of ideas concerning the best ways to organize 
significant social relations and lead individual and collective lives. Such societies are rightly 
called multicultural. While all societies today are culturally heterogeneous, not all of them are 
multicultural. 
 
Cultures derive their authority from different sources, of which two are currently the most 
important. Some cultures are based on and derive their authority from religion, and demand 
respect deemed to be due to religion. Some others are ethnically based, and demand respect 
because they are bound up with the life and history of specific ethnic groups. In yet others 
ethnicity and religion are integrally connected and provide a complex source of legitimacy. This 
means that multicultural societies could be multi-ethnic or multi-religious or both. Since 
ethnicity and religion are different in nature, multi-ethnically constituted multicultural societies 
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raise different kinds of problems to those raised by multi-religiously constituted multicultural 
societies. However since they are both multicultural, albeit in their own different ways, some of 
the basic problems they raise are broadly similar in nature. Multi-culturalism is not new to our 
age, for many pre-modern societies such as the Roman empire, medieval India and Europe, and 
the Ottoman empire included several different cultural communities and coped with the diversity 
in their own different ways. 
 
Anne Phillips ( London School of Economics ) 
 
Public Opinion in recent years has soured on Multiculturalism, due in large part to fears of 
radical Islam. In Multiculturalism without Culture, Anna Phillips contends that critics 
misrepresent culture as the explanation of everything individuals from minority and non-western 
groups do. She puts forward a defense of multiculturalism that dispenses with notions of culture, 
instead placing individuals themselves at its core. Multiculturalism has been blamed for 
encouraging the oppression of women-forced marriages, female genital cutting, school girls 
wearing the hijab. Many critics opportunistically deploy gender equality to justify the retreat 
from multiculturalism, hijacking the equality agenda to perpetuate cultural stereotypes. Phillips 
informs her argument with the feminist insistence on recognizing women as agents, and defends 
her position using an unusually broad range of literature, including political theory, philosophy, 
feminist theory, law, and anthropology. She argues that critics and proponents alike exaggerate 
the unity, distinctness, and intractability of cultures, thereby encouraging a perception of men 
and women as dupes constrained by cultural dictates. 
 
Opponents of multiculturalism may think the argument against accommodating cultural 
difference is over and won, but they are wrong. Phillips believes multiculturalism still has an 
important role to play in achieving greater social equality. In this book, she offers a new way of 
addressing dilemmas of justice and equality in multiethnic, multicultural societies, intervening at 
his critical moment when so many Western countries are poised to abandon multiculturalism. 
 
What are the fallouts? EXPECTED OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS – ACTIONS 
 
Relevance of the Action 
 
The problem of conflict arising due to the lack of communication among the personnel at 
workplace, and in the institutions of learning, contributing to a lack of coherence in policy 
decisions gives rise to the need for framing such a proposal. The relevance of this proposal 
would account for the far-reaching effects of a culturally-sensitive Organization, in the long run, 
and to work in a more emancipated environment, in the short run. 
 
The target groups are institutions of learning, schools and universities, and also International 
Non-Governmental Organizations. Furthermore, they would include Civil Society Organizations, 
Local Authorities, Government Bodies, University Training Institutes, Cooperation Agencies, 
Donors, Private Sector and Media Organizations. Now, we attempt to delineate the description of 
various actions to be undertaken under this Project, with simultaneously underlining their 
importance and repercussions they hold, for fulfilling the stated Objectives and Aims. 
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Description of the Actions and their proposed significance 
 
Visits to Migrant Centers 
 
Migrant Information Centre provide a range of services for migrants and refugees living 
especially in the suburbs of any big town in Europe. They usually aim to provide information 
and help on issues related to aged care & disability, child care, employment, English classes, 
volunteering, family support, health, housing, migration and youth services. They also provide 
facilities for meetings; information on migrant communities and support groups; computer, fax 
and photocopying facilities and support for clubs and community groups. 
 
Special Focus on Inter-generational activities 
 
Intergenerational programs are activities that bring together individuals of different ages as 
partners to explore, study, and work towards a shared goal. These activities foster cooperation 
and promote interaction among generations including children, youth and older adults. Programs 
can be youth serving older adults, older adults serving youth, or youth and older adults serving 
together. Some examples of intergenerational programs are: youth teaching seniors or providing 
chore service; older adults mentoring youth or providing childcare; and children, youth and older 
adults performing in a community theater group or working to improve the natural environment. 
 
Certain priorities would be given to environmental health hazards that affect older persons 
by: Examining the environmental impact of an aging population in a smart growth context. 
Encouraging civic engagement among older persons in their communities to reduce 
environmental hazards. 
 
To succeed with this the participation of older adults is critical. 
 
Many older adults give of their time to improve quality of life for themselves, their families and 
their communities, including protecting the environment. 
 
Hold symposia on youth from different cultural backgrounds 
 
The symposium will offer field trips and presentations on a wide variety of topics. There will be 
something for everyone’s interest! Presenters will be university faculty and graduate students, 
students, biologists, foresters, geologists, activists, artists, writers, and educators that represent a 
diversity of perspectives. The activity would be undertaken in the following manner, and with 
the following objectives: Designed and/or implemented by one or more students. Demonstrate 
initiative, creativity, and commitment by students on behalf of environmental education, 
scientific research, and/or environmental protection. 
 
Demonstrate collaboration with other students, classes and/or community members. 
Workshop for an alternative critical media paradigm 
 
Contrary to the illusion that media only 'mediate' what goes on in rest of society, the media's 
representational power is one of society's main forces in its own right. From this perspective, 
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media power is an increasingly central dimension of power in contemporary societies. Far from 
media simply being there to guard us against the overwhelming influence of other forms of 
power, media power is itself part of what power watchers need to watch. On this view, if we 
cannot imagine a society where media power is the first mover of social action, media power 
remains a very significant dimension of contemporary reality. In short, media power is an 
emergent form of social power in complex societies whose basic infrastructure depends 
increasingly on the fast circulation of information and images. It is with this view that a 
workshop on an alternative critical and constructive media paradigm will be conducted under 
this Project. 
 
Inculcate common universal values/ideals through a widespread Charter 
 
Subsequently, a widespread would be adopted in wake of institutionalising these ideals such as 
Democracy, Human Rights and Justice. This is so because in carrying out the actions and the 
expected outcomes, these are some universal values that run through these activities and they 
reinstate the need of these values to be incorporated in situations which are particular in some 
location or general, implying their wide significance in sultry other situations and circumstances. 
Replicate models of a considerable successful multicultural work-place. The nature of our 
workplaces has changed. We have moved away from the monochromic makeup of our offices to 
one that is now colored by team members from all over the world. With this new multicultural 
make-up come differences in cultures which in turn bring differences in areas such as 
communication styles, approach to time, managerial styles and a plethora of other cross cultural 
differences. 
 
Cultural awareness is now crucial if multicultural teams within businesses are going to maximize 
their potential. Although cross cultural differences do not always cause obvious problems, it is 
their more subtle manifestations that can and do lead to a lack of clear communication and poor 
performance. 
 
Why is Cultural awareness necessary? 
 
Cultural awareness is important to help members of a multicultural team identify where things 
may be going wrong or how to best leverage their differences. Without some sort of formal cross 
cultural awareness training it is difficult for multicultural teams to identify areas that need 
attention. Cultural differences manifest in many ways. Within a multicultural team, a person's 
cultural background will impact how they act and behave. There will be differences in areas such 
as communication, attitude to towards conflict, approaches to task completion and decision 
making styles. Unless people come to realize these differences between them through cultural 
awareness, problems can continue and even intensify. 
 
Cultural awareness in a multicultural workplace 
 
Building real cross cultural synergy is only accomplished through properly considered cultural 
awareness training. However, below are some suggestions for working in multicultural 
workplaces: 
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Building your cultural knowledge: Try and learn a bit more about other cultures and countries. 
Information is easily found on the internet and in books. You can also ask your colleagues. Start 
to build some sort of cultural awareness. 
 
Treating people as individuals: Information in other cultures is usually based on 
generalizations. This means that the information will not apply to every single member of that 
culture. Be aware of this and try and deal with people as individuals. 
 
Implementing your cultural knowledge: If you have discovered some useful information about 
a culture that is represented in your multicultural team put it to the test. It is only by putting these 
things into action that you will come to see the benefits and learn more. 
 
Withholding assumptions: Try to avoid jumping to conclusions about people. One of the first 
rules of cultural awareness is refraining from assuming one way is wrong and one is right. 
 
Avoiding blame: Blame is simply not constructive. When you see a situation break-down rather 
than apportion blame, pick the situation apart with your 'cultural awareness glasses' on and see 
what the cultural mechanics were. This helps resolve issues and act as a precedent for the future. 
 
Listening actively: Active listening is another cornerstone of cultural awareness. Rather than 
listening to people you should really pay attention to the words used, the way it is said, the 
context and also read between the lines. 
 
Relaying your knowledge: Work with colleagues in your multicultural team to relay knowledge 
to one another. Help build up the skills set of the team. Create innovative recreational activities 
among all age-groups An intergenerational activity program is one way to encourage physical 
activity among older adults. These programs can involve partnerships among students, older 
adults, academic institutions, and the local community. All partners must cooperate in order to 
provide an effective program. The overall goals of an older-adult activity program using students 
as volunteers, for example, could be (1) to positively affect the well-being of older adults; (2) to 
provide an opportunity for older adults to participate in a physical activity program that improves 
their quality of life; and (3) to provide an opportunity for students to learn about aging and 
history. Strategies for initiating an intergenerational activity program would include planning and 
development, orientation and training, implementation, and evaluation. 
 
Organize lectures on Multiculturalism from an academic perspective 
 
The Lectures, symposia and workshops will be conducted on Multiculturalism, in theory and 
practice to educate the youth on the contemporary relevance of Intercultural and Multicultural 
values and ideals, so as they incorporate the same in their day-to-day life and also impart on 
others around them, the similar values, resonating the need to live in this free multicultural 
environment, and open up the society to greater acceptance and viability of multiculturalism in 
practice. 
 
Undertake case-studies of multicultural societies ( also through video conferencing ) 
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Multiculturalism was adopted as official policy, in several Western nations from the 1970s 
onward, for reasons that varied from country to country. The great cities of the Western world 
are increasingly made of a mosaic of cultures. Government multicultural policies may include: 
recognition of multiple citizenship (the multiple citizenship itself usually results from the 
nationality laws of another country) government support for newspapers, television, and radio in 
minority languages support for minority festivals, holidays, and celebrations acceptance of 
traditional and religious dress in schools, the military, and society in general support for music 
and arts from minority cultures programs to encourage minority representation in politics, 
Science, Engineering, Technology, Mathematics, education, and the work force in general. 
enforcement of different codes of law on members of each ethnic group (e.g. Malaysia enforces 
Shari'a law, but only for a particular ethnic group). Hence, this includes undertaking case-studies 
of different countries in order to understand well the delicacy and sensitivity of a particular 
society, and create an environment of vibrant multiplicity of existing differing societies under 
one mosaic of Interculturality. 
 
4.3 EU-UN Legislation 
 
BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION 
 
In order to lay grounds for the Background and Justification of the Project, it is pertinent, first, to 
consider the provisions made in lieu of Intercultural Dialogue and Mediation, in the Official 
Documents of the European Union ( EU ) Conventions and Agreements. They are stated here in 
the form of the Title of the Agreement and subsequently, its appropriate provisions. They are, as 
follows: 
Council Conclusions on the promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue in the 
external relations of the Union and its Member States, 20 November, 2008 'As a comprehensive 
and consistent approach establishing specific strategies with regions and countries outside the 
Union with a view to clarifying objectives and approaches in the area of cultural relations; these 
strategies will in particular be tailored to the features and sustainable development prospects of 
their cultural sectors, to the state of cultural exchanges with the Upon and to their economic and 
social situations.' 
 
UNESCO: Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, 20 October, 2005 
 
Policy Decision : Celebrating the importance of cultural diversity for the full realization of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and other universally recognized instruments. 
Policy Decision : To reaffirm the importance of the link between culture and development for all 
countries, particularly for developing countries, and to support actions undertaken nationally and 
internationally to secure recognition of the true value of this link. 
Article 2 :Cultural diversity can be protected and promoted only if human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, such as freedom of expression, information and communication, as well as the ability 
of individuals to choose cultural expressions, are guaranteed. No one may invoke the provisions 
of this Convention in order to infringe human rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined in 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or guaranteed by international law, or to limit the 
scope thereof. 
Article 2 : The protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions presuppose the 
recognition of equal dignity of and respect for all cultures, including the cultures of persons 
belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples. 
Article 4: “Cultural expressions” are those expressions that result from the creativity of 
individuals, groups and societies, and that have cultural content. 
Article 4: “Interculturality” refers to the existence and equitable interaction of diverse cultures 
and the possibility of generating shared cultural expressions through dialogue and mutual 
respect. 
European Union: Council conclusions of 22 May, 2008 on Intercultural Competences 'the 
development of a lifelong learning perspective which includes the acquisition by all citizens of 
the key competences most relevant to intercultural competences and most likely to foster an 
appreciation of cultural diversity as a core value. 
 
4.4 Relevant Action Plan 
 
METHODOLOGY OF THE PROJECT 
 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Monitoring is the systematic collection and analysis of information as a project progresses. It is 
aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of a project or organization. It is based on 
targets set and activities planned during the planning phases of work. It helps to keep the work 
on track, and can let management know when things are going wrong. If done properly, it is an 
invaluable tool for good management, and it provides a useful base for evaluation. It enables you 
to determine whether the resources you have available are sufficient and are being well used, 
whether the capacity you have is sufficient and appropriate, and whether you are doing what you 
planned to do. 
 
Evaluation is the comparison of actual project impacts against the agreed strategic plans. It looks 
at what you set out to do, at what you have accomplished, and how you accomplished it. It can 
be formative ( taking place during the life of a project or organization, with the intention of 
improving the strategy or way of functioning of the project or organization). It can also be 
summative (drawing learning’s from a completed project or an organization that is no longer 
functioning). Someone once described this as the difference between a check-up and an autopsy. 
 
Ethnography 
 
Ethnography is perhaps the most important and most widely used qualitative mode of inquiry 
into social and cultural conditions, not only in the academic social sciences, but also increasingly 
in organizations and activities outside the university as well, from PARC to the Federal Reserve. 
There is no single definition of ethnography or uniform practice of ethnographic method, nor 
should there be: ethnographic practice responds and adapts to the field situation. As Marilyn 
Strathern has written, ethnography, through participant-observation, interviewing, and other 
qualitative techniques, is a "deliberate attempt to generate more data than the researcher is aware 
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of at the time of collection," and is thus eminently suited to the study of unpredictable outcomes, 
complex emerging social formations, and technological and market change. 
 
Open Interaction or Jestership 
 
The most powerful application of the jester concept is the creation of a culture of jestership in an 
organization. If the creation, acceptance, and support of jesters can be made a cultural norm, the 
entire organization wins. An association that makes jestership a priority for its staff can create an 
environment in which each staff member feels a responsibility and accountability to help their 
fellow staff members eliminate blind spots and is committed to do so in a way that is effective, 
supportive, and positive. 
 
So where to start? First, share the concept of corporate jestership with your staff, and ask for 
their support in making it come alive within your association. Ask each one of them to 
concentrate on developing skill at discovering, acknowledging, and addressing their own blind 
spots. 
 
Your staff will quickly discover that the very nature of blind spots make them difficult to 
illuminate by oneself. Even though your staff might have some wonderful self-reflection, they 
probably won't see anything but the faint traces of their own blind spots unless they involve other 
people. Sitting alone in an office or cubicle just thinking about what they don't see won't produce 
much revelation. Encourage your staff members to examine, ponder, and discuss jestership with 
each other. As some of your staff make a personal commitment to jestership and their own blind 
spots fall away, they will start to appear different. Others will begin to recognize in them new 
abilities, insights, and understanding. Those that did not commit to the idea of being a jester at 
first many soon show a new interest. Help them. Encourage them. 
 
Once you have a critical mass of staff members pursuing the ideals of jestership, you can 
encourage them to step into the jester role more publicly. This requires taking on a more open 
and active role as a jester in the association. Encourage staff members to speak their mind more 
often in staff meetings, invite them to challenge the status quo, and even encourage them to 
illuminate any blind spots you might be exhibiting. Remember to encourage and reinforce staff 
to take on this role with care, creativity, and grace; it can be very tricky or even dangerous if 
entered into haphazardly. Ask your staff to choose when and how to step into the role of jester 
and to always do so in a way that makes others feel valued and esteemed. Give private feedback 
as to the way they are being perceived by others as they try to take on the mantle of jester. It may 
seem a little daunting at first, but the more you continue to support and encourage genuine jester 
behavior, the more it will occur. As more staff participate, jester-like thought and behavior will 
spread throughout the association. At some point, if enough people adopt the paradigm, you will 
see a shift in the entire organizational culture. Staff will be more likely to be honest and open in 
discussions. They will be more forthcoming in sharing perspectives that differ from those of the 
majority opinion. They will be open to feedback and to aggressively addressing blind spots 
others help them discover about themselves and more likely to give you valuable feedback as to 
your leadership. Walking around a transformed organization, you will wonder just what 
happened. The truth will be that you happened. You made a leadership commitment to bring 
jestership to your association. 
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As the concept of the corporate jester is embraced in your association, you should make sure it is 
noticed, supported, and enshrined. Look for ways in which processes and policies can support it. 
Make sure new staff understand what it is. Help those who have not completely adopted it to 
start seeing it as a cultural expectation. Organizations that exhibit this level of cultural jestership 
are rare, interesting, and engaging environments to be a part of, and they are extremely 
successful at what they set out to do. I challenge you to make your association an example of one 
of them. So, are you ready? Put on your multicolored cap and get started. 
 
Inter-generational activities 
 
Intergenerational connections are magic. But anyone who has worked in an intergenerational 
program knows that magic takes work. If our goal is to develop meaningful connections, we 
can’t simply put different generations in a giant blender and hit the mix button. We need to 
prepare and take time to be thoughtful, intentional, and respectful. At the heart of the social 
compact is the understanding that our civil society is based on the giving and receiving of 
resources across the lifespan. We all need and, in turn, are needed at different stages of our lives. 
Intergenerational work demands that we recognize the inherent strength of each generation and 
the need we all share to be connected. Intergenerational work is about building bridges not 
barricades. It is about what is possible when we view people of different generations as pure 
potential ready to engage, not left behind to wait. In a world of easy isolation and quick, 
impersonal media connections, intergenerational approaches are proving once again to be not 
just nice, but to be necessary. Whether addressing a pressing community need, tutoring a child, 
teaching an older person to surf the Internet, or sharing a community building, the generations 
are meant to be together. Our communities and country are better served when we encourage the 
connection and benefit from the magic. 
 
Experiential understanding and empirical analysis 
 
The synergies generated out of dialogue and mediation; as in the fabric of dialogue and 
mediation, in other contexts and scenarios such as ecological, economical, other sectors of 
mutual interaction and reciprocity. 
 
Analytical methodology – improvisation 
 
Method validation is the process used to confirm that the analytical procedure employed for a 
specific test is suitable for its intended use. Results from method validation can be used to judge 
the quality, reliability and consistency of analytical results; it is an integral part of any good 
analytical practice. Analytical methods need to be validated or revalidated before their 
introduction into routine use; whenever the conditions change for which the method has been 
validated (e.g., an instrument with different characteristics or samples with a different matrix); 
and whenever the method is changed and the change is outside the original scope of the method. 
 
Principle of specialization and efficiency, based on differential human capacity. 
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Efficiency is an economic theory that states that the greatest benefit to society of any action is 
achieved when the marginal benefits from the allocation of resources are equivalent to the 
marginal social costs of the allocation. The principle of specialization means that in a 
bureaucracy all business assign certain people to complete certain tasks in order to have more 
productivity. This will maintain all bureaucracies to remain the same. Transport, personnel for 
administering the recreational activities, stationery, managerial tasks, well-versed researchers on 
conducting surveys, analysis of indicators The dynamic attitude, not static, even the stakeholders' 
perception will change, facts will change the inherent values. 
 
A New Theory of Justice 
 
Ever since the idea of constitutional justice has achieved the status of public domain, political 
parties, governmental departments, communities, groups, chambers of commerce, consumer 
sections, sectional movements – all look to constitutional recognition on their respective stands 
on justice as the mark of final approval. All other ideas of justice – moral, ethical, psychic, 
political, and economic – have given way to the most abstract form, the idea of constitutional 
justice. It is argued that the justice bearing provisions in the constitution are not to be understood 
as isolated dots; together with liberty-bearing provisions they are to be considered as an 
independent coherent domain with strictly determined connections with the entire domain of 
politics – leading, setting standard, evaluating the latter. As consequence of the preceding 
assumption, in this distinct domain of constitutional justice, we find the whole meaning of the 
constitution absorbing all history, at times all politics. This is a situation where we find a 
relatively robust tradition of judicial decision-making with the constitution as its warrant 
subsuming popular decision-making and popular politics to which the constitutional language 
hitherto had been less important. Our political practice has conceded authority over questions 
addressing the basic issues of a political life – to a trans-temporal practice of juridical language, 
called in a complete lack of humor, basic law. The rich political concept of justice suffers deficit 
in a double absorption: justice subsumed under law, and politics subsumed under 
constitutionalism. The result is the emergence of what can be termed as the emergence of 
governmentalised justice, in a context where the justice bearing provisions in the constitution 
have to depend too much on the governmental procedures of justice. I am to show in this paper 
how in post-colonial India the emergence of the justice-seeking subject is marked by the 
presence of the two forms of justice - governmental and popular-political. 
 
Democracy in a Multi-lingual Community, as an approach 
 
Languages and their diversity represent a significant problem concerning the delimitation of 
political communities, which I define as a group of individuals that are, or would like to be, 
bound to the same destiny, and that has developed, or would like to develop, common rules and 
institutions. In this context, political communities do not necessarily coincide with territorial 
states; they can equally be autonomous sub-state units, as is the case with several federal systems 
or even not territorially contingent communities. The aim of this paper is to explore the 
relationship between language and political community. This has become an increasingly 
important issue since linguistic minorities have become more demanding in claiming new rights. 
At the same time, the interconnections between different peoples have increased substantially as 
a consequence of economic and social globalization. 
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The problem of language is particularly relevant for those political communities that are, or aim 
to be, democratic. Popular control requires that, in fact, each individual had the opportunity to 
exercise this control and that the decision-making is carried out in the languages known to all the 
citizens. Hence, equality implies that all the citizens, regardless of their commands of languages, 
can effectively participate in the political arena. If these conditions are not fulfilled, democracy is 
hampered. 
 
Is a common language a prerequisite for the formation of a political community? History has 
shown that multilingual communities can prosper and grow: both the Roman Empire and the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire accommodated peoples speaking a variety of different languages: but 
neither of these Empires was democratic. Therefore - and more specifically - can a political 
community be multilingual and democratic at the same time? John Stuart Mill argued that “free 
institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a 
people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united 
public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist”. This 
project aims to re-examine this question both theoretically and empirically. 
 
In fact, many democratic communities have managed to flourish in a multilingual context. 
Countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, Canada and India are even taking advantage of the fact 
that different linguistic groups comprise them. In these countries, the variety of languages has 
been preserved, although some efforts have been made in order to allow each linguistic 
community to also acquire the other’s language as a second one. Multilingual countries have 
often opted for federal systems, which were considered an important condition to preserve 
variety. The most fascinating case of multilingualism today is represented by the European 
Union. It is here that a major integration process is taking place without making any attempts at 
imposing a common language (as it would generally happen in a nation-building process); 
instead, more value is given to language diversity. A comparison between multilingualism in 
India and in the European Union will be attempted. 
 
THE VIABILITY OF STAKEHOLDERS 
 
The importance of Stakeholders in this Project on 'Intercultural Dialogue and Cross-Cultural 
Mediation' is made viable with the holding of Information and Training Sessions, with 
Intercultural Dialogue, and promoting the fabric of Multiculturalism, in the backdrop. The 
primary aim would be to benefit Africa from this Intercultural Dialogue, we aim to bring about. 
Potential Stakeholders include ITC – ILO, Turin, ETF, Turin, Development Workers, CSOs, 
Peace-keeping Operations, NATO, International Civil Servants, Ministry of Cooperation and 
Development, Private Sector Employees ( Firms investing in Africa )with AfromediaNet as the 
Executive Agency. 
 
Trainers will include Members of Ladies' Panel, Journalists (AfromediaNet), University 
Researchers, Former Interns and Fellows (AfromediaNet). A deemed training of trainers on 
Intercultural Dialogue. (also including International Relations\Global Development), 
functionality from Brussels (Organisations’ Personnel), will be planned as the first major step for 
bringing together of Intercultural Approach, in a more concretised, coherent manner for stating 
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clearly the terms which will be followed upon by, in the forthcoming workshops/Conferences on 
the promotion and sustenance of Interculturalism in Institutions and other sectors of society. 
 
Keywords: 
Development Workers ( as a part of CSOs ), Military Peace Keeping Operations, for instance 
NATO, International Cooperation Officers ( specializing in International Affairs ), Private Sector 
Companies investing in Africa. 
 
4.5 Application to Institutional Frameworks 
 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
 
Overall Objectives: 
 
Enhancing Intercultural skills and competence of students 
 
One of the primary objectives of the project is to enhance the Intercultural skills leading to a 
greater competence among the Students of all disciplines in the Universities of Europe/European 
University Institutes. By Intercultural, we refer here, to the coming together of different cultures 
contributing to a more widespread plethora of skills such as learning, attitude, responsiveness to 
situations and others, which are based on the required intercultural exchange among students. 
This will lead to an enrichment of the academic life of students, by complementing it with this 
cultural dimension. Hence, this Intercultural fabric is a necessary component for the generation 
of a health-multifaceted young student, giving a variegated tinge to his/her personal and 
academic-cultural life. 
 
Strengthen cooperation between social partners 
 
In the development of a well-being of a multicultural community, the diverse roles of social 
partners is of utmost importance. Through this tool of Intercultural Dialogue, and subsequently 
cross-cultural mediation, the grid of social mobility will be strengthened. Explicitly, the social 
partners such as the State, the Civil Society Organizations and other non-state actors, will act 
more in a synchronized, coherent line of functionality. In other words, this dialogue, by 
harnessing on the principles of a conversation between different cultures, will lubricate the 
process of a more active cooperation among these social partners, by moving beyond their own 
frontiers and limitations. It will help in streamlining the trajectory of thought and actions among 
different societal partners committed to a single goal or to resolve a particular given crisis 
situation. 
 
Strengthen connection between education and labor market 
 
In the journey of considering the imprints of this Intercultural Dialogue, the next stage, which is 
pertinent, is the bond or a strong connection between the education and the labor market. How 
this will come about is the following: the intercultural dimension is already based on the 
underlining principle of the breakdown of cultural stereotypes, hence, leading to an increased 
exchange among the different social sectors, especially education and the labor, since the two 
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have a close interconnection in a way of education contributing to the labor and vice-verse. An 
open, multicultural educative human being will make a significant, different, authentic 
contribution to the labor ethic and a well-versed labor ethic will create significant parameters for 
the educative standards in reciprocation. 
 
Intercultural Dialogue and cross-cultural mediation at workplace 
 
One of the important objectives of this Project is the promotion of Intercultural Dialogue and 
cross-cultural mediation at the workplace in any or every Organization of Europe, rather the 
effects of which could also be replicated in other continents as well. The development of the 
intercultural skills, the solidarity of the social partnerships, and the strong connection between 
education and the labor market, would contribute to an ideal organization, a workplace 
incorporating the basic principles of this kind of dialogue and mediation. A workplace based on 
free and mutual exchange of cultures, reciprocity of cultural lineages and geared towards 
resolution of conflicts on an impartial basis, rather considering an equal and the opinions of all 
(from different cultures) especially in the resolution of a particular crisis situation. 
 
Intercultural Dialogue among Nations and a more close-knit civil society 
 
Considering the increased Intercultural exchange of the above-mentioned features, what leaves 
us herewith, is the situation wherein, it is the State and the non-State actors who will garner this 
Project to higher levels of functioning and applicability. This will provide considerable aid in 
promoting the values and ethics of Inter-cultural Dialogue at cross-cultural as well as 
transnational level, giving them a greater leverage and a greater profundity in everyday working 
of sultry other Organizations across all continents, thus making it a truly Multicultural and 
Multinational phenomenon. 
 
Education pursued through Intercultural Dialogue 
 
The facet of education, pursued through Intercultural Dialogue, is differential and unique, in the 
sense of its essential character of promoting an appreciation of different cultures through well 
placed. Educative tools in the institutions of learning such as the schools and the Universities. 
This can come about by inculcating a sense of shared understanding and mutual reciprocity 
among different cultures. This sense can come about only when certain tools such as intercultural 
activities, learning of intercultural attitudes and such other forms of interculturality are 
implemented through appropriate teaching lessons, which move beyond the text-learning and 
induce an intercultural discipline among the teachers and the students. 
 
Cross-cultural imprint in the work place 
 
In the work place, the first aim is to avoid any possibility of conflict arising out of the presence 
of staff of an office, from different cultures. A well-versed intercultural education would 
contribute to a well-versed intercultural work force. In the work place, in any institution or an 
Organisation, it is pertinent to consider this fabric of interculturality by employing the employees 
from different cultural backgrounds, and to inculcate a spirit of a joint force irrespective of any 
race, creed, colour, region etc. A cross-cultural work place is a significant factor in the successful 
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working of an Organisation, in its functionality and in its spirit. Through the exchange of 
intercultural factors of producing knowledge, an organisation can definitely benefit from the 
innovatine techniques and tools produced even during the course of any Project or work in 
progress, where all work together and are jointly responsible for any event or action. 
 
A civil society composed of primarily all the Organizations or Institutions under the name of 
'non-state actors' is a well-enriched civil society when it is based upon this notion of 
interculturality spread among different actors in the social sector. Hence, one of the primary 
aims, to make a better civil society definitely comes to be based upon the fabric of this network 
of a close-knit intercultural civil society, where the actors work in an environment which is rid of 
all stereotypes, prejudices, biases and in close connection with each other within an Organization 
and also, outside in explicating the dynamics of multiculturalism. Hence, a well enriched civil 
society can set further parameters in stating this intercultural dimension as an indispensable 
feature for the formulation of any work force in an Organization and to inculcate a spirit of 
commonality and sameness in sultry other scenarios. 
 
The factor of Interculturality is one of the primary factors in the contribution to the EU Global 
Citizenship. By Global Citizenship, we refer here to the more concrete, coherent EU citizens as 
the bearers of EU fraternity and solidarity, rather than ending up in divisions and fragments. 
Global citizens can effect change in the following manner. We cannot stop terrorism with more 
and better security and weapons alone. We must seek to change how people conceive their roles 
in society. We may understand the science of climate change, but understanding how to change 
ourselves is another matter. The Global Citizenship programme provides students with a deeper 
understanding of the cultural and political dimensions of change, and of their potential role in 
developing a conception of citizenship geared to the needs of a rapidly globalizing world. 
 
The significant shift in the profile of the youth can come about by facilitating youth participation 
and intergenerational partnerships in global decision-making. This can be furthered by 
supporting collaborations among diverse youth organizations; and providing tools, resources, and 
recognition for positive youth action. 
 
Technology has made the media the most important immediate influence on opinions and 
understanding in the industrialized world and has significantly heightened media impact in the 
developing countries as well. Media has a powerful capacity to encourage global awareness 
thereby promoting cross-cultural understanding, tolerance and acceptance of ethnic, cultural, 
religious and gender differences in communities across the globe. By disseminating messages 
that create and reinforce negative stereotypes and perpetuate misconceptions, the media 
frustrates dialogue and works against mutual understanding 
 
The media is, therefore a crucial arena for challenging prevailing attitudes regarding the many 
“others” across the globe. Individuals do not simply hold intellectual beliefs about peoples in 
distant lands, but rather, they have strong emotional responses to divisions that are perpetuated in 
the media. One critical example is the influential idea of the clash of civilizations, which has 
spread out of the domain of news journalism and into all other forms of media. At the same time, 
while appreciating the significant power of the media, it is important to recognize that people 
around the world can have an impact on the media. Where the media grossly distorts or 
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withholds information, civil society may be able to take action such as barraging the media with 
letters or emails or boycotting the media corporations responsible for disseminating caricatures 
and misrepresentations. Hence, the role of media besides being more open and interactive, is also 
under constant scrutiny and check by the public to push media in order to play a constructive role 
in the society. 
 
Specific Objective 
 
Promotion of inter-culturality among youth through education, labor sector, the media and 
the civil society 
 
Keeping this specific objective in mind, one can identify the specific goal, with which this 
Project aims to be associated and work for, in a single, coherent direction. The basic aim is to 
promote interculturality among the youth through the insitutionalised sectors as mentioned 
above. In each of these institutional frameworks, all attempts would be made therein, to promote 
features of cross-cultural interaction among the youth. Hence, this accounts for the specific 
objective of this Project, which arises out of all the overall general objectives mentioned above. 
Furthermore, it would be seen that how this Interculturality comes to be complemented with the 
concept of Human Rights, in theory and in practice, in the subsequent stages of its formulation. 
Thus, a trajectory would be attempted to be drawn wherein, this significant parameter of 
Interculturality finds its companion and follows steps in consonance with the Human Rights 
Phenomenon 
 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
 
Overall Objectives: 
 
Enhancing Intercultural skills and competence of students 
 
One of the primary objectives of the project is to enhance the Intercultural skills leading to a 
greater competence among the Students of all disciplines in the Universities of Europe/European 
University Institutes. By Intercultural, we refer here, to the coming together of different cultures 
contributing to a more widespread plethora of skills such as learning, attitude, responsiveness to 
situations and others, which are based on the required intercultural exchange among students. 
This will lead to an enrichment of the academic life of students, by complementing it with this 
cultural dimension. Hence, this Intercultural fabric is a necessary component for the generation 
of a health-multifaceted young student, giving a variegated tinge to his/her personal and 
academic-cultural life. 
 
Strengthen cooperation between social partners 
 
In the development of a well-being of a multicultural community, the diverse roles of social 
partners is of utmost importance. Through this tool of Intercultural Dialogue, and subsequently 
cross-cultural mediation, the grid of social mobility will be strengthened. Explicitly, the social 
partners such as the State, the Civil Society Organizations and other non-state actors, will act 
more in a synchronized, coherent line of functionality. In other words, this dialogue, by 
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harnessing on the principles of a conversation between different cultures, will lubricate the 
process of a more active cooperation among these social partners, by moving beyond their own 
frontiers and limitations. It will help in streamlining the trajectory of thought and actions among 
different societal partners committed to a single goal or to resolve a particular given crisis 
situation. 
 
Strengthen connection between education and labor market 
 
In the journey of considering the imprints of this Intercultural Dialogue, the next stage, which is 
pertinent, is the bond or a strong connection between the education and the labor market. How 
this will come about is the following: the intercultural dimension is already based on the 
underlining principle of the breakdown of cultural stereotypes, hence, leading to an increased 
exchange among the different social sectors, especially education and the labor, since the two 
have a close interconnection in a way of education contributing to the labor and vice-verse. An 
open, multicultural educative human being will make a significant, different, authentic 
contribution to the labor ethic and a well-versed labor ethic will create significant parameters for 
the educative standards in reciprocation. 
 
Intercultural Dialogue and cross-cultural mediation at workplace 
 
One of the important objective of this Project is the promotion of Intercultural Dialogue and 
cross-cultural mediation at the workplace in any or every Organization of Europe, rather the 
effects of which could also be replicated in other continents as well. The development of the 
intercultural skills, the solidarity of the social partnerships, and the strong connection between 
education and the labor market, would contribute to an ideal organization, a workplace 
incorporating the basic principles of this kind of dialogue and mediation. A workplace based on 
free and mutual exchange of cultures, reciprocity of cultural lineages and geared towards 
resolution of conflicts on an impartial basis, rather considering an equal and the opinions of all ( 
from different cultures ) especially in the resolution of a particular crisis situation. 
 
Intercultural Dialogue among Nations and a more close-knit civil society 
 
Considering the increased Intercultural exchange of the above-mentioned features, what leaves 
us herewith, is the situation wherein, it is the State and the non-State actors who will garner this 
Project to higher levels of functioning and applicability. This will provide considerable aid in 
promoting the values and ethics of Inter-cultural Dialogue at cross-cultural as well as 
transnational level, giving them a greater leverage and a greater profundity in everyday working 
of sultry other Organizations across all continent, thus making it a truly Multicultural and 
Multinational phenomenon. 
 
Education pursued through Intercultural Dialogue 
 
The facet of education, pursued through Intercultural Dialogue, is differential and unique, in the 
sense of its essential character of promoting an appreciation of different cultures through well 
places educative tools in the institutions of learning such as the schools and the Universities. This 
can come about by inculcating a sense of shared understanding and mutual reciprocity among 
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different cultures. This sense can come about only when certain tools such as intercultural 
activities, learning of intercultural attitudes and such other forms of interculturality are 
implemented through appropriate teaching lessons, which move beyond the text-learning and 
induce an intercultural discipline among the teachers and the students. 
 
Cross-cultural imprint in the work place 
 
In the work place, the first aim is to avoid any possibility of conflict arising out of the presence 
of staff of an office, from different cultures. A well-versed intercultural education would 
contribute to a well-versed intercultural work force. In the work place, in any institution or an 
Organization, it is pertinent to consider this fabric of interculturality by employing the employees 
from different cultural backgrounds, and to inculcate a spirit of a joint force irrespective of any 
race, creed, color, region etc. A cross-cultural work place is a significant factor in the successful 
working of an Organization, in its functionality and in its spirit. Through the exchange of 
intercultural factors of producing knowledge, an organization can definitely benefit from the 
innovating techniques and tools produced even during the course of any Project or work in 
progress, where all work together and are jointly responsible for any event or action. 
 
A well enriched civil society 
 
A civil society composed of primarily all the Organizations or Institutions under the name of 
'non-state actors' is a well-enriched civil society when it is based upon this notion of 
interculturality spread among different actors in the social sector. Hence, one of the primary 
aims, to make a better civil society definitely comes to be based upon the fabric of this network 
of a close-knit intercultural civil society, where the actors work in an environment which is rid of 
all stereotypes, prejudices, biases and in close connection with each other within an Organization 
and also, outside in explicating the dynamics of multiculturalism. 
 
Significant contribution to EU Global Citizenship 
 
The factor of Interculturality is one of the primary factors in the contribution to the EU Global 
Citizenship. By Global Citizenship, we refer here to the more concrete, coherent EU citizens as 
the bearers of EU fraternity and solidarity, rather than ending up in divisions and fragments. 
Global citizens can effect change in the following manner. We cannot stop terrorism with more 
and better security and weapons alone. We must seek to change how people conceive their roles 
in society. We may understand the science of climate change, but understanding how to change 
ourselves is another matter. The Global Citizenship programme provides students with a deeper 
understanding of the cultural and political dimensions of change, and of their potential role in 
developing a conception of citizenship geared to the needs of a rapidly globalizing world. 
 
Shift in the profile of the Youth 
 
The significant shift in the profile of the youth can come about by facilitating youth participation 
and intergenerational partnerships in global decision-making. This can be furthered by 
supporting collaborations among diverse youth organizations; and providing tools, resources, and 
recognition for positive youth action. 
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Showcasing of this implied inter-culturality by the media 
 
Technology has made the media the most important immediate influence on opinions and 
understanding in the industrialized world and has significantly heightened media impact in the 
developing countries as well. Media has a powerful capacity to encourage global awareness 
thereby promoting cross-cultural understanding, tolerance and acceptance of ethnic, cultural, 
religious and gender differences in communities across the globe. By disseminating messages 
that create and reinforce negative stereotypes and perpetuate misconceptions, the media 
frustrates dialogue and works against mutual understanding. The media is, therefore a crucial 
arena for challenging prevailing attitudes regarding the many “others” across the globe. 
 
Individuals do not simply hold intellectual beliefs about peoples in distant lands, but rather, they 
have strong emotional responses to divisions that are perpetuated in the media. One critical 
example is the influential idea of the clash of civilizations, which has spread out of the domain of 
news journalism and into all other forms of media. At the same time, while appreciating the 
significant power of the media, it is important to recognize that people around the world can 
have an impact on the media. Where the media grossly distorts or withholds information, civil 
society may be able to take action such as barraging the media with letters or emails or 
boycotting the media corporations responsible for disseminating caricatures and 
misrepresentations. Hence, the role of media besides being more open and interactive, is also 
under constant scrutiny and check by the public to push media in order to play a constructive role 
in the society. 
 
How well have we been able to deduce a relationship between the theory put forth and its impact 
on the Project credentials, can be analyzed in the Conclusion, which highlights apart from the 
bridging gap between theory and practice, other ethical ramifications to preserve such an 
identity. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion: Moral Justification to Preserving ‘Cultural Identity’ 
In conclusion, we juxtapose a situation where we try to posit a view of this dynamic cultural 
identity in light of the fact that how morally valid it is, to preserve this identity. What are the 
grounds on which we should claim a right to preserve this identity rather more implicitly than in 
any other fashion.  
As Thomas Nagel puts it --‘I believe it is most accurate to think of rights as aspects of status—
part of what is involved in being a member of the moral community. The idea of rights expresses 
a particular conception of the kind of place that should be occupied by individuals in a moral 
system—how their lives, actions and interests should be recognized by the system of justification 
and authorization that constitutes a morality. Moral status, as conferred by moral rights, is 
formally analogous to legal status, as conferred by legal rights, except that it is not contingent on 
social practices. It is a universal normative condition, consisting of what is permitted to be done 
to persons, what persons are permitted to do, what sorts of justifications are required for 
preventing them from doing what they want, and so forth.’ Thomas Nagel, “Personal Rights and 
Public Space,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 24, no. 2. (Spring 1995). 
 
Hence, there are primarily three categories in which we can distinguish the moral claims to 
preserve this identity. We start with the category on ‘Status, Respect and Dignity’.  
 
5.1 Status, Respect and Dignity 
 
Colin Bird advances two main claims. The first is that once we understand the way in which the 
concept of respect characteristically functions, He suggests that we can make sense of the idea of 
respect for “identity” or “difference” only by threatening the sort of egalitarianism. So here, the 
aim is to expose a more general tension between egalitarianism and identity-based conceptions 
of respect. The second claim is that even the sort of egalitarianism involved in Kantian ideals of 
respect for persons is itself parasitic on a presupposed status hierarchy. In order to forestall any 
misunderstanding on this score, he wishes to make it crystal clear at the outset that this second 
claim asserts a conceptual hypothesis, not a substantive criticism. That is, in claiming that the 
concept of respect may be bound up with a certain sort of hierarchy even in the context of 
Kantian “equal respect,” I am neither denying that the Kantian position is genuinely egalitarian 
nor somehow attempting to undermine it. I am merely seeking to uncover a property of the 
conceptual mechanics that hold ideals of equal respect in place. If successful, my argument 
identifies a feature of our notion of equal respect, not a reason to reject it. We are accustomed to 
contrasting equality and hierarchy; but there can be equality within hierarchy, and this, he 
suggests, is exactly how it is with our concept of equal respect. 
 
These considerations reveal that despite the important differences Darwall identifies between the 
two kinds of respect, an affinity between respect and hierarchy persists even in the case of 
Kantian moral recognition respect. Implicit in the idea that something is reckonable is the idea 
that it rates highly in some presupposed rank-order of considerations bearing upon deliberation. 
So to say that authoritative instructions, or the special moral standing of persons as ends in 
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themselves, are worthy of respect is to imply that they are particularly impressive considerations, 
capable of pre-empting or “trumping” others. Respect as a deliberative disposition therefore 
involves a sensitivity to the relative urgency with which reckonable considerations command our 
attention and the order in which some of them pre-empt others. He puts himself in a position to 
address the issues raised, where he asks why it seems so natural to characterize the deliberative 
disposition celebrated by Kantians as a form of “respect” for persons. ‘To say that we should be 
respectfully disposed toward persons in thinking about how to act in a given case is to recognize 
the way in which their presence commands our attention and exerts control over our choices. The 
“proper thinking” required by the Kantian disposition of respect for persons, then, is a matter of 
recognizing, in proper order, the sources of reasons to which our judgments must submit.’ 
 
Conversely, to be an object of this sort of respect is to be in a position to invoke one’s own 
personality as grounds for expecting others to (not) act in certain ways and for pre-empting some 
of their possible choices in a defined range of cases. On this view, moral persons bear a form of 
authority before which suitably “respectful” others (to use a famous Kantian metaphor) “bend 
the knee.” To see how this appeal to the generalized other can still explain identity based 
oppression, consider the way in which multiculturalists often stress the “dialogical” structure of 
identity formation. Thus Charles Taylor notes that My sense of who I am is partly a function of 
how I am defined within a context of discourse. When that discourse “mirrors back to me a 
confining, or demeaning or contemptible picture” of who I am, I become the target of a certain 
kind of disrespect.  
 
But here, the liberal will deny that the problem consists in a failure on the part of the participants 
in this discourse to “respect my identity,” as if my identity was an independently reckon worthy 
consideration to which the discourse was somehow responsible for attending. Rather, the 
problem seems to lie in the process of identity formation itself, for it is this that creates the 
demeaning self-image along with the associated stigma. From this angle, the contempt to which 
the bearer of this stigma is subject is wrong, not because their “social identity” is not being 
appropriately respected, but rather because in such cases their socially constructed identity 
precludes their recognition as a civic equal. If we construe the problem in these terms, the 
appropriate remedy would seem to be to encourage people to set aside the victim’s social 
identity, for in this sort of case it is the source of the problem rather than its solution. 
 
After all, the objections offered here apply to any conception that calls for respect for an 
“identity,” and on this point liberals and multiculturalists ultimately find themselves in the same 
boat. This reply assumes that the liberal account of equal respect is itself based upon a call to 
respect people in virtue of some aspect of their identity. This assumption undergirds the familiar 
characterization of the dispute between liberals and multiculturalists as a debate over whether 
people are owed respect in virtue of what they share or in virtue of what differentiates them. 
 
Thus it has become common to summarize the debate in terms of a confrontation between views 
that focus on “sameness” or “difference.” On this construal, when liberals call for “blindness to 
difference” they are attempting to bracket all those features of peoples’ identities that 
differentiate them from each other. Respect for Benhabib’s “generalized other” turns out to 
involve respect for a residual common identity. If this is an appropriate way to characterize the 
liberal position, then the same problems I have exposed in the multiculturalist idea of respect for 
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particular identity would seem to infect the liberal view as well. The fact that certain identities 
are shared rather than differentiating does not automatically make them unambiguously reckon 
worthy. So if identity per se is a practically indeterminate consideration, this indeterminacy is 
just as likely to disturb liberal accounts of equal respect as multiculturalist ones. 
 
For example, one’s citizenship very often becomes a part of one’s identity—citing my 
citizenship may legitimately serve as part of an answer to the question, “Who am I?” This is the 
case even though strictly speaking to be a citizen of a country is primarily to enjoy a status vis-à-
vis other citizens and noncitizens. But from the fact that a status claim may generate an identity 
claim it doesn’t follow that we can’t distinguish between them, nor that claims about status entail 
claims about identity. Bypassing identity in this way allows liberals to avoid the problems and 
unclarities inherent in the idea of respect for identities and differences. For the principle “treat 
individuals in accordance with their status” is far less likely to be indeterminate in the way that 
treatment “in accordance with identity” seems to be. The reason is that a person’s status can be 
directive in something like the way that authority claims are: that is why it makes sense for 
Kantians to talk of individuals’ dignity (which is of course a status) as commanding attitudes of 
respect. Status can be directive like this because to enjoy a certain status just is for there to be an 
expectation that others treat one in certain ways. Thus one way to describe a person’s status is to 
supply an inventory of their rights, privileges, and the various other legal and moral claims they 
may make upon institutions and other individuals. 
 
Moreover, status admits of comparison such that the treatment one person can expect to 
command can be judged against that which others can expect to command. Comparisons of this 
kind allow us make sense of equalities and inequalities of status. Neither of these seems true for 
identity. A person’s identities and differences don’t generate automatic expectations about how 
they are to be treated: discursive or deliberative interaction with features of people’s identity is 
inevitably open- ended and unruly. Further, since accounts of identities and differences will be 
assemblages of propositions shot through with historical contingency and cultural 
incommensurability, it’s hard to see what sense can be attached to the idea of “equalizing” the 
recognition of identity and difference. 
 
Finally, it is important to remember that in daily life agents are embedded within a dense 
network of status hierarchies, many of which are highly stratified and inegalitarian. These are 
both manifestations of social power and conduits through which power flows - for, as argued 
here, to have a certain status is to be in a position to command treatment of certain kinds from 
others. It is quite reasonable, then, to think of the ability to be respected in this way as a form of 
power and control. If we are going to make an issue about the importance of “equal moral/civic 
status” we need an account of how it relates to the much more tangible forms of status 
surrounding agents in their professional, personal, cultural, and institutional routines along with 
the relations of power they reflect. But we currently lack any canonical or agreed basis for 
translating claims about equal “moral/civic status” into defensible judgments about legitimate 
status divisions in this other less abstract settings. Rawls’s argument about the need to give a 
certain priority to the interests of the least advantaged groups in society remains a pioneering 
gesture in this direction. 
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Thus for him, a representative least advantaged person who does not receive the highest share of 
primary goods that his society’s economy could in principle bear is the victim of a certain kind 
of disrespect. In failing to do the best for her that economic circumstances permit, her fellow 
citizens fail to reckon properly with her moral status. But such conclusions have not gone 
unchallenged, and have met particularly strong resistance from those who claim also to be 
committed to the project of respecting individuals’ equal moral status before all else. The 
substantial disagreement between proponents of equal respect about what should be counted as 
fundamental forms of disrespect or impermissible status - inequality implies that our 
understanding of “equal respect” is underspecified relative to the (various) concrete political 
conclusions it is mobilized to support. These considerations, along with the arguments of this 
essay, suggest that it is time for egalitarians to leave behind the politics of identity and reflect 
more deeply on the politics of status. Any investigation of this social phenomenon has to 
embrace the assumption that the use of specific words and structures within the context of a 
certain discourse reflects each group’s support of its own political interests, cultural norms, or 
theological beliefs and attempt to discredit those of the other group. It also presupposes that a 
linguistic investigation will provide an in-depth understanding of these conflicts and that a 
careful selection of linguistic expressions will contribute to the conflict’s management, 
resolution, and even avoidance. 
 
5.2 Reducing Intra-Group Conflicts 
 
Putting some light on the Intra-Muslim Conflicts, the global Muslim community consists of 
people who have different cultural, linguistic, and religious backgrounds. This phenomenon may 
result in minor or major intra-Muslim conflicts characterized by linguistic expressions designed 
to present, either overtly or covertly, opposing positions that may have a considerable impact on 
certain conflicts. Hence, there is a need for extensive research that analyzes the implications of 
such linguistic representations within the context of how language can influence the initiation, 
spread, management, or resolution of intra-Muslim conflicts. Its influence is also recognized in 
reconciling social affairs and rectifying broken relations. 
 
Linguistic representation, in its capacity as a semantic symbol that conveys concepts, positions, 
and values, becomes a factor in both intra- and inter-Muslim conflicts among social groups. Its 
functions cover initiating enmity and turning a foe into an ally (and vice versa), thereby causing 
anarchy or war; stirring up social relations; and suspending, stopping, or avoiding anarchy. 
Ambiguous terms and slang may lead to conflict through a pragmatic interpretation or how the 
various linguistic groups or sub-cultural groups understand their connotations. Thus, a language 
of conflict emerges to represent action and reaction to the conflict in question. The effects of 
linguistic representation upon intra-Muslim conflicts become clear when we analyze the role 
played by linguistic expressions in conflict situations. How the language of conflict is used, 
however, depends upon the situation and the positions of each group’s members. In addition, 
some aspects of linguistic expression may symbolize certain aspects of intra-Muslim conflicts. 
 
Representing a conflict through language is not restricted to those who speak the same language, 
for it also exists among speakers of different languages. Such conflicts may be caused by clashes 
over regional cultural norms, conflicting religious beliefs, and conflicting political interests. 
Linguistic expressions of intra-communal conflicts among groups are fuelled by intolerance, 
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failure to reach a compromise, a conflict of interest, heightened tension in relations, or a state of 
war. The influence of linguistic expressions among rival groups extends to relations between 
individuals and nations, due to socio-cultural and religious factors. As a result, the ensuing 
reactions to expressions used to denote some groups, tribes, races, or members of certain 
religious sects reflects one group’s inner feelings and perceptions of other groups. The paper 
investigated the linguistic representation of intra-Muslim conflicts by analyzing the features, 
factors, strategies, and implications of utilizing linguistic expressions. The discussion and 
analysis reveal the impact of how linguistic representation is designed and then used to initiate, 
manage, reduce, or resolve intra-Muslim conflicts. The study confirms the role of linguistic 
representation in fostering good relations and mending worsening relations among Muslims, as 
well as in avoiding intra-Muslim conflicts and attaining a greater understanding of others. It also 
reveals the significance of studying the spoken and written discourses used in specific cases in 
order to examine the role of linguistic representation in certain stages of such conflicts. 
Constraints in preparing an extensive project on this subject lie not only in data collection, due to 
the many language communities involved, but also in isolating expressions of interpersonal 
conflict and prejudice from actual linguistic representations of conflicts among different Muslim 
groups. Other constraints lie in the classification of terms according to their utilization and 
implications, as well as in the likely cultural impact of language upon the project. 
 
5.3 Intergenerational Justice 
 
A political society is intergenerational. Citizens are born into a pre-existing polity that in most 
cases will continue to exist, perhaps for many generations, after they are dead. They obey laws 
and act in the framework of institutions that were brought into being by past generations, and 
their government makes laws that will affect the lives and relationships of future generations. 
‘We the people’ consists of a procession of citizens through time. But most citizens do not 
merely conceive of themselves as people who happen to share a territory and institutions with 
people of the past and future. They regard themselves as inheritors of a history and a political 
tradition. They understand themselves and their political actions in a historical framework that 
connects the deeds of past generations to their own deeds and to aspirations for the future of their 
society. They see themselves as carrying on a tradition, maintaining a valued institution, righting 
a historical wrong, or continuing a struggle to achieve a national ideal. They honor their nation's 
dead, or the dead of other communities to which they belong, and make sacrifices for posterity. 
They preserve their heritage and pass it on to future generations. Their government makes 
agreements and incurs obligations which succeeding generations are supposed to honor. 
Intergenerational relationships, and the obligations and entitlements that go with them, are 
central to the moral fabric of a political society. A nation for them is, in essence, a 
trangenerational polity: a society in which the generations are bound together in relationships of 
obligation and entitlement. 
 
It is often claimed that issues of justice between generations are special. Still, there remains a lot 
of work to do, namely, in identifying these special features and their normative implications. 
This is particularly important with respect to the possibility of intergenerational obligations and 
the content of such obligations. In this Introduction, we will simply adumbrate some of these 
features, inviting attention to some of their implications. The various chapters will then develop 
several of these points in greater detail. The unique features that distinguish issues of justice 
85 
The Dynamic Notion of Cultural Identity: Implications for Human Rights 
Dhruv Pande LUISS Guido Carli 
 
between generations from other issues of justice are often at the heart of key challenges. For 
example, some of these features potentially threaten the possibility of intergenerational 
obligations. Consider the fact, harmless enough at first glance, that future people do not exist 
today. The non-existence challenge implies that obligations can only make sense when they are 
owed to people who actually exist. People who did exist in the past or who could exist in the 
future would thus not qualify as rightful recipients of such obligations. Another distinctive and 
problematic feature is rooted in the fact that the composition of future generations (that is, 
whether it be Paul or John who comes into existence) depends in many cases on our own actions. 
This, of course, leads to the famous non-identity challenge. 
 
Thus, in deciding what to bequeath to our great-grandchildren, additional uncertainties obtain, 
such as whether their own parents will fulfill their own obligations toward them, how many 
children our grand-children will have, and how technological evolutions will transform society. 
Complicating these issues is the fact that both overlap (or the lack thereof) and relative 
remoteness in time can have different sorts of consequences depending on the theory one adopts. 
There are additional factors that will affect either the possibility of obligations of justice between 
generations or the content of such obligations, again with different impacts stemming from the 
application of different theories. Consider, for example, the ability of a theory to come to terms 
with an indefinite number of generations. Uncertainty regarding the number of generations is 
especially problematic for aggregative theories. If one cares about fairly dividing the 
intergenerational cake of well-being, it is important to know how many guests will be present at 
the table. Moreover, a non-ideal theory of justice needs to address the problem of noncompliance 
by both earlier generations and future generations. If earlier generations did not respect their own 
intergenerational obligations, should this affect the extent to which present generations ought to 
comply with these obligations? And should the likelihood of future noncompliance have an 
impact on the content or very existence of our own intergenerational obligations? Similarly, the 
sequentially of generations not only generates dependence on the behavior of earlier or later 
generations, but it also entails, for example, asymmetries of knowledge associated with variable 
time location (that is, someone tends to have more information about facts and events that are 
contemporaries to her than about those that would be  remote in the future or in the past). Finally, 
as mentioned earlier, time distance (or remoteness) as such (in addition to time location and the 
absence of overlap per se) also has implications, not only in epistemic terms (greater uncertainty 
about what is remote), but also in motivational terms. This is exhibited by the fact that we may 
care more about our close relatives than about our distant ones. 
 
As noted, these challenges do not affect the various theories in the same way, nor does each of 
these difficulties affect all types of intergenerational relations (with past or future generations, 
with overlap or without). For example, some theories depend less than others on the existence of 
an overlap. And we should not lose sight of the fact that justice between neighbouring 
generations is not, as such, a negligible field of investigation, as those insisting on justice 
between non-overlapping and remote generations may too quickly assume. Some theories are 
also less demo-sensitive than others, in the sense that they will render the content of our 
intergenerational obligations less dependent on the size of the next generations. And furthermore, 
some theories need to refer to obligations toward dead people in order to justify obligations 
toward future people, whereas others do not. In short, in studying the normative implications of 
each of the specific features of intergenerational relations, it is crucial to understand that 
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different theories of intergenerational justice will interpret each of the aforementioned 
characteristics differently. Moreover, what the particular implications are will also be important 
in assessing the relative consistency of various theories of justice. If a standard theory fares 
better than another in accounting for our intuitions of justice in the intergenerational realm, then 
this can be used as an argument in favor of this theory in general. 
 
Before moving to a presentation of the chapters of this volume, let us also explain what areas of 
the ongoing debate in intergenerational justice we do not cover. To begin with, we will not be 
looking at our obligations toward dead people, nor will we address issues of historical injustice 
understood as determining what one community owes another today as a result of what their 
respective ancestors did to each other in the past. These issues are important when we consider 
the history of slavery in the United States, the various forms of dispossessesion forced upon the 
aboriginal peoples of several continents, the inflicting of countless atrocities on those of Jewish 
ancestry and on Gypsies during World War II and, more recently, the significance of historical 
emissions of carbon dioxide. At the other end of the spectrum, we shall also leave aside the 
Jonassian issue of possible justifications for guaranteeing that future generations will continue to 
exist (as opposed to determining what we owe them if we can anticipate that they will exist). 
Furthermore, issues of justice between age groups, in so far as they can be separated out from 
issues of justice between birth cohorts, will not be taken up either. Social sciences tend to use a 
distinction between cohort effects and age effects. 
 
For example, it may be strictly due to age effects that a group of people suffers from deficient 
audition or poor memory. Whatever the cohort, people at the age of 90 tend not to have auditive 
capacities or memory abilities which are as sharp as those of people aged 20. Yet, it may also be 
the case that in comparing people at the same age from different birth cohorts (for example, 
those in their 40s born in 1920 compared to those born in 2000), some proper cohort effects may 
occur, for instance due to the intensive use of headphones at a young age in recent times, or to 
lesser memorization habits. It is often assumed that the difference between cohort effects and age 
effects may be linked to two distinct realms of justice, though this is far from certain. Yet, at the 
very least, this age-group/birth-cohort distinction should certainly not be confused with the 
distinction between overlapping and non-overlapping generations. Cohorts (that is, groups of 
people born at the same time) can overlap or not. Issues of justice between cohorts do not 
necessarily need to involve non-overlapping generations only. Conversely, when facing 
overlapping generations, issues of justice do not necessarily need to be analyzed in terms of 
justice between age groups. Here, we will limit ourselves to issues of justice between birth 
cohorts, be they overlapping or not. 
 
Moreover, members of communities have a moral interest in maintaining practices and 
institutions that enable legitimate lifetime-transcending demands to be made and fulfilled. This 
argument can be extended to include transgenerational obligations that people have as members 
of political societies. Trangenerational obligations arise in this context since members of political 
societies will have liftime-transcending interests. As such, they will also have a moral interest in 
the maintenance of practices and institutions that facilitate the making and fulfilling of lifetime 
transcending interests and that provide for the conditions that make the flourishing of these 
practices possible. 
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This understanding, it is argued, diffuses the non-identity problem, for this account allows for the 
possibility of committing wrongs against future people without harming them. It also raises the 
issue, however, of how we ought to understand our relation to those who will live in the distant 
future. In the context of contractualism, valid principles for the regulation of behavior must be 
justifiable to anyone on grounds that she cannot reasonably reject whether or not she currently 
exists. This means that even if we do not stand in any concretely characterisable relation toward 
future human beings, we do stand in a morally relevant relation to them, for those decisions that 
we make now, decisions that have implications for the quality of life likely to be available to 
them, must be justifiable to them by means of a principle that no one can reasonably reject. 
 
Finally, it is noted that the contractualist account developed here is identical to the one used in 
understanding interpersonal obligations that those living now owe one another. To the extent that 
this account is convincing, it implies that most of the interesting questions concerning 
obligations to future generations are not foundational in the sense that their justification is sui 
generis. Rather, the interesting questions are substantive. We need to enquire further into how 
best to specify our obligations to future people, given the special features of intergenerational 
relations. 
 
Hence at the outset it can be explained that the three dimensions of ethical politics find 
complementarity with the dynamic notions of cultural identity. Thus, a justification of such a 
cultural identity is credible on these moral ethical grounds. Therefore to conclude and to put in a 
open ended form we need to continuously engage ourselves in such a notion of identity laden 
with dynamic, changing and the questioning facts and values. 
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